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This study explores the subjective experiences of CBT therapists who have undergone 
personal therapy and seeks to gain insight into the significance of personal therapy in 
CBT clinical practice. Seven CBT therapists who have undergone personal therapy 
were interviewed. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was chosen to 
generate rich interview data. Participants were asked about their experience of 
personal therapy in clinical practice. Participants’ narratives were analysed using IPA 
to identify common themes. The analysis resulted in twelve interrelated themes from 
which three master themes emerged. The first theme, ‘Personal therapy creates 
conflict’, explores a paradox that arises between personal therapy and CBT clinical 
practice; participants suggest that personal therapy equips them with therapeutic tools 
that paradoxically hinder their capacity to practice a standardised protocol-led CBT. 
The second master theme, ‘Personal therapy ties me to humanity’, suggests that the 
gap between personal therapy and CBT practice narrows by participants’ ‘use of self’: 
calling upon their own vulnerabilities to forge fundamental connections with their 
clients based on the shared experience of being human. This study finds that all 
participants value ‘being human’ with their clients, however, struggle to find the 
space ‘to just be’ within an action-focused, goal-orientated CBT model. This is 
further explored in the final theme, ‘Personal therapy: Being and doing’. Potential 
implications of the themes that emerged were considered. This study contributes to 
the literature on CBT and counselling psychology, and to the understanding of a 
divide in the psychotherapy profession between evidence-based priorities and 
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Navel-gazing. A term that is often thrown at therapists to caution them against 
participating in excessive introspection at the expense of their clients. I was first 
introduced to the notion of navel-gazing in response to my research topic: why was I 
focusing on therapists’ perspectives rather than on clients’ perspectives? The fact that 
my participants are clients seemed irrelevant and dismissed by the fact that they are 
also therapists. This use of the term navel-gazing extends beyond a caution against 
self-indulgence and appears to undermine therapists’ perspectives by dismissing their 
position as clients, which I believe is an invaluable perspective. I was perplexed by 
the paradoxes that this notion presented: Are clients navel-gazers? Does being a 
therapist mean not needing therapy? Would you want to receive therapy from 
someone who has not had any therapy themselves? 
 
My perplexity resonates with my role as a counselling psychologist and my reflexive 
position in both therapeutic practice and research. Reflexivity represents the idea that 
‘the observer and observed cannot be separated’ (Donati, 2016, p.67). Reflexivity 
helps to manifest a reciprocal relationship that underpins all aspects of the counselling 
psychology profession (Kasket, 2012). Furthermore, reflexivity is an essential facet of 
qualitative research paradigms that recognise the centrality of the researcher’s 
subjectivity, understanding, and meaning-making to the research process (Donati, 
2016; Shaw, 2010). In line with the role of reflexivity in counselling psychology and 
qualitative research, it seems appropriate to introduce the reader to my research 
project through a personal, reflexive statement.  
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I initially became interested in the field of counselling psychology during my own 
experience of personal therapy years ago, which I then continued throughout my 
training. However, when I started working within the National Health Service (NHS) 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services I was surprised to find 
that, whilst my colleagues had years of clinical experience, most had never had 
personal therapy themselves. This sparked my interest in therapists’ work with 
vulnerable people and how personal therapy can be useful. I began to think about how 
my personal therapy influences my clinical practice. I started to notice when I would 
become aware of my own personal therapy in clinical practice. I felt that personal 
therapy facilitated therapeutic relationships, particularly when working with clients’ 
issues that touched on my own. But finding the words to describe how it was useful 
remained difficult. 
 
The topic of personal therapy in clinical practice has been a focus of consideration for 
over a century and has gradually developed into a controversy over whether the use of 
personal therapy amongst psychotherapists is beneficial and, even, necessary. An 
overwhelming body of research suggests that personal therapy is beneficial by 
enhancing professional development and relational capacities and decreasing chances 
of burnout and unethical behaviour. Today, personal therapy has become an integral 
element of most psychotherapy trainings. However, it remains peripheral to 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) training.  
 
CBT is the only evidence-based psychotherapy intervention recommended for both 
depressive mood and anxiety disorders and, therefore, has become the most 
commonly provided treatment within the NHS. Whilst personal therapy is considered 
 10 
essential in most trainings, it is not considered essential in CBT training. This appears 
to be part of a prevailing political culture within the field that seems to dismiss the 
therapist’s subjective perspective in place of formulaic solutions and appears to be 
affecting training and the latest generation of therapists without the opportunity to be 
questioned. CBT has a particular resonance at the moment, where the focus on 
procedures and treatment strategies can too easily be prioritised over a human 
connection, in which an intersubjective relationship between therapist and client is 
formed and developed. I aim to add to the literature by exploring the perspective of 
CBT therapists, a popular, yet under-researched group on the topic of personal 
therapy. 
 
Further in line with the reflexive nature of this project, it seems appropriate to offer 
the reader a deeper account of my personal motivation to explain my interest in 
developing this research. As a counselling psychologist, I have been trained with a 
relational foundation and hold a sense of responsibility to balance my subjective 
perspective with formulaic solutions; to marry the relational with scientific elements 
of psychotherapeutic practice. However, with this I have struggled. A split in the 
psychotherapy profession has emerged between reflective and evidence-based 
practices and the division of counselling psychology appears to straddle this growing 
division. Navel-gazing is somewhat symptomatic of this split; as if therapists should 
have therapy but also dismiss it. In my attempt to understand how ‘the scientific 
demand for rigorous empirical enquiry’ can be married to ‘a firm value base grounded 
in the primacy of the therapeutic relationship’ (Division of Counselling Psychology, 
2015a, p.1), I was drawn to ask CBT therapists who have had personal therapy about 
how they might balance the relational with the scientific.  
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The divide between ready-made solutions and human connection can be considered 
another symptom of a split in the psychotherapy profession that lies within the 
scientific paradigms, between quantitative and qualitative research. Curiously, I find 
that much of the research on the topic of personal therapy has adopted a quantitative 
approach, incorporating Likert scales and other ‘objective’ measures to assess the 
impact of personal therapy on clinical practice. Despite the many positive results, the 
literature struggles to determine whether personal therapy results in better clinical 
outcomes, in part due to the subjective and equivocal nature of the clinical experience. 
Rather than continue to try to prove this elusive link, perhaps it is more appropriate to 
ask therapists themselves about how they use personal therapy in their clinical 
practice. Therefore, I adopted a qualitative approach where semi-structured interview 
schedules have allowed participants greater scope to express the ways in which they 
make sense of their experiences, for a direct exploration of whether and how personal 
therapy might be useful to CBT clinical practice. I offered participants a way to 
convey what they have gone through, which, in exchange, offered me a way to 
consider and grasp what their experiences mean to them. I analysed participants’ 
accounts using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), which allowed me to 
produce theoretical frameworks based on and transcending this individual meaning 
making.  
 
This phenomenological approach seems to be at odds with the prevailing political 
culture, which prioritises a positivist approach to obtaining objective solutions over 
the subjective discovery of personal insight. In contrast to phenomenology, positivism 
is a deductive approach that depends on quantifiable observations to determine logic 
and facts (Ponterotto, 2005). These differences further seem to exemplify a split in the 
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profession that lies between what you see and what you don’t, body and soul, 
evidence and reflection; seeming dichotomies embedded within this research project 
that perhaps more appropriately prevail on a continuum.  
 
Within our culture, there is a seductive idea of a ready-made solution, the safety of 
knowing, which, in my experiences as both therapist and client, does not seem to 
mean much unless you have a human person caring about you. Learning how CBT 
therapists use personal therapy to inform their clinical practice may narrow the 
contradiction between the evidence-based priorities of the CBT model and its 
expectations of reflective practice; by offering a research-based understanding of how 
CBT clinicians incorporate self-awareness and interpersonal relatedness within their 
therapeutic work.  
 
This study explores CBT therapists’ experiences of personal therapy in clinical 
practice. The next chapter reviews the existing literature on the topic of personal 
therapy and the current context of increasing interest in the CBT, IAPT and positivist 
models of therapeutic practice. This is followed by detailed consideration for the 
interpretative and phenomenological methodology upon which this research project is 
based. The analysis of participants’ accounts is presented before inviting the reader 
into a discussion of what I learned from participants’ accounts and its clinical 
implications for CBT, the field of counselling psychology and the prevailing political 






The existing literature on the topic of personal therapy and psychotherapeutic clinical 
practice is vast. ‘Psychotherapist’ is an equally vast umbrella term that refers to 
trained therapists of various therapeutic approaches, including CBT. ‘Personal 
therapy’ refers to the psychotherapy undergone by such trained therapists and is 
generally considered an integral part of psychotherapists’ professional training and 
clinical practice. Yet, personal therapy has rarely, if ever, been formally encouraged 
in CBT training.  
 
Personal therapy has been linked to reducing the likelihood of blind spots and 
unethical behaviour in clinical practice as well as to the enhancement of 
psychotherapists’ self-awareness and interpersonal relatedness, identified in the 
literature as major contributors to therapeutic outcomes. There have been a number of 
studies attempting to explore the role and impact of personal therapy in the clinical 
practice of psychotherapists of various theoretical orientations. However, CBT 
therapists have received scarce attention.  
 
Whilst more traditionally emphasised in other therapeutic approaches, CBT, too, 
demands a high degree of self-awareness from the psychotherapist, especially in the 
context of working with clients with long-standing, complex problems. Furthermore, 
CBT shares with other psychotherapeutic approaches the central component of a 
collaborative relationship. Given the frequently cited research linking the role of the 
therapeutic relationship and the therapists’ self-awareness to clinical outcome, I argue 
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that more attention be paid to the role of personal therapy in the practice of CBT 
therapists. 
 
In this chapter, the notion of psychotherapy is considered before reviewing the 
existing literature on the use of personal therapy in general clinical practice and CBT. 
This is followed by a review of the current context of increasing interest in the CBT 
model as it relates to the development of the medical model and manualised therapies 
within NHS IAPT services. The literature on the use of personal therapy in clinical 
practice is then revisited through a dichotomous lens, between positivist and 
phenomenological perspectives. Lastly, conclusions and the research question are 
addressed. 
 
What is Psychotherapy? 
The NHS defines psychotherapy as ‘a type of mental health therapy used to treat 
emotional problems and mental health conditions’, and describes psychotherapists as 
the trained professionals who listen to a person’s problems and help that person to 
discover the source of a problem to find a solution (http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/ 
Psychotherapy). Holmes’ (2000) more expressively illustrates psychotherapy as the 
facilitation and strengthening of our personality to enhance our sense of autonomy 
and capacity to form greater intimate relationships. This definition signifies the 
psychotherapist’s position as a facilitator to enhance self-awareness, interpersonal 
awareness, and sense-making. In psychotherapy, our thoughts and worries are meant 
to be listened to in detail and taken seriously, to help us find meaning or coherence in 
what we find overwhelming and unmanageable (Richardson & Hobson, 2000). To 
offer this service to others, most psychotherapists are trained to tune into their own 
 15 
narrative style as well as to the various narrative styles of their clients (Richardson & 
Hobson, 2000), exemplifying its overarching value on individuality and uniqueness.  
 
The emotional component 
People who are emotionally distressed usually seek psychotherapy as a process to 
recollect, explore, understand and change themselves (Whelton, 2004). Research 
supports that the exploration and expression of one’s pain, loss and trauma, and the 
development of emotional experience into meaningful narratives, can improve 
psychological health (Booth & Pennebaker, 2000; Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker & 
Seagal, 1999). One of the most significant and consistent findings in the literature of 
the psychotherapeutic process is that ‘depth of experiencing’, one’s capacity to 
readily access emotions to form new meanings and solve problems, is positively 
correlated with therapeutic outcome (Goldman, Greenberg & Pos, 2005; Klein, 
Mathieu-Coughlan & Kiesler, 1986; Orlinsky & Howard, 1978). Therefore, a 
prominent aspect of the therapeutic process is the arousal and transformation of 
emotion (Honos-Webb, Surko, Stile & Greenberg, 1999; Stalikas & Fitzpatrick, 
1995). Castonguay, Goldfried, Wiser, Raue and Hayes (1996) further present a 
theoretical argument that supports emotional processing as essential to therapeutic 
change, regardless of the therapeutic approach. However, different therapeutic 
approaches conceptualise emotions differently.  
 
For example, the psychodynamic approach has long considered emotion to be an 
expression of a complex, ambivalent and conflicted inner motivational and relational 
world that must be acknowledged, faced and tolerated within the therapeutic 
relationship (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Sandler & Sandler, 1978; Stein, 1991; 
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Westen & Gabbard, 1999). In contrast, CBT has traditionally viewed emotion as 
symptomatic, troublesome and something to be tamed under rational control 
(Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000). Wiser and Goldfried’s (1993) study compared the role 
of emotion in the process of psychotherapy in psychodynamic-interpersonal and 
cognitive-behavioural therapies. Results indicated that affective experiencing was 
equally present in the two orientations. However, therapists’ clinical views of the role 
of emotion were dissimilar. Psychodynamic-interpersonal therapists viewed higher 
emotional arousal as more critical to the change process, whereas CBT therapists 
shared the view that lower levels of emotional arousal were more therapeutically 
significant. However, cognitive experts today challenge this conviction. CBT is 
becoming increasingly open to a more complex and differentiated view of the 
relationship between cognition and emotion (see Leahy, 2002). Overall, across 
theoretical approaches higher levels of emotional arousal predict better outcomes, yet 
it is dependent upon a strong working alliance (Beutler, Clarkin & Bongar, 2000; 
Iwakabe, Rogan & Stalikas, 2000; Mergenthaler, 1996; Whelton, 2004).  
 
  The relational component 
Greenson (1967) coined the term ‘working alliance’ to describe one of the essential 
components of therapeutic success: a positive collaboration between client and 
therapist. However, the significance of the therapist-client relationship on the 
outcome of psychotherapy dates back to Freud (1913/1958) and has become one of 
the oldest themes in therapy research. Interest was maintained through the writings of 
Sterba (1934), Zetzel (1956) and Gitleson (1962), and was also reformulated by Carl 
Rogers (1957) and his associates (i.e. Barrett-Lennard, 1962) to focus on the 
therapist’s capacity to be empathic, congruent and to offer their clients an 
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unconditional positive regard.  
 
Initially a psychoanalytic concept, the therapeutic alliance had spread into a more 
general therapeutic notion, and a significant indicator of therapeutic outcome, 
generalizable to all psychotherapeutic approaches (Bordin, 1979; Gelso & Carter, 
1985). For example, Horvath and Symonds’s (1991) meta-analysis of 24 studies 
related the quality of the working alliance to the therapeutic outcome and identified 
the therapeutic alliance as a significant variable linking therapy process to outcome 
amongst all therapeutic approaches. Reandeau and Wampold (1991) more specifically 
examined the therapeutic alliance in brief-therapy cases and found therapists’ roles to 
be inherently powerful regardless of a ‘high’ or ‘low’ alliance. However, client 
participation was positively correlated with the therapeutic alliance, which previous 
research had shown to be highly correlated with therapeutic outcome (see Gomes-
Schwartz, 1978; Hartley & Strupp, 1983; Kokotovic & Tracey, 1990; Moras & 
Strupp, 1982; O’Malley, Suh & Strupp, 1983; Strupp, 1980a, 1980b; Strupp & 
Hadley, 1979).  
 
The central idea of the therapeutic alliance focuses on the collaboration between, and 
capacities of both, the therapist and client to negotiate a contract appropriate to the 
type of therapy (Bordin, 1980; Horvath & Greenberg, 1989; Luborsky, 1976; Marmar, 
Weiss & Gaston, 1989; Marziali, 1984; Strupp & Hadley, 1979). Much of the 
research literature focuses on investigations of the impact of the alliance on 
psychodynamic, experiential and cognitive therapies (Greenberg & Webster, 1982; 
Luborsky, 1976; Rounsaville, Chevron, Prusoff, Elkin, Imber, Sotsky & Watkins, 
1987). These distinct therapeutic approaches can be bound together by a shared 
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emphasis on the therapist-client relationship; conceptualised as a vital context of 
personality change within the psychodynamic model; as a supportive and growth-
facilitating influence within the existential model; and as a precondition for the 
effective delivery of CBT interventions (Orlinsky, Geller & Norcross, 2005). 
 
Personal Therapy and Clinical Practice: An Overview 
Personal therapy for psychotherapists has been a focus of consideration for over a 
century. Freud (1912/1958) first proposed personal therapy as an integral element of 
professional development amongst psychoanalysts. This has gradually developed into 
a controversy over whether the use of personal therapy amongst all psychotherapists 
is beneficial and, even, necessary (Buckley, Karasu & Charles, 1981; Fierman, 1965; 
Holt & Luborsky, 1958; McNamara, 1986).  
 
An overwhelming body of research suggests that psychotherapists of all theoretical 
orientations who have had personal therapy find that it enhances professional and 
personal development and relational capacities (Farrell, 1996; Geller, Norcross & 
Orlinsky, 2005). Norcross, Strausser-Kirtland and Missar (1988) reviewed earlier 
sources (i.e. Fleischer & Wissler, 1985; Fromm-Reichmann, 1959; Garfield & Kurtz, 
1976; Shapiro, 1976; Wampler & Strupp, 1976) and summarised that personal therapy 
contributes to clinical practice by improving the emotional and mental functioning of 
the therapist; providing the therapist-client with a more complete understanding of 
their interpersonal dynamics; alleviating the emotional stresses and burdens of 
working clinically; serving as a profound socialisation experience; facilitating the 
internalisation of the healer role; placing the therapist in the role of the client; 
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increasing respect for client struggles; and providing a first-hand intensive 
opportunity to observe clinical methods, all of which are integral training goals.  
 
Many therapists find personal therapy to be the most significant part of their training 
(Macran & Shapiro, 1998). Yet, it has also been suggested that a mandatory element 
of personal therapy in training can have a negative impact on the trainee who 
becomes preoccupied with their own emotional turmoil (Strupp, 1958, 1973; Garfield 
& Bergin, 1971; Greenberg & Staller, 1981). Thorne and Dryden (1991) highlight the 
obligation of personal therapy in training as a guarantee for a systematic and thorough 
confrontation of the trainee’s personal issues. However, there is also concern that the 
lack of choice hinders its potential efficacy. Another argument is that a mature, well-
balanced trainee could suffice with a competent clinical supervisor, and find personal 
therapy unnecessary (Altucher, 1967; Glass, 1986; Leader, 1971; Traux & Carkhuff, 
1967). In fact, many psychotherapists choose not to undertake personal therapy, citing 
their own coping strategies sufficient to maintain their wellbeing (Norcross, Bike, 
Evans & Schatz, 2008). Many psychologists, however, report undergoing personal 
therapy for the purpose of managing mild ‘personal stuff’ and to enhance mental 
wellbeing (Norcross, 2005), not to achieve a training goal or attain a specific 
technique (Norcross, Strausser-Kirtland & Missar, 1988), but perhaps simply to be a 
part of the client experience.  
 
The research literature has also identified null or negative effects of personal therapy 
on psychotherapists. Four studies (Buckley et al., 1981; Grunebaum, 1986; Norcross 
et al., 1988; Pope & Tabachnick, 1994) that asked participants whether personal 
therapy had been harmful in any way showed that eight to 22 percent of participants 
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responded affirmatively. Buckley et al. (1981) speculated that unresolved conflictual 
transference feelings are indicated in harmful therapeutic experiences. Grunebaum 
(1986) found that ‘harmful’ therapeutic experiences cluster under five themes: distant 
and rigid therapists; emotionally seductive therapists; poor client-therapist match; 
explicitly sexual therapists; and dual relationships with the therapist. In a separate 
study, Pope and Tabachnick (1994) identified therapists’ sexual or attempted sexual 
acts, incompetence, sadistic or emotionally abusive behaviour, general failure to 
understand the client, and nonsexual dual relationships and boundary violations, as 
what causes the most harm. These are unfortunate but realistic insights into the 
potential dangers of engaging in an intimate therapeutic encounter; dangers from 
which psychotherapists are ethically bound to protect their clients and, perhaps, serves 
to support the use of personal therapy amongst psychotherapists: to diminish the 
chance of such dangers from occurring in their clinical practice.  
 
Due to clients’ heightened vulnerability, the therapeutic relationship can be more 
easily damaged by moments of misunderstanding or intemperate emotional 
expression (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 2007; Schneider, 1980). The 
personal therapy undertaken by psychotherapists can be the means for developing, 
refining and maintaining interpersonal qualities and skills at the highest level 
(Orlinsky, Geller & Norcross, 2005). For example, Pope and Tabachnick (1994) also 
found common benefits of personal therapy to include enhanced self-awareness and 
self-understanding, developed self-esteem and improved clinical skills. An 
overwhelming amount of research suggests that personal therapy significantly serves 
to enhance aspects of clinical practice that seem to extend beyond what can be learned 
to, arguably, what must be experienced: such as self-awareness of personal issues, 
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values, conflicts and defence mechanisms; increased empathy and interpersonal 
relatedness; and decreased chances of burnout and unethical behaviour (Bellows, 
2007; Macran & Shapiro, 1998; Norcross, 2005; Orlinsky, Norcross, Rønnestad & 
Wiseman, 2005; Orlinsky, Schofield, Schroder & Kazantzis, 2011; Rake & Paley, 
2009; Rizq & Target, 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Wiseman & Egozi, 2006; Wiseman & 
Shefler, 2001).  
 
Overall, many psychotherapists—approximately three quarters (Norcross & Guy, 
2005), report making use of personal therapy throughout the course of their 
professional careers (Orlinsky, Schofield, Schroder & Kazantzis, 2011) and find it 
both personally and professionally beneficial (Geller, Norcross & Orlinsky, 2005; 
Macran, Stiles & Smith, 1999; Norcross, 2005; Orlinsky, Norcross, Rønnestad & 
Wiseman, 2005). Yet, the proponents of different theoretical models assign various 
values and purposes to personal therapy (Malikiosi-Loizos, 2013). A US study by 
Norcross, Karpiak, and Santoro (2005) found that out of 646 clinical psychologists, 
100 percent of psychoanalytic therapists, 81 percent of psychodynamic therapists, 76 
percent of humanistic therapists, 65 percent of cognitive therapists, and 64 percent of 
behaviour therapists, had undergone personal therapy. Other international studies 
have revealed similar patterns. Orlinsky, Rønnestad et al. (2005) conducted a study of 
therapists around the world and found that 92 percent of psychodynamic therapists, 92 
percent of humanistic therapists and 60 percent of CBT therapists had undergone 
personal therapy. It might come as no surprise that the use of personal therapy is most 
popular amongst psychoanalytic/psychodynamic therapists, then humanistic therapists 
and, least, amongst CBT therapists.  
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Within the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP) all 80 member 
organisations have extensive personal therapy training requirements, except for one: 
members of behavioural and cognitive psychology. The CBT model’s traditional 
focus on specific therapeutic techniques to promote psychological change rather than 
on the relationship between client and therapist has served to downplay the role of the 
CBT therapist’s self-awareness (Rizq, 2010a). Meanwhile, the current position of 
personal therapy in counselling psychology is underpinned by the emphasis of self-
awareness in training and on the use of the self of the therapist in clinical practice 
(Rizq, 2010a). In fact, within the British Psychological Society (BPS), it is only 
members of the Division of Counselling Psychology that are required to undergo a 
mandatory period of personal therapy during training. The BPS (2015b) supports the 
use of personal therapy to develop greater self-awareness through the understanding 
of personal therapy from the perspective of a client; to understand therapy through 
one’s own life experience; and to be able to critically self-reflect on one’s use of self 
in the therapeutic processes. Counselling psychologists are required to maintain ‘a 
high level of self-awareness and competence in relating the skills and knowledge of 
personal and interpersonal dynamics in the therapeutic context’ (BPS, 2015c), which 
is potentially relevant across all the theoretical models they practice (including CBT).  
 
 A brief psychodynamic perspective 
Freud first posed the question how one could guide another through a process of self-
knowledge without having first gained awareness of his or her own hidden thoughts 
and desires. According to the psychodynamic model, personal therapy is thought to 
bring to light one’s internal subjective states, unconscious motivations, expressions of 
emotions and past experiences (Lorr & McNair, 1964; Sundland & Barker, 1962), as 
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well as to enhance self-awareness and one’s capacity to manage countertransference 
reactions (Kumari, 2011). This is especially relevant to psychoanalytic oriented 
psychotherapists, whose focus is on acknowledging and confronting primitive 
conflicts through the revelation of unconscious needs and desires, which requires 
them to deal with both their clients’ as well as their own unconscious process, to 
reduce blind spots and facilitate the client’s therapeutic progress (Orlinsky, Geller & 
Norcross, 2005).  
 
 A brief humanistic perspective 
The humanistic approach is based on the belief that as humans we possess an internal 
need and potential for growth, which is always present and creates a basis for 
therapeutic change (Malikiosi-Loizos, 2013). This philosophy of growth is built upon 
the significance of self-awareness, openness to one’s experience, and one’s lifetime’s 
task to actively work on oneself, and is shared between therapist and client (Mearns, 
Thorne & McLeod, 2013; Rice & Elliot, 1996). Therefore, the psychotherapist’s 
commitment to the personal growth of their clients must be matched by their own 
commitment to personal growth (Orlinsky, Geller & Norcross, 2005). Furthermore, 
personal therapy is seen to enhance the psychotherapist’s capacity to offer clients the 
core conditions of empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard, upon 
which the person-centred approach is based. The humanistic approach prizes the 
therapist’s ‘use of self’ as the most important aspect of treatment, which depends on 
the therapist’s capacity to acknowledge and distinguish their own unique feelings, 
beliefs and values from that of their clients, and to cultivate a relationship where 
clients feel accepted and equal (Mearns, Thorne & McLeod, 2013). Wiseman and 
Shefler (2001) suggest that personal therapy plays an important role in the therapist’s 
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ongoing process of individuation and in the development of the ‘use of self’, to 
achieve authentic relatedness with clients.  
 
 A CBT perspective 
Unlike the psychodynamic and humanistic approaches, the behavioural origins of 
CBT and the philosophy of science upon which it is based have greatly influenced its 
focus on the reduction of problematic cognitions and behaviours with well-defined 
and validated scientific techniques (Beck, 1967). The arrival of cognitivism in the 
1960s joined the behavioural movement and placed the study of human learning and 
cognitive knowledge at the centre of empirical psychological research. The study of 
‘automatic negative thoughts’ (Beck, 1967) identified how certain errors of cognition 
and maladaptive reaction patterns could be changed (Beck, 1993).  
 
CBT was initially established as a form of psycho-education, where therapists teach 
clients techniques to change attitudes, behaviours, and cognitions (Malikiosi-Loizos, 
2013). Its traditional focus on the amelioration or removal of specific symptoms, and 
the correction of irrational beliefs and faulty reasoning that give rise to symptoms, 
gives little reason to formally recommend personal therapy for therapists who do not 
currently experience overt symptoms (Orlinsky, Geller & Norcross, 2005). 
Furthermore, as the antithesis of working with the unconscious, this learning 
experience does not generally expect its therapists to be aware of their own nor their 
clients’ unconscious feelings and fantasies (Laireiter & Willutzki, 2005). 
Nevertheless, CBT has increasingly begun to recognise the significance of the 
psychotherapist’s interpersonal behaviour with clients (Orlinsky, Geller & Norcross, 
2005), especially regarding the therapist’s capacity for self-knowledge. The notion of 
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‘self-knowledge’ within the CBT model refers to the relational domain of personal 
and interpersonal sensitivities: to develop skills that support the therapeutic 
relationship, such as of empathy and of identifying inappropriate feelings towards a 
client (Bennett-Levy & Thwaites, 2007; DiGuiseppe, 1991; Malikiosi-Loizos, 2013).  
 
Although not formally encouraged, research shows that many CBT therapists do 
undergo personal therapy. In the United States, about 50 to 60 percent of CBT 
therapists engage in personal therapy at least once in their lives (Geller, Norcross & 
Orlinsky, 2005). Laireiter (2000) conducted a similar study in Germany and further 
found that about 50 to 60 percent of CBT therapists who undergo personal therapy 
prefer psychodynamic psychotherapy, compared to about ten to 15 percent who prefer 
to undergo their own CBT. To date, no such studies have been conducted in the UK.  
 
Nonetheless, there has been a recent emphasis on the emotional and interpersonal 
experiences of CBT therapists (Haarhoff, 2006). It has been suggested that CBT 
demands a high degree of self-awareness from its psychotherapists (Wills & Sanders, 
1997); and is of particular significance amongst cognitive therapists who work with 
clients with long-standing, complex problems (Beck & Freeman, 1990; Linehan, 
1993). Beck and Butler (2005) encourage personal therapy as an appropriate method 
of reflection within clinical practice. Although personal therapy does not have a long 
or deep tradition in CBT, it is increasingly becoming accepted as a helpful way to 
improve clinical practice (Geller, Norcross & Orlinsky, 2005).  
 
Current research shows that personal therapy has overwhelming positive clinical 
implications (Orlinsky, Schofield, Schroder & Kazantzis, 2011; Rake & Paley, 2009; 
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Rizq, 2011; Rizq & Target, 2008a, 2008b, 2010), yet there has been little interest to 
date on how it relates to CBT clinical practice. Whilst most European countries 
require an obligatory number of hours of personal therapy in order to become 
accredited or licensed as a psychotherapist (Geller, Norcross & Orlinsky, 2005), this 
does not apply to CBT therapists within the UK. However, in other European 
countries where government regulations on psychotherapy similarly exist (Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland), personal therapy is 
mandatory in becoming an accredited psychotherapist of any orientation within the 
health care system, including CBT (Laireiter & Willutzki, 2005).  
 
Orlinsky, Schofield, Schroder & Kazantzis (2011) conducted a large quantitative 
study with just about 4,000 psychotherapists across six English-speaking countries 
(United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) on the use of personal therapy in clinical practice. The highest prevalence of 
psychologists who had never undergone personal therapy was in the United Kingdom 
at 35 percent. Orlinsky et al. (2011) suggested this may be attributed, in part, to the 
comparatively greater salience of the CBT model in the UK. Since the initiation of 
IAPT, CBT has become the most popular therapeutic orientation in the UK and 
remains the focus of NHS mental health services. Clinical psychologist trainees are 
employees of the NHS and are predominantly trained in the CBT model. They, like 
their CBT contemporaries, are not formally encouraged to undergo personal therapy. 
The BPS Division of Clinical Psychology (2015) states on its website that “the 
difference in requirements [between the Divisions of Counselling and Clinical 
Psychology] is historical and also due to the foundation upon which each of the 
programmes was developed” (Personal Therapy section). 
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The Rise of IAPT  
The NHS was founded in 1948 as part of “a revolutionary plan to bring quality 
healthcare” to all UK citizens (Sreenan, 2013, p. 22). Its structure was established 
within the medical model and gave the medical profession a large influence over 
budget and the delivery of mental health care, which consequently served to 
medicalise social support (Ham, 2009; Sreenan, 2013). Ascribing to the medical 
model, a focus has been placed on pathologising mental health issues and developing 
ways in which they can be ‘cured’ most efficiently and cost-effectively (Layard, Bell 
& Clarke, 2006).  
 
Significant political differences exist between the medical model of mental health and 
other therapeutic models (Sreenan, 2013), a trend that has been said to have started in 
post-second World War America (Addis, Cardemil, Duncan & Miller, 2006). 
Psychologists have been encouraged to take on more of a ‘scientist-practitioner’ role, 
incorporating the medical language into a notion of ‘mental disease’, which has now 
led to the use of drug evaluation methods, such as the Randomised Control Trial 
(RCT), in mental health treatment research. Sreenan (2013) explains how in 1999 the 
Department of Health prioritised five types of research evidence, hierarchically, to 
constitute knowledge in the field of healthcare provision: systematic reviews with at 
least one RCT, a minimum of one RCT, a quantitative study without randomisation, 
an observational study and, lastly, the opinion of experts, service users and carers. As 
the medicalisation of mental health increases, along with the ‘gold standard’ of RCT 
research, a relationship between the two has evolved (Sreenan, 2013).  
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The medical model of mental health 
In 1952 the psychologist Hans Eysenck made a bold claim warning the NHS against 
the hypothesis that psychotherapy facilitates wellness and, instead, suggested that it is 
no more effective than spontaneous remission. The psychiatrist, Michael Shepherd 
(1979, 1984), furthered the claim that psychotherapy is ineffective by suggesting that 
it might even be harmful, and in 1984 strikingly likened a psychotherapist’s 
effectiveness with that of a placebo pill. He came to this conclusion following the 
Prioleau, Murdoch, and Brody (1983) review of outcome studies.  
 
Bloch and Lambert (1985) later criticised Shepherd’s (1984) editorial for its distorted 
lack of objectivity and disregard for the (Prioleau, Murdoch & Brody, 1983) review’s 
several weaknesses. Bloch and Lambert (1985) went on to identify many well-
founded and relevant reviews of the literature on psychotherapeutic outcomes that 
Shepherd (1984) had neglected (i.e. Andrews, 1983; Andrews & Harvey, 1981; Dush, 
Hirt & Schroeder, 1983; Landman & Dawes, 1982; Miller & Berman, 1983; 
Nicholson & Berman, 1983; Shapiro & Shapiro, 1982; Smith & Glass, 1977). One of 
the neglected studies by Smith and Glass (1977) offered convincing evidence of the 
efficacy of psychotherapy in which clients were found to be better off than 75 percent 
of untreated individuals. This study was later critically reanalysed by Landman and 
Dawes (1982) who verified the positive conclusions of therapeutic efficacy.  
 
Andrews and Harvey (1981) conducted a reanalysis of 475 controlled studies and 
similarly found that the condition of clients after psychotherapeutic treatment was 
better than that of 77 percent of untreated controls measured at the same time. This 
study further identified behaviour and psychodynamic therapies as superior to other 
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psychotherapeutic approaches. Miller and Berman (1983) later reviewed the research 
evidence for CBT, specifically, and were inconclusive about whether CBT is superior 
to other psychotherapies. However, the efficacy of CBT appeared relatively uniform 
across diagnostic categories and equally effective when administered in a group or 
individual format.  
 
Aaron T. Beck (1967) indeed hoped that the success of CBT would be its ability to be 
manualised and replicated by other therapists: “The same therapeutic program used by 
different therapists does not differ substantially from one to the other” (p. 333). 
Sreenan (2013) finds that, “In general, studies tend to equate competence with 
technical skills and adherence to specific models rather than a broader sense of the 
word” (i.e. relational competence, emotional competence, etc.) (p.44). Perhaps this is 
due to technical adherence being easier to monitor or rate than other aspects of 
competence, and directly serves the overriding goal of NHS psychological services: to 
provide evidence-based treatments in the most cost-efficient way. 
 
Cost-efficiency and mental health 
Early findings suggested that psychotherapy would be economically beneficial for the 
UK. For example, the Yates and Newman (1980a, 1980b) review of American cost-
effectiveness studies of psychotherapy found that medical services were over utilised, 
such as when clients with physical symptoms associated with psychiatric conditions 
were treated for the physical rather than psychiatric symptoms (McGrath & Lowson, 
1986). Schlesinger, Mumford, and Glass (1981) and Mumford, Schlesinger, Glass, 
Patrick, and Cuerdon (1984) later reviewed the evidence and found that 
psychotherapeutic services were both effective and reduced the utilisation of medical 
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services by up to 20 percent. McGraw and Lowson (1986) also examined the 
concurrent debates, of the doubts about (Gwyn Jones, 1985; Shepherd, 1984; 
Wilkinson, 1984) and defences of (Aveline, 1984; Bloch & Lambert, 1985) 
psychotherapy services within the NHS and concluded that psychotherapy has 
beneficial effects that can be economically justified within the NHS.  
 
In 2000, the Psychiatric Morbidity Report (Office of National Statistics, 2001) 
identified depression, with or without anxiety, to be the most prevalent form of mental 
disorder in the UK. In 2005, Lord Richard Layard’s presentation, “Mental health: 
Britain’s biggest social problem?”, highlighted the economic cost of depression and 
anxiety, mainly in that it reduced ‘output’ through sick-leave and unemployment. 
Layard, Bell & Clarke (2006) suggested that making psychological therapies available 
to everyone in Britain would pay for itself by reducing expenditure on incapacity 
benefits to people able to go back to work. In October 2007, the UK government 
announced their initiative to Improve Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) for 
depressive mood and anxiety disorders within the NHS with a focus on increasing 
employment.  
 
CBT as a manualised therapy 
However, the economic downturn (i.e. increased unemployment and other fallout 
from the recession) increased the demand for mental health services and reduced 
funding levels for public sector services (Royal College of Psychiatrists, NHS 
Confederation Mental Health Network & London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2009). The IAPT movement called further attention to the political culture’s 
sense of urgency for evidence-based psychological therapies to be made more 
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available by improving access to primary care mental health services. The proposal 
was driven by the focus on how mental health issues could be treated effectively and 
economically by ascribing to the dominant medical model (Layard et al., 2006). In 
2004 the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) initiated 
systematic reviews of the effectiveness of a variety of therapeutic interventions for 
depressive mood and anxiety disorders, which led to the publication of a series of 
clinical guidelines (NICE 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2011) 
that strongly supports the use of certain psychological therapies, predominantly CBT. 
Thousands of new psychological therapists were trained by the NHS and employed in 
IAPT clinical services to offer psychoeducation, guided self-help, and psychotherapy 
based on cognitive behavioural principals (Clark, 2011). 
 
The need to improve effectiveness without increasing costs, along with the rising 
demands for talking therapies and a lack of trained therapists, resulted in the further 
development and evaluation of manualised protocols and guided self-help in the form 
of computer-based CBT (Goldberg & Gournay, 1997; Layard et al., 2006). 
Richardson and Richards (2006) argued that CBT-based self-help materials were 
limited in value as they lacked the common ingredients of personal therapeutic 
encounters. However, the implications of Learmonth and Rai’s (2008) study to 
determine whether an established computer-based CBT programme (Beating the 
Blues) could extend beyond primary care surprisingly found that outcomes from 
computerised CBT offered in routine care were comparable to those observed from 
face-to-face CBT. Another study (Reger & Gahm, 2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 
19 RCTs of treatment for anxiety disorders and found that outcomes of computer-
based CBT were similar to outcomes of traditional face-to-face CBT. The success of 
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computer-based therapies challenges the claim that a relational component of 
therapeutic practice is necessary. 
 
 A sacrifice of the relational component 
NICE mental health treatment guidelines are tied to a ‘gold standard’ RCT 
methodology that is influenced by a positivist philosophical paradigm (Williams, 
2015). Therefore, the therapeutic alliance and claims that it is a key factor in 
therapeutic outcome are hindered by its inability to be ‘experimentally manipulated’ 
(DeRubeis, Brotman & Gibbons, 2005; Wampold, 2005). The positivist view of 
‘psychology’ suggests that theoretical statements are only valid if empirically tested 
and verified, which poses issues when looking at concepts such as intersubjectivity 
and the therapeutic alliance (Orlans & van Scoyoc, 2009). The notion of 
intersubjectivity postulates that we are fundamentally and inextricably intertwined 
with others (Crossley, 1996) and, alongside the therapeutic alliance, is based on a 
more constructivist philosophy that is embedded in all relational forms of clinical 
theory and practice (Rizq, 2010b).  
 
The IAPT ‘low intensity’ (i.e. guided self-help, psychoeducation) manual (Richards & 
Whyte, 2011) and ‘high intensity’ (i.e. psychotherapy) curriculum (Department of 
Health, 2008a, 2008b) do briefly reference the ‘therapeutic alliance’ and ‘therapeutic 
relationship’, respectively. Yet, the prevailing positivist research paradigms that 
influence IAPT and its evidence-based treatments seem to undermine these relational 
forms of clinical theory and practice. Studies by Addis, Wade, and Hatgis (1999) and 
Addis and Krasnow (2000) examined therapists’ attitudes towards evidence-based 
treatment and found that, whilst therapists were supportive of its view of science, they 
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were concerned about the impact of standardised manuals on the therapeutic alliance 
and individualised case conceptualisation. Another study (Nelson & Steele, 2007) 
about therapists’ attitudes towards manualised treatment similarly showed that 
therapists were concerned about evidence-based treatments, not as a consequence of 
negative attitudes toward research but, instead, based on their sense of the reduced 
opportunity to exercise their own clinical judgment, and on fears that research-based 
protocols do not fully address the complexity of their cases. It appears that the 
positivist research and outcome agenda characteristic of evidence-based treatments 
has come to be at odds with the relational approach to therapeutic practice.  
 
Within the positivist approach to mental health treatment the therapist’s ‘use of self’ 
offers a variability in outcomes (Crits-Christoph, Baranackie, Kurcias et al., 1991; 
Crits-Christoph & Mintz, 1991; Huppert, Bufka, Barlow et al., 2001; Kim, Wampold 
& Bolt, 2006; Wampold & Brown, 2005), which seems to diminish the significance 
of the therapist in the psychotherapeutic endeavour. It has been argued that positivist 
assumptions can serve to hinder the progression of CBT research (Lyddon, 1995) and 
has been suggested that the integration of constructivist research paradigms can offer 
a plurality of perspectives to further our knowledge of CBT and the reduction of 
psychological distress (Grant, 2009). However, within the current climate, massive 
and increasing economic pressures impacting on public sector services (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, NHS Confederation Mental Health Network & London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2009) seem to put a strain on our efforts 
to achieve paradigmatic balance and strengthens the appeal of manualised, ready-
made, cost-effective mental health treatments. 
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Therapy ‘efficacy studies’ and ‘outcome research’ trials have prompted a precise 
description of psychological treatment from one another, sponsoring a rapid growth in 
treatment manuals (Luborsky & DeRubeis, 1984). Supporters of manualised therapies 
believe that these forms of scientific scrutiny lead to quality evidence (Clark, Layard, 
Smithies et al., 2009). This becomes particularly relevant within the NHS IAPT 
services, firmly embedded within a medical, positivist, and objective view of science 
to provide the most evidence-based and cost-effective mental health treatments (Ham, 
2009; McGrath & Lowson, 1986).  
 
Today, CBT has become the poster child for the NHS IAPT services because it is the 
only evidence-based manualised intervention recommended for both depressive mood 
and anxiety disorder (Clark, 2011). Recognising the overwhelming economic 
pressures and diminished funding that deeply impacts the NHS, it has been argued 
that its ‘Payment by Results’, which pays services for each successfully treated case 
(O’Reilly & Kingsnorth, 2004), creates a ‘market for care’ where protocols, targets, 
and outcomes have the potential to subvert the client’s psychological needs (Rizq, 
2012). In this way, the prevailing political culture seems to be seduced by the idea of 
CBT as a ready-made solution at the expense of its more relational forms of clinical 
theory and practice.  
 
CBT as a model 
It is important to make a distinction between the protocol-based CBT that currently 
predominates in IAPT services and CBT as a model per se, which is more relational 
and individualised, and reflective of what CBT is and can be. CBT can be a 
collaborative process that facilitates increased self-awareness and self-compassion, 
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and serves as a good motivator to the therapeutic process (Westbrook, 2014). It 
combines a client’s presenting issues and experiences with theory and research to 
synthesise a new individualised understanding (Kuyken, Padesky & Dudley, 2009). 
This starts at the formulation, a key element of CBT (Beck, 2011), by which the 
therapist and client together identify the client’s presenting issues in a theoretically 
informed, salient, and meaningful way to guide effective interventions (Dudley & 
Kuyken, 2014). The CBT approach can focus on examining, testing, and challenging 
the contents of clients’ cognitions (Beck, 2011), as well as, on exploring clients’ 
relationships and processing styles to facilitate a process by which distressing 
thoughts can be understood and accepted (Hayes, 2004; Westbrook, 2014). This 
collaborative process signifies the strong relational component of CBT practice 
(Orlinsky, Geller & Norcross, 2005), which, alongside other psychotherapy models, 
demands a high degree of self-awareness from therapists. In fact, the CBT therapist’s 
capacity for self-reflection is considered one of the key elements that distinguish the 
learning of sophisticated interpersonal skills from the learning of technical or 
conceptual skills (Bennett-Levy & Thwaites, 2007). 
 
An Evidence-Based Approach to Personal Therapy 
CBT training does not formally encourage the use of personal therapy. Yet, a 
developing evidence-base for incorporating reflection in CBT training has emerged: 
the self-practice/self-reflection (SP/SR) approach, formalised in a training context as a 
self-experiential and reflective tool to enhance clinical practice (Bennett-Levy, 
Thwaites, Chaddock & Davis, 2009; Bennett-Levy, Lee, Travers et al., 2003; Bennett-
Levy, Turner, Beaty, Smith, Paterson & Farmer, 2001; Laireiter & Willutzki, 2005). 
SP/SR serves to facilitate a more advanced reflective ‘system’, enabling a 
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progressively refined set of therapeutic skills, which can be particularly helpful when 
interpersonal ruptures arise that threaten the therapeutic relationship (Bennett-Levy, 
2006). Bennett-Levy, Thwaites et al. (2009) argue that, in comparison to SP/SR, 
personal therapy is less targeted as a training tool and is typically a longer and deeper 
process that focuses on the self without necessarily having clinical implications. 
 
SP/SR is a structured training experience in which trainees practice CBT techniques 
on themselves (SP) and then complete written reflections (SR) that focus on their 
experiences, implications for their clinical practice, as well as, implications for 
cognitive theory (Bennett-Levy et al., 2003). Two forms of SP/SR have been 
developed: one in which trainees practice on their own, and another in which they 
take turns offering and receiving ‘co-therapy’ with another trainee for about four to 
six weeks each (Bennett-Levy & Thwaites, 2007). Participants of SP/SR report a wide 
range of benefits, primarily to their interpersonal skills (Bennett-Levy, 2005). For 
example, one participant wrote, “…having experienced [co-]therapy has deepened my 
understanding of the importance of a good therapeutic alliance, collaboration, interest, 
trust, acceptance, compassion, etc.” (Bennett-Levy & Thwaites, 2007, p. 275).  
 
The suggestion of SP/SR in the UK as a superior CBT training tool to personal 
therapy (Bennett-Levy, Thwaites et al., 2009) highlights a particular consideration of 
what might be useful for professional development during and post-training. During 
training, self-practice of CBT techniques might be important for developing a solid 
and cohesive identity as a CBT therapist (Laireiter & Willutzki, 2005), whilst later in 
professional life the experience of alternative therapeutic techniques, such as personal 
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therapy, might serve to enrich and broaden one’s professional competence (Willutzki 
& Botermans, 1997).  
 
Reframing the relationship in positivist terms: The self-reflective tool 
In accordance with the prevailing positivist culture, empirical evidence indicates that 
‘the collaborative therapeutic relationship’ is central to CBT clinical practice and 
significant to the outcome of therapy (Bennett-Levy, McManus, Westling & Fennell, 
2009). Although the value of self-experiential and reflective strategies within the CBT 
model continue to seek empirical verification to appease positivist paradigms (i.e. to 
use behavioural skill measures rather than self-report measures), CBT therapists are 
increasingly starting to recognise that their interpersonal behaviour with clients can 
have a significant impact on the course and outcome of treatment (Geller, Norcross & 
Orlinsky, 2005). Furthermore, a growing empirical base and an increasingly coherent 
theory of personal and professional development encourage CBT therapists to 
participate in SP/SR as frontline training strategies (Laireiter & Willutzki, 2005).  
 
The SP/SR training tool enhances self-awareness and serves to integrate the CBT 
model’s technical and relational components: to involve both the ‘self-as-therapist’ 
and the ‘person of the therapist’ (Bennett-Levy and Thwaites, 2007). In line with its 
integration of relational and technical components, the CBT framework 
conceptualises self-awareness as a practical, metacognitive skill that enables the 
therapist (a) to reflect-on-action (after the session) and reflect-in-action (during the 
session) (Bennett-Levy et al., 2003; Schön, 1983); (b) to develop perceptual skills 
(Greenberg & Goldman, 1988; Rice & Greenberg, 1984); and (c) to develop a more 
mindful practice (Epstein, 1999; Safran & Muran, 2000).  
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However, the extent of the CBT model’s dedication to positivist research and practice 
within IAPT threatens its position as a model, to simply becoming an evidence-based 
psychological therapy (Gilbert & Leahy, 2007). Within IAPT, therapist training 
follows nationally agreed curricula that focus on the competencies required to deliver 
mental health treatments that have been shown by RCTs to be effective for specific 
conditions (Fonagy & Clark, 2015). This increasingly strict adherence to evidence-
based CBT techniques runs the risk of diminishing its clinicians to psychological 
mechanics (Leahy, 2005). Given the significance of the therapeutic relationship and 
therapists’ self-awareness to CBT clinical outcome (Gilbert & Leahy, 2007), I argue 
that more emphasis should be placed on integrating notions of reflexivity and 
intersubjectivity into the current, dominant, rather objective CBT perspective on 
human connection: to bring the relational to the forefront, alongside its evidence-
based techniques. 
 
Personal Therapy and Clinical Practice: Positivist vs Phenomenological 
Perspectives 
Curiously, much of the research on the topic of personal therapy has adopted a 
quantitative paradigm, incorporating surveys and other ‘objective’ self-reporting 
questionnaires to assess a rather subjective impact of personal therapy on clinical 
practice (i.e. Darongkamas, Burton & Cushway, 1994; Daw & Joseph, 2007; 
Lorentzen, Rønnestad & Orlinsky, 2011; Norcross, 2005; Orlinsky et al., 2011; Pope 
& Tabachnick, 1994; Sandell, Carlson, Schubert et al., 2006; Schroeder, Pomerantz, 
Brown et al., 2014). For example, a large-scale international study conducted by the 
Collaborative Research Network of the Society for Psychotherapy Research (Orlinsky 
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et al., 1999) collected data on the personal therapy experiences of over 3,500 
therapists of diverse professions and various theoretical orientations in the United 
States, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, 
South Korea, New Zealand, Israel and Russia. Despite variations in specific 
percentages, the results were generally consistent across countries with positive 
benefits reported by 80 to 90 percent of therapists. The focus of this research was on 
the value personal therapy had for the therapist as a person and suggested that 
therapists found that their experiences of personal therapy could be translated into 
their clinical practice.  
 
In 2001, Orlinsky, Botermans, and Rønnestad conducted a slightly larger international 
study of 4,000 therapists, which found that personal therapy ranked amongst the top 
three sources of positive influence on professional development, just behind direct 
clinical experience and formal case supervision. And the more senior therapists with 
25 to 50 years of experience ranked personal therapy as the second most positive 
influence on professional development. Overall, more than 75 percent of the 
participants reported significant positive influences of personal therapy on 
professional development, and fewer than two percent identified personal therapy as 
negatively influencing their professional development. Orlinsky, Rønnestad, 
Wiseman, and Botermans (2002) next conducted a study with over 500 American 
therapists that they then replicated amongst 300 Norwegian therapists. In addition to 
questions about their personal therapy, this study asked therapists to rate the quality of 
their childhood experiences. Findings revealed that the quality of therapists’ 
childhood experiences had a pervasive influence on their current adult experiences 
and that the apparent influence was notably lower amongst therapists who had what 
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they found to be a highly beneficial personal therapy. This study suggested that a 
successful experience in personal therapy can significantly attenuate the impact of 
remembered childhood experience on critical areas of adult functioning. It further 
proposed that successful personal therapy helps therapists make peace with the past, 
and to experience adult life and work relatively unburdened by the impact of 
childhood events (Orlinsky, Norcross, Rønnestad & Wiseman, 2005).  
 
Subsequently, Orlinsky, Norcross, Rønnestad, and Wiseman (2005) reviewed 
empirical evidence of the outcome and impact of personal therapy amongst 
psychotherapists (Buckley, Karasu & Charles, 1981; Liaboe, Guy, Wong & Deahnert, 
1989; Norcross, Dryden & DeMichele, 1992; Norcross, Strausser-Kirtland & Missar, 
1988; Patterson & Utesch, 1991; Pope & Tabachnick, 1994) and confirmed that, 
across the board, at least 90 percent of participants found personal therapy to be 
effective and reported improvement in self-esteem, work functioning, social life, 
character conflicts and symptom severity. These results offer us a list of facts, like 
ready-made solutions, that tell us that there are benefits to undergoing personal 
therapy, however, without telling us how personal therapy impacts clinical practice. Is 
the purpose of personal therapy simply to produce the kinds of personal benefits 
outlined above or is it to enhance the effectiveness of the therapist’s clinical practice? 
These are potentially interrelated but distinct objectives and outcomes. 
 
The empirical research literature is interested in attempting to determine whether 
therapists who have undergone personal therapy are more effective than those who 
have not (see Clark, 1986; Garfield & Bergin, 1971; Greenberg & Staller, 1981; Holt 
& Luborsky, 1958). Despite the many positive results, the research offers only 
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equivocal results about the suggested relationship between personal therapy and 
effective clinical practice (Macran & Shapiro, 1998; Macran, Stiles & Smith, 1999; 
Rizq & Target, 2008b). It remains difficult, and perhaps unfeasible, to demonstrate 
whether personal therapy results in a therapist’s better clinical outcomes. Therefore, 
rather than continue to try to prove this elusive link, perhaps it is more appropriate to 
ask therapists themselves about how they use personal therapy in their clinical 
practice.  
 
Macran, Stiles, and Smith (1999) revolutionised this research process by adopting a 
qualitative paradigm to capture the richness of this topic that failed to be captured 
through quantitative measures. This significantly smaller study interviewed seven 
practicing therapists who spoke about the unique contributions of their personal 
therapy in which their experiences as clients were translated into skills and attitudes 
utilised in clinical practice. This study suggested that the experience of helpful 
conditions in the participants’ own therapy enabled them to provide similar conditions 
in their clinical practice. The shift in paradigm initiated a significant shift in focus to 
develop a richer theoretical framework of the relationship between personal therapy 
and effective therapeutic practice.  
 
Rizq and Target (2008a, 2008b) subsequently conducted qualitative studies that drew 
on attachment-related research to contextualise results from an interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) of nine experienced counselling psychologists’ 
descriptions of the meaning and significance of personal therapy. Analysis of 
participants’ accounts suggested that participants found personal therapy to be 
valuable, primarily as a means of developing their ability to reflect on the self and to 
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use this self-awareness in clinical practice. The (2008b) study further considered that 
personal therapy could be a valuable vehicle for a genuine and often intense 
relationship to facilitate authentic emotional contact with oneself and one’s clients. 
This study further identified findings comparable to that of Macran, Stiles, and Smith 
(1999), such as the acknowledgement of the intensity of experiences within personal 
therapy, and that personal therapy supports one’s capacity to be and use one’s ‘real’ 
self. 
 
Rizq and Target (2010) later conducted a mixed methods study to more specifically 
explore how counselling psychologists’ attachment status and levels of reflective 
functioning intersect with how they experience, recall and describe using personal 
therapy in clinical practice. The analysis suggested that participants who identified as 
securely-attached used therapy to manage complex feelings evoked by difficult or 
challenging clients, whilst participants who identified as insecurely-attached found 
therapy valuable regarding behavioural modelling, but not in managing complex 
process issues. More generally, appreciation of another’s mental state appeared to be 
embedded in participants’ early attachment relationships. This led to a reflexive 
observation of the significance of the researcher’s subjectivity and relational style and 
how it can impact the research process and outcome and highlights the considerable 
feat of the qualitative researcher’s challenging endeavour to capture the richness of 
another’s experience.  
 
Conclusions and the Research Question 
Despite the many positive effects of personal therapy on clinical practice, the 
literature has revealed difficulties that researching this field entails. Mainly, it remains 
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difficult and seemingly impracticable to evaluate whether personal therapy leads to 
better clinical outcomes (Greenberg & Staller, 1981; Clark, 1986; Macaskill, 1988; 
Macran & Shapiro, 1998). Ultimately, personal therapy cannot be systematically 
applied in a way statistically proven to enhance clinical outcomes. Although most 
therapists rate the impact of personal therapy on their practice highly (Bellows, 2007; 
Malikiosi-Loizos, 2013; Mearns, Thorne & McLeod, 2013; Orlinsky, Botermans, 
Rønnestad et al., 2001), objective evidence of its effectiveness remains weak 
(Bennett-Levy et al., 2003; Orlinsky, Rønnestad, Willutzki et al., 2005). The CBT 
model refers to the reflective ‘system’ as the ‘engine’ that drives lifelong learning as 
therapists (Bennett-Levy, Thwaites, Chaddock et al., 2009b; Schön, 1983; Skovholt & 
Rønnestad, 1992), yet it does not formally encourage the practice of personal therapy, 
seemingly due to its weak empirical link to clinical outcome.  
 
Given the difficulty of establishing a linear relationship between personal therapy and 
clinical outcomes, there has been increasing interest in how therapists themselves 
understand the impact of personal therapy on their clinical work (Macran & Shapiro, 
1998). Rizq (2011) confirms that “in the last decade there has been a shift in interest 
from whether to how personal therapy influences client work” (p. 177), reflected in 
recent research studies (see McMahon, 2012; Murphy, 2005; Rizq & Target, 2008a, 
2008b). The revision from quantitative to qualitative methodologies, from objective 
outcome measures to subjective understanding of individual experiences, is more in 
line with the subjective and individualised nature of self-awareness and the 
collaborative therapeutic relationship, central to CBT clinical practice. Therefore, the 
purpose of this research study is to use qualitative methods to explore the perspectives 
of CBT therapists, a popular, yet under-researched, group within the field.   
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The prevailing positivist research agenda appears to be at odds with the constructivist 
and phenomenological epistemologies embedded in relational forms of clinical theory 
and practice (Rizq, 2010b). The practice of counselling psychology appears to 
straddle this seeming contradiction by drawing upon and seeking to develop 
phenomenological models of practice and enquiry in addition to that of positivist 
scientific research (BPS, 2015a). My position as a counselling psychologist is to 
marry these two models of practice and research: to embody both the ‘scientific-
practitioner’ and the ‘relational-practitioner’ by participating in rigorous empirical 
enquiry upon a foundation of interpersonal awareness, contextual understanding and 
empathic identification (Rizq, 2010b). My interest in this research project developed 
from my search for a middle ground: to forge a compromise between the two 
extremes. Therefore, my research aims to acknowledge a plurality of perspectives that 
manifest within the evidence-based practices of the CBT model, by integrating a 
phenomenological philosophy of ‘truths’ into its more prevalent positivist approach to 
obtaining objective solutions. Given that the research on CBT therapists’ experiences 
of personal therapy is limited, and my personal interest in this topic, the following 
research question was developed: How do CBT therapists experience personal 




The divide between evidence-based therapy manuals and human connection can be 
considered a symptom of a dichotomy within the field of psychology, between 
quantitative and qualitative research. On the topic of personal therapy, a positivist 
view of psychology and its focus on objective empirical research poses difficulties. 
The conceptual limitations of the quantitative measures reviewed in the previous 
chapter are due to its traditional empirical methods, which can offer only equivocal 
results about the suggested relationship between personal therapy and effective 
clinical practice (Macran & Shapiro, 1998; Macran, Stiles & Smith, 1999; Rizq & 
Target, 2008b).  
 
Ultimately, the quantitative paradigm does not permit the exploration of subjective 
meanings and lived experiences. In light of the richness of the experience of personal 
therapy, it may be more befitting to explore this area by accessing in-depth 
descriptions of participants’ experiences: to ask CBT therapists themselves about how 
they use personal therapy in their clinical practice. My research design involves 
claims about the nature of reality (ontology), how I know it (epistemology) and my 
process for studying it (methodology); key considerations of the research project 
(Crotty, 1998) that will now be explored.  
 
Qualitative Research 
Qualitative methods tap into the subjective inner world of a person and have been 
built upon existential philosophies, such as Heidegger’s attempt to refocus Western 
assumptions about objective truths back to fundamental questions of ‘being’ (Orlans 
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& van Scoyoc, 2009). My position as a Counselling Psychologist is similarly 
underpinned by humanistic values and principles and assumes a ‘scientist-
practitioner’ model that is phenomenologically-focused and interested in exploring 
subjective truths (Woolfe & Dryden, 1996). Therefore, a qualitative approach, based 
on a humanistic and phenomenological foundation of counselling psychology, has 
been deemed most appropriate for exploring CBT therapists’ experiences of using 
personal therapy in their clinical practice.  
  
  Constructivism/Interpretivism 
The constructivist/interpretivist paradigm can be seen as an alternative to the 
positivist paradigm (Ponterotto, 2005). Its relativist ontology supports the existence of 
multiple realities rather than one single reality. The notion of reality is then subjective 
and influenced by the context of experience, perceptions and the interactions between 
self and other (Drummond, 2007). There are multiple meanings of a phenomenon in 
the minds of the people who experience it, along with multiple interpretations of the 
people with whom the experience is shared (Ponterotto, 2005). This 
phenomenological and subjectivist stance maintains that one’s reality is constructed 
between self and other, a dynamic interaction that translates between researcher and 
participant and is central to understanding and describing one’s lived experience. 
 
Epistemology 
The epistemological foundation of phenomenology that I have adopted is based on the 
ontology that, as we are a fundamental part of a meaningful world, which is also a 
fundamental part of us, we can only be understood as a function of our various 
involvements with this meaningful world (Larkin, Watts & Clifton, 2006). This 
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phenomenological approach requires the gathering of rigorously descriptive research 
that explores the intentional relationship between person and situation, to reveal the 
inherent essence of meaning within human experience (Giorgi, 1989). Therefore, I 
have gathered rich descriptions of lived experiences of which I adopted an open 
attitude to (at least initially) refrain from important external frameworks and 
judgments (Finlay, 2009).  
 
Humans are embedded in this world along with the thoughts and meaning systems 
that result from being in the world and, therefore, it is impossible to remove myself in 
a way to determine a definitive truth of how things ‘really’ are (Larkin et al., 2006). 
Whilst reality might not depend on humans, the meaning and nature of reality do 
(Dreyfus, 1995), and this knowledge is built through language and how people make 
sense of and understand their worlds (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Phenomenology 
gives precedence to the inherent process of reflexivity when making meaning of one’s 
own experiences. Brunner (2004) suggests that the story of one’s own life is reflexive 
in that the narrator and main character in the narrative are the same person, defining 
reflexivity as one’s turning on oneself. This, too, emerges from interpretation, an 
inherently relational activity, that embraces both the desire to understand and the 
impulse to connect (Tappan, 1997a).  
 
  Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was developed by Jonathan A. Smith 
to allow researchers to produce theoretical frameworks based on and transcending 
participants’ personal terminologies and conceptualisations (Smith, 2004). It is 
phenomenological in its concern for individual perception and depends on an 
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idiographic and inductive method to explore personal lived experience (Finlay, 2009). 
IPA is idiographic in its commitment to analyse individual cases in a corpus in detail, 
embracing the significance of particular utterances, the depth of interpretations, and 
the sensitivity of analysis (Smith, 2011a, 2011b). It focuses on individual accounts of 
specific situations and typically involves the highly intensive and detailed analysis of 
a comparatively small number of participants (Larkin et al., 2006). The detailed 
analysis of each case is then followed by a search for patterns across the cases (Smith, 
2011a). 
 
IPA is based on the epistemological stance that through subjective meaning-making it 
becomes possible to access individual cognitive inner worlds, which is especially 
suited to psychological theory (Smith, 1996). Smith (2011c) defines IPA as 
“phenomenological in its concern with lived experience and…interpretative in 
recognising the analysis of experience as a hermeneutic activity” (p. 6). Its theoretical 
underpinnings stem from Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness and hermeneutic 
theory of interpretation and symbolic interactionism, which suggest that personal 
meaning ascribed to an experience can only be accessed through an interpretative 
process (Marriott & Thompson, 2008). Chamberlain (2011) appropriately declares 
that this method of research pursues “what the data means, not what it is” (p. 52).  
 
  Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is the philosophical movement concerned with the meaning of an 
experience, how one makes sense of that experience, and involves a detailed 
examination of personal lived experience in its own terms (Smith, 2011a). If the focus 
is not on a lived experience and the description of how things appear, it is not 
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phenomenological (Finlay, 2009). A phenomenon of existential importance will be 
expressed in a “full, textured, emotionally powerful, consequential narrative form” 
(Charon, 2006, p. 13). Humans order their lives through narratives, interwoven with 
hopes, desires, memories, fantasies, intentions, representations of others, and time 
experiences as life history (Josselson, 2004). Histories are subjectively recounted in 
linguistic form as stories expressing the connectedness of human experience; making 
the implicit explicit (Ricœur, 1991).  
 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was a philosopher who first shed light on an 
epistemological problem concerning the relationship between the subjectivity of 
knowing and the objectivity of what is known (Husserl, 1983). From this he went on 
to develop the philosophical foundations of phenomenological enquiry, to examine 
experience in the way that it occurs, in its own terms (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 
2009). He believed that certain or objective knowledge could only be attained via 
processes of consciousness (Larkin et al., 2006).  
 
Husserl served as a mentor to Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) who extended the 
concept of phenomenology, beyond a reference to some thing appearing in its own 
terms (Smith, 2011c), to suggest that thought—and the essence in which humans 
engage with the world, is ad hoc in nature and also intentionally directed (Dreyfus, 
1995). Unlike Husserl, Heidegger believed that the intentionality of human activity is 
part of an unconscious mental process. His position further suggested that all things 
become some thing when, and only when, one encounters it and when it is brought 
meaningfully into the context of human life (Polt, 1999). This existential shift was 
supported and developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and Paul Ricœur 
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(1913-2005) who gave great precedence to the process of linguistic communication. 
Gadamer considered ‘world-understanding’ to be embedded in linguistic 
communication, and Ricœur signified narrative as its greatest form (Brockmeier & 
Meretoja, 2014).  
 
Through the great philosophical works of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricœur 
we can begin to understand the phenomenological emphasis on the experiential 
accounts of IPA research participants (Larkin et al., 2006). A phenomenological 
researcher reflects on the correlation of their subjective-relatedness of objects as 
experienced, to study transcendental consciousness as that which makes possible a 
significant world, with the aim of bringing such significance to awareness 
(Drummond, 2007). As an IPA researcher, I consistently reflected upon my 
experiences as a trainee, therapist, researcher and client to explore how they 
intertwine, to make meaning of my experiences, and to bring its significance to my 
awareness. The challenge is signified in the analysis of participants’ experiences, 
carried out by an ‘other’ (me as the researcher) and, therefore, is of the other’s (my) 
experience (Smith, 2011a). To accommodate this challenge, I participated in a process 
of engagement and interpretation, of connection and separation, to tie in a 
hermeneutic perspective (Smith, 2011a).  
 
Heidegger united phenomenology and hermeneutics to facilitate the explicit study of 
meaning-making and how things appear and are covered up at the same time (Moran, 
2000); linked together by interpretation. How things appear or are covered up are 
explicitly studied, each thing presenting itself in a manner that is concurrently self-
concealing (Moran, 2000). Hermeneutics offers up-close and personal access to 
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phenomenology (Smith, 2011c) and will be explored in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
  Interpretative phenomenology 
IPA involves two components: phenomenology and interpretation. The 
phenomenological component maps out the participants’ concerns and cares in the 
form of experiences claimed for themselves, and precedes the interpretative 
component that contextualises these claims and attempts to make sense of the 
constitutive relationship between the person and world, within a psychological 
framework (Larkin et al., 2006). In other words, phenomenology seeks meaning, 
meaning is difficult to grasp, and so interpretation is necessary (Josselson, 2004). 
Heidegger identified a significant distinction between the notion of phenomenology, 
which implies the exploration of something as itself, and the notion of interpretation, 
which, in contrast, demands that something is deliberately explored as something else 
(Dreyfus, 1995).  
 
My method of phenomenological description embodies an interpretative process, an 
inevitable and basic structure of one’s being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962). 
Interpretative phenomenology emerged from hermeneutic philosophy, including 
works from Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricœur, who shared the conviction of one’s 
embeddedness in the world of language, one’s special relationships and one’s 
historicity of understanding (Finlay, 2009). Heidegger’s hermeneutic tradition 
emphasises humans’ ongoing need for understanding, self-resolution and the use of 
narrative through which one interprets their being in the world (Brockmeier & 
Meretoja, 2014). Gadamer (1975/2013) suggests an openness and neutrality required 
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of phenomenologists, situating an other’s meaning in relation to one’s own meaning, 
that depends on appropriating—at the foreground, one’s own prejudices and fore-
meanings. He states, “The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that 
the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s 
own fore-meanings” (p. 269). I have been challenged by the simultaneous 
embodiment of contradictory attitudes: being scientifically removed from, open to and 
aware of, whilst also interacting with the participants amidst their own experiencing 
(Finlay, 2008). Thus, phenomenological understanding that is also interpretatively 
analysed requires a hermeneutic enterprise.  
 
  Hermeneutics  
In IPA research the participant gives the narrative, through which he or she constructs 
a reflexive interpretation of his or her experience, which the researcher then 
reflexively reconstructs to offer a different level of discourse (Josselson, 2004). This 
describes a ‘hermeneutic circle’, a dynamic interpretative process that requires 
discrimination, a constant moving and mutual illumination between part and whole 
(Smith, 2011c). Through this circle of belief and understanding, meanings derive 
from a consideration of the whole, which itself is created through an understanding of 
the parts (Ricœur, 1970). Smith (2007) more simply states, “To understand the part, 
you look to the whole; to understand the whole, you look to the part” (p. 5).  
 
The hermeneutic tradition recognises the central role of the researcher and assumes 
that interpretation essentially involves a circularity of understanding, identifying the 
‘knower’ (participant) and the ‘known’ (data), the part and the whole, as 
fundamentally interrelated (Smith, 2007; Tappan, 1997a). I was offered entry into the 
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hermeneutic circle through participants’ interpretations of life events, which offered 
further insight into their life-worlds; expressed with unconscious conflicts and desires, 
and identified cultural resources, moral rules, and unique social interactions (Larkin et 
al., 2006). Whilst my perspective had initially (and perhaps inevitably) shaped my 
interpretations, I tried to remain open to revision and elaboration through which my 
perspective and understanding—along with my biases and blind spots, were 
continuously acknowledged and evaluated (Tappan, 1997a).  
 
My first aim was to try to understand and then describe the meaning behind 
participants’ experiences. However, access to this information was partial and 
complex (Larkin et al., 2006; Smith, 1996). My second aim was to develop an overt 
interpretative analysis to provide a critical and conceptual commentary of 
participants’ personal sense-making activities (Smith & Osborn, 2015). More 
specifically, I examined what it meant for the participants to have made such claims 
and to have expressed such feelings and concerns regarding their use of personal 
therapy in CBT clinical practice (Larkin et al., 2006). However, all discoveries that 
were made were considered a necessary function of the relationship between myself 
as researcher and participants; between person and world, subject and object, which 
presented a dilemma of reflexivity (Larkin et al., 2006). I worked hard to enhance my 
self-awareness of pre-existing beliefs and to develop a critical self-awareness of my 
own subjectivity, to examine and question myself in light of new evidence and to be 
conscious of how I might impact the research (Finlay, 2008, 2009; Halling, 2008).  
 
My interest in the field of counselling psychology developed during and within my 
personal therapy. My experiences as a highly emotional child in a highly intellectual 
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family posed a seeming contradiction between feeling and thinking from a very early 
age. My endeavour throughout training has been to narrow this contradiction within 
myself, which I have come to realise is not much of a contradiction but, rather, a 
divide. I have experienced a similar divide within the psychotherapy professions: 
between positivist and constructivist claims for truth; between the manualised use of 
protocols and the use of the relationship between client and therapist; between 
evidence and reflection. My attempts to narrow this divide manifests in my curiosity 
about how CBT therapists describe the significance of their personal therapy in 
clinical practice.  
 
Throughout the research process, I have acknowledged my resistance to the steady 
political pull towards a positivist, medicalised approach to mental health care, which I 
find undermines the relational components of clinical theory and practice. I also find 
personal therapy to be essential to working with the relational demands of my clinical 
practice. My pre-existing beliefs and assumptions about the medical model and the 
positive benefits and values of personal therapy had to be monitored closely to adapt 
my language and attitude into a more neutral stance: to locate, acknowledge and 
bracket myself-in-context so that I could be more sensitive and alert to each unique 
participant-in-context.  
 
Heidegger identified a ‘person-in-context’ as the very nature of humans, being in the 
world, located and observable in our relatedness to some meaningful context (Larkin 
et al., 2006). Therefore, I am a ‘person-in-context’ seeking to make meaning of 
another ‘person-in-context’, which highlights the inescapable nature of my own 
preconceptions (Larkin et al., 2006; Smith, 2007). Developing a Heideggerian 
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phenomenology has depended on my empathic attunement to the subject matter and 
preparedness to bring awareness as well as adjust ideas and assumptions in response 
to the promptings of the subject matter (Larkin et al., 2006). I have endeavoured to 
examine the phenomena as it appeared, facilitated by the analysis, to help grasp what 
was being shown (Smith, 2007).  
 
  The hermeneutics of faith and suspicion 
Ricœur (1970) proposed two distinct hermeneutic stances: one which aims to 
‘restore’, or have faith in, the meaning offered by people; and another which aims to 
‘demystify’, or be suspicious of, the meaning offered by people, as if in the form of 
disguise. My position lies on the thin line between the hermeneutics of faith and 
suspicion, conceiving the interpretative process to distil, elucidate and illuminate the 
intended meanings of participants, whilst also discovering meanings that lie hidden 
within the unconscious (Josselson, 2004).  
The hermeneutics of faith is what ‘re-presents’ and gives voice to the meanings 
accepted as relatively transparent—with an interpretative edge, to develop the self-
understanding of participants (Josselson, 2004). Its epistemological basis derives from 
the Husserlian phenomenology of experience through which participants are 
considered to use narrative accounts as a process of self-formation, through 
experiences of learning or conflict, through further which the researcher seeks to 
unearth inherent meaning; remaining faithful to the narrator’s intentions (Tappan, 
1997b). This hermeneutic stance is one of recollecting and reordering meaning 
inherent in personal accounts (Gwyn, 2000). Kvale (1996) highlights the dilemma of 
grasping a good understanding of participants and suggests that, to achieve ‘a purer 
distillation of meaning’ (Josselson, 2004), we must acknowledge that the context of 
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the interviews and the nature of the research relationship can affect the meanings thus 
produced. In my experience, the genuine personal encounters between myself and 
participants facilitated the disclosures of inner, authentic, and important meanings 
(Josselson, 2004). Furthermore, this environment facilitated a shared experience 
through which new levels of understanding and meaning-making could evolve.  
 
This is where the hermeneutics of suspicion has entered my interpretive process, in 
which a more sceptical perspective helped reveal underlying processes. The 
hermeneutics of suspicion is interested in what is hidden and latent (Josselson, 2004). 
I sought to explore the self-understanding and meaning making that operated outside 
of participants’ immediate awareness—at first with each participant, to facilitate a 
process of enhanced self-awareness. I wanted to understand the participant’s 
subjective meanings before being able to consider what meanings lay hidden and 
fluctuated between the positions of accepting the participants as the authors of, and 
having authority over, their own experiences (Josselson, 2004).  
 
All hermeneutics share an interpretive effort to uncover the world of the people under 
study. However, there are distinct processes in which the researcher can get there 
(Josselson, 2004). My epistemological stance assumes that participants have 
described to their greatest capacities how they have perceived their experiences; and 
that my role is to ‘re-present’ to myself and the readers of this study what the 
participants were conveying to me to the best of my capacity (Josselson, 2004). This 
process embraces the equivocal nature of language (Ricœur, 1970), which 
communicates an untold story alongside the told story, and I have intended to reveal 
both aspects. Ricœur (1970) supports the researcher’s oscillation between 
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demystifying and restoring meaning, with a shared focus on what is said and what is 
not said: to identify what meanings are intended and which are unintended.  
 
Ricœur’s (1970) intersubjective definition of truth, as a natural movement towards 
self-clarification by unfolding perceptions of the world and communications with 
others, appears to describe the essence of narrative research from both hermeneutic 
stances: of faith and suspicion (Josselson, 2004). Smith (2001c) agrees that, “The 
phenomenon lies, in part, latent, underneath but connected to the manifest, and it can 
come into visibility,” as “something hidden comes to light during the process of 
hermeneutic phenomenology” (p. 12). Alongside participants’ awareness of their own 
meaning-making, I hoped to facilitate the illumination of a smaller, quieter new 
meaning embedded within the louder and larger corpus (Smith, 2011c). Smith (2011c) 
coined the term ‘gems’ to describe such illuminations, which require a fluctuation 
between ‘appearing’ and ‘peering’, and which involves three elements: the 
phenomenon that consciously appears, the peering role of the researcher, and the 
awareness and recognition of the participant.  
 
You will find that each participant’s phenomenological account has been centralised, 
contextualised and analysed in detail to learn about their cognitive and affective 
reactions to specific phenomena (Larkin et al., 2006). This narrative act has offered 
participants a way to convey what they have gone through and, in exchange, has 
offered me a way to consider and grasp what their experiences have meant to them 
(Brockmeier & Meretoja, 2014). I have then described what emerged from the 
narratives just as they are (Drummond, 2007), which is meant to demonstrate my 
capacity to be aware of my own standpoint whilst open to an other’s: to appropriately 
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filter what belongs to me, what belongs to each participant, and what is shared 
between us (Josselson, 2004). My role as an IPA researcher has been to extend the 
scope of the reservation of judgment to include all experience, my own as well as that 
of each participant, to focus my attention on possible experiences that present as 
themes relevant across participants (Drummond, 2007). 
 
IPA Method 
IPA is a qualitative research method that facilitates access to personal meanings and 
sense-making amongst individuals who share an experience (Smith et al., 2009). This 
methodology is most relevant to my focus on accessing the subjective lived 
experiences of CBT therapists who have undergone personal therapy. IPA 
incorporates semi-structured interview schedules to allow participants greater scope to 
express the ways in which they make sense of their experiences, and was used for a 
direct exploration of how personal therapy is experienced in CBT clinical practice. 
Furthermore, IPA promotes a distinctly inductive and interrogative approach to 
theoretical development (Smith, 2015). Rather than test previously established 
hypotheses, I attempt to contribute to and critique existing psychological research and 
literature, to develop a distinct psychological perspective to the limited extant 
research literature in the field. 
 
IPA is met with challenges of its own, mainly in regards to one’s capacity to achieve 
an accurate understanding of another’s subjective lived experience. Subjective lived 
experiences cannot be accessed directly but, rather, requires some interpretative 
activity on the part of the researcher, to focus on what is particular and distinct about 
each individual participant (Rizq & Target, 2008a). IPA is a form of 
 59 
phenomenological enquiry that incorporates a reflexive, inter-subjective stance to 
engage with participants’ language, stories and experiences (Smith et al., 2009). IPA 
then draws from the participant group as a whole to inductively and interrogatively 
support individual accounts and search for patterns across the cases, to develop 
themes (Smith, 2011a).  
 
  Criticisms of IPA  
One of the main criticisms of IPA is its seeming lack of concern for the proper use of 
its method based on scientific criteria, and how the steps of the IPA method meet 
human scientific criteria (Giorgi, 2011). Many are not satisfied by the expectation that 
an IPA study should be apparent by the demonstration of a phenomenological and 
hermeneutic stance (Smith et al., 2009). For example, unlike sociological approaches 
(i.e. grounded theory), IPA does not build on each participant’s account to extract a 
universal model from the data (Charmaz, 2015). Grounded theory was considered as 
an alternative qualitative approach for this research project. If chosen, it could have 
offered insight into the social processes underlying participants’ experiences of 
personal therapy in clinical practice, as well as, an overall theory of how participants 
use personal therapy in clinical practice and of how it relates to social and contextual 
factors. However, I was not interested in assuming there was a theory of a process of 
how personal therapy influences clinical practice.  
 
Discourse and Conversation Analysis were also considered and could have offered 
insight into the performative functions of participants’ dialogue and how language is 
used in interaction to construct a particular view of oneself and the world (Larkin et 
al., 2006; Smith, 2011a; Willig, 2015). However, I was not interested in making 
 60 
claims about the function of participants’ use of talk. Instead, I was interested in 
developing a phenomenological understanding of what it is like for participants to 
have therapy and to use it in their CBT clinical practice. Heuristics was also 
considered as an alternative methodology and could have offered a more explicit 
acknowledgement of my personal involvement as the researcher of this research 
project by making my own lived experience of using personal therapy in clinical 
practice the main focus of the research (Moustakas, 2001). However, not having 
practiced CBT, I did not have lived experience of the research question. Overall, 
although other qualitative methodologies had been considered, for the purpose of this 
research project, IPA was selected as the most suitable approach due to its assumption 
that language has the ability to tell us about an individual’s experience, what one feels 
and thinks, for the purpose of offering insight into how a person, in a given context, 
makes sense of a given phenomenon.  
 
Issues of validity and reliability 
Qualitative research has long been evaluated according to criteria of validity and 
reliability as applied to quantitative research. Smith et al. (2009) assert that, whilst 
validity and reliability are important considerations, qualitative research should be 
evaluated with more appropriate criteria. Yardley (2000, 2008) recommends 
following four principles to assess the quality of qualitative research:  
1) Sensitivity to context – sensitivity towards participants, their accounts, 
and from the onset of the research process (i.e. choosing the research 
topic, recruitment, the interview schedule, etc.).  
2) Commitment to rigour – the attention towards participants before, 
during and after interviews; taking care in how the analysis is carried 
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out; and the thoughtfulness of the study (i.e. in choosing the sample, 
developing the interview questions, etc.).   
3) Transparency and coherence – clearly documenting the stages of the 
research process; the careful writing and re-writing of drafts; and the 
degree to which the research and the method complement each other.  
4) Impact and importance – that the research reveals something important 
or useful.  
These criteria were reviewed and referred to throughout the research study to enhance 
the quality of this research project. For example, to maintain ‘sensitivity to context’ I 
was mindful of my empathic communication from the first point of contact and 
throughout my contact with participants. My focus was on putting participants at ease 
and considering interpersonal difficulties as they arose. This was particularly relevant 
to my experience as a trainee and novice researcher interviewing experienced 
therapists. I remained curious as to how my experience interacted with participants’ 
experiences of being interviewed and the potential power plays that appeared between 
us. I found supervision particularly helpful in maintaining a balance between 
following participants’ leads and digging deeper. One example of my ‘commitment to 
rigour’ arose during the early stages of analysis, when I started to experience feelings 
of protection over participants. I was careful with my interpretations because I wanted 
to maintain the essence of each participant, and so I often asked myself: if the 
participant was to read this, could they recognise themselves? To uphold 
‘transparency and coherence’, I offered participants the opportunity to read over their 
transcripts and, later, to review and provide feedback on their individual analyses 
before I completed cross analysis. I have valued and learned from participants’ 
experiences and, in support of this study’s ‘impact and importance’, I have 
respectively drawn from their accounts to raise awareness of their experiences and to 
arouse curiosity and interest in the psychotherapy professions, which will be 
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demonstrated in the Discussion section.  
 
  Recruitment 
I collected data from an information-rich, rather than representative, participant pool 
(Rizq & Target, 2008b), meaning that access to a small group of participants, all who 
have lived experience of my topic of interest, was crucial to ensure this study would 
elicit sufficiently rich, in-depth data. Therefore, I recruited a homogeneous and 
purposive sample, a closely defined group of seven participants for whom the 
research question was significant (Smith, 2015). The following inclusion criteria were 
determined based on its relevancy to the research question (Willig, 2015), and were 
applied to establish homogeneity: 
1) Each participant was to have Full Accreditation as a Cognitive 
Behavioural Psychotherapist by the British Association for Behavioural 
and Cognitive Psychotherapy (BABCP).  
2) To further establish a homogeneous sample characterised by similar 
professionals with extensive clinical training experience, inclusion criteria 
extended beyond the Minimum Training Standards of the BABCP 
(expected of psychologists, psychotherapists, psychiatrists, nurses, 
counsellors and social workers alike) and requested qualifications of both 
a degree and a doctorate in psychology.  
3) Within the CBT framework personal therapy is distinct from ‘self-
practice’ and ‘self-reflection’ training goals (Bennett-Levy et al., 2001) 
and is defined as a longer and deeper process that is less targeted as a 
training tool (Bennett-Levy, Thwaites et al., 2009). In line with this 
definition, inclusion criteria required participants to have at least five years 
of post-accreditation clinical experience along with the experience of 
undertaking at least weekly personal therapy for a minimum of two years.  
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4) To increase potential efficacy and reduce the risk of indoctrination, 
inclusion criteria further requested that participants’ experience of 
personal therapy be voluntary.  
 
I recruited participants from the official public registers of the BPS and BABCP, 
through which names were cross-checked between both registers to identify potential 
participants. I made initial contact through email, which provided a brief description 
of the study and requested participation based on the inclusion criteria (see Appendix 
II). A Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix III) was also attached to the initial 
email to provide more detailed information about participation. I encouraged chain 
referral sampling (Patton, 1990), in which potential participants may have known and 
referred other potential participants, to facilitate the recruitment process. Involvement 
in the study was voluntary, and responses were both anonymised and remained 
confidential to the research team (Daw & Joseph, 2007).  
 
My initial attempt at recruiting participants involved sending individual emails to 40 
professionals who cross-checked on both BPS and BABCP registers. I received 
responses from two potential participants, one of whom agreed to participate. I 
realised the minimal response-ratio I could expect to receive and, therefore, sent 
blind-copy emails to 138 professionals with doctorates in psychology from both the 
BPS and BABCP public registers, which resulted in one more response from a 
professional who agreed to participate. Throughout the recruitment process, I 
contacted four University lecturers as well, wondering whether they might participate 
or know someone who might be interested. Discussion with one lecturer shed light on 
the limitations of my inclusion criteria, specifically in requiring participants to be both 
registered members of the BPS and BABCP; to be both chartered psychologists as 
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well as fully accredited CBT therapists. To maintain a homogeneous sample, I 
considered alternative ways to establish CBT expertise amongst similar professionals 
with extensive psychotherapeutic training experience. Adjustments of the inclusion 
criteria were discussed in supervision, and the following alternatives were applied: 
1) To establish CBT expertise, participants were asked to have completed an 
accredited training in CBT. 
2) To further establish a homogeneous sample characterised by similar 
professionals with extensive clinical training experience, participants were 
asked to have completed an accredited training in psychotherapy.  
This resulted in a more successful recruitment process. I again sent blind-copy emails 
to the 138 professionals I had emailed before as well as to an additional 356 
professionals on the BACP public register. I received responses from two more 
people who agreed to participate. I also received individual referrals to contact six 
potential participants of whom three agreed to participate. This resulted in a total of 
seven participants.  
 
There were three men and four women with ages ranging from 35 to 71 (mean age 
52). Professional qualifications included masters-level and doctorate-level degrees 
and diplomas in psychotherapy, as well as postgraduate diplomas and advanced 
certificates in CBT. Post-accreditation clinical experience ranged from nine to 22 
years. Length of time spent in voluntary personal therapy ranged from four to 15 
years (a mean of seven years). Some participants may have had therapy as part of 
their training, however, the additional voluntary therapy was the basis of their 
selection. Theoretical orientations of personal therapy varied. Each participant’s 
demographic information is presented below: 
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71 M Counselling 
Psychologist  
BPS Chartered 
Psychologist,   
BABCP accreditation 
22 5 Pluralistic, 
Humanistic  





14 4 Psychoanalytic, 
Systemic 
69 M Psychotherapist UKCP Registered 
Psychotherapist, 
BABCP accreditation 
20 15 Jungian 
42 M Counsellor BACP accreditation, 
Adv Cert in CBT 
9 7 Integrative 
48 F Psychotherapist BACP Registered,  
PG Dip CBT 
10 7 Integrative 




Adv Cert CBT 
10 6 Integrative 





9 4 Psychodynamic, 
CBT 
 
I, comparably, was a training counselling psychologist, with several years’ experience 
of both clinical work and personal therapy. I found many benefits in the ways 
personal therapy had impacted my clinical practice, although had not used the CBT 
model in my clinical practice. Nonetheless, I owned my assumption that the benefits I 
experienced could be generalised. 
 
  Ethics 
I followed the ethical regulations of Roehampton University, in line with the Health 
and Care Professions Council (HCPC) and British Psychological Society (BPS) 
guidelines. Prior to there being contact with participants, I obtained approval from the 
Ethics Committee at the University of Roehampton (see Appendix I).  
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Participants and I mutually agreed upon a time and place to meet. Interviews lasted 
for around one hour and took place either at the University of Roehampton or the 
participants’ public offices or private homes. I read and adhered to the Lone Worker 
Policy at the University of Roehampton and, when interviews took place in a private 
place, I ensured that I was contactable by phone by a colleague who was aware of my 
specific location at all times.  
 
Prior to the start of each interview, I read through the Participant Information Sheet 
(see Appendix III) with each participant. This process was meant to ensure that 
participants understood what the study was about and that they had the opportunity to 
ask questions or clarify anything concerning participation in this research study. 
Participants were then presented with the Consent Form (see Appendix IV) to be read, 
completed and signed twice so that both I and participants each retained an original 
copy. Participants were also asked to complete a Demographic Questionnaire (see 
Appendix V), which was used to enhance analysis.  
 
Due to the high level of sensitivity necessary in dealing with the confidential and 
personal nature of this research topic, in-depth, semi-structured interviewing was 
considered the most effective method for data collection (Rizq & Target, 2008; Smith, 
1995). Furthermore, given the personal nature of the interviews, it was important that 
I develop and maintain respect and trust with the participants (BPS, 2014; HCPC, 
2012). Participants were informed about the aims of the research and were given the 
opportunity to ask any further questions at the end of the interview process.  
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There were ethical issues of anonymity and confidentiality that had to be considered. 
For example, participants could have consented to take part in the study and then 
subsequently request that their data be destroyed. In lieu of this, any necessary time 
limits on data withdrawal were made clear to participants from the start (BPS, 2014). 
Moreover, participants were ensured that all data was anonymised and could not be 
traced back to them (BPS, 2014; HCPC, 2012) and were offered the opportunity to 
review their individual transcripts for accuracy and anonymity (Smith, Flowers & 
Larkin, 2009). 
 
The interviews had the potential to be distressing for the participants and, therefore, I 
engaged in a debriefing process where participants had an opportunity to discuss 
anything they found difficult. It was of ethical significance that I explore potentially 
distressing experiences or memories, limiting the potential for participants left 
vulnerable in ways that they were not prior to the interview (Shaw, 2010). Although 
they were a professional group, and therefore neither clinically nor socially 
vulnerable, I had contact information readily available for further support if 
necessary. See Appendix VII for the complete Debrief Schedule.  
 
My role as a reflexive researcher introduced a need for further ethical considerations. 
It was paramount that I respect the knowledge, insight, experience and expertise of 
participants (BPS, 2014). Therefore, I continually attempted to confront and 
interrogate my own prejudices, to move beyond them and subsequently incorporate 
them into my understanding (Shaw, 2010). I was aware that my own lack of 
awareness could detract focus and serve to lose richness from the participants’ 
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accounts (Shaw, 2010). Shaw (2010) further describes the significance of using a 
reflexive approach in experiential qualitative research:  
“Through making ourselves aware of our own feelings about and 
expectations of the research we can begin to fully appreciate the nature of 
our investigation, its relationship to us personally and professionally, and 
our relationship as a researcher and experiencer in the world to those with 
whom we wish to gather experiential data. By engaging in reflexivity, that 
is, proactively exploring our self at the start of our research inquiry, we 
can enter into a dialogue with participants and use each participant’s 
presentation of self to help revise our fore-understanding and come to 
make sense of the phenomenon anew” (p. 235). 
One can only understand another’s presuppositions, beliefs, and predilections once 
one’s own have been made transparent (Gadamer, 1975/2013). IPA embraces a 
double hermeneutic that supports the adoption of a reflexive attitude in which self and 
other are examined as part of the research process (Shaw, 2010), which lays at the 
heart of the proposed research study. 
 
  Interview schedule 
To maintain the openness required for such exploration, I incorporated guidelines 
offered by Smith (2015) and Smith et al. (2009) into the design of the interview. The 
questions for the interview schedule were developed as a result of my own experience 
of personal therapy and clinical practice, discussions with colleagues, and from 
reading the existing literature on personal therapy and CBT. The interview schedule 
(see Appendix VI) included questions such as: Do you feel that your personal therapy 
has influenced your CBT clinical practice? Can you think of a time in clinical practice 
when you were aware of your personal therapy? Do you feel that your personal 
therapy has been influential in maintaining effective therapeutic relationships? 
 69 
 
Interviews lasted between one and one and a half hours and took place in a 
conveniently located and comfortable setting of participants’ choosing: at their 
homes, private offices, consulting rooms or at the University of Roehampton research 
rooms. Interviews were audiotaped with consent and, when appropriate, departed 
from the interview schedule guided by the participants’ contributions (Kvale, 1996; 
Smith & Osborn, 2015). Interviews were then transcribed verbatim. Participants were 
offered the opportunity to review their transcripts. Following one of the interviews, I 
and a participant together agreed to a follow-up interview to further the detailed 
account of their individual experience.  
 
  Analysis 
Interview transcripts were subject to IPA, suitable to my aim of adopting an insider 
perspective as far as possible into participants’ worlds (Mulveen & Hepworth, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, in agreement with IPA I rejected pre-existing hypotheses prior 
to conducting the research and, rather, focused the analysis on themes that emerged 
from participants’ accounts to create new theoretical frameworks (Rizq & Target, 
2008b).  
 
Following the approach outlined by Smith et al. (2009), individual analyses were 
conducted separately, one interview transcript at a time. I repetitiously read through 
each transcript, made initial notes (see Appendix VIII) and listed individual themes 
and subthemes (see Appendix IX) before moving on to the next transcript. I 
developed detailed notes on three levels: descriptive (i.e. content), linguistic (i.e. 
language use or linguistic style) and conceptual (i.e. personal reflections). The first 
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level, descriptive coding, required the identification, description, and understanding of 
two related, yet distinct, aspects of participants’ accounts: the ‘object of concern’ in 
participants’ worlds and the ‘experiential claims’ made by participants (Larkin et al., 
2006). IPA requires an in-depth exploration of individual experience and meaning 
creation prior to exploring patterns and themes across individuals (McMahon, 2012). 
Therefore, I developed a framework for building themes with subthemes, supported 
by the verbatim text from the transcript. This process was repeated for each transcript 
as if each were my only piece of data. Once I had sufficiently analysed each transcript 
individually, I contacted participants to ask whether they might like to review my 
analysis of their transcript. Five out of the seven participants responded. Three out of 
the five participants who responded reviewed and approved the individual analysis. 
 
I then began to cross-analyse by looking over all the transcripts as a whole with 
consideration for how themes might merge. Throughout this process, I continuously 
referred back to each individual transcript to ensure the emerging master list of 
themes and subthemes remained justified within the data. Guidelines for ensuring 
rigour in qualitative research were followed to establish a quality of control 
framework (see Mays & Pope, 2000; Morse, Barrett, Mayan et al., 2002). The 
analysis process was recorded in detail to enable the Director of Studies to conduct a 
validity check (Yardley, 2000, 2008). Furthermore, the completed analysis was 
presented to the London Regional IPA Group to confirm that the analytic process and 





Interpretative phenomenological analysis of seven interviews resulted in the 
identification of three master themes, with 12 subthemes. In this chapter I explore 
these themes in detail. This analysis is my account of CBT therapists’ experiences of 
personal therapy in clinical practice, and I acknowledge that different researchers 
could have focused on different aspects of participants’ experiences.  
 
Each theme is presented with supporting verbatim extracts from participants’ 
accounts to help clarify and illustrate themes. Some minor amendments have been 
made for ease of reading. In quotations, material that has been omitted is indicated by 
ellipsis points ‘…’ All identifying information has been eliminated to ensure 
anonymity, as previously discussed in the Methodology chapter. The analysis resulted 





ties me to humanity 
Personal therapy: 
Being and Doing 
Working in the shadow 









Holding both positions 
as therapist and client 
Maintaining a space 
within 
Making room for 
emotional experiencing
 Being present 




Master Theme 1:  Personal Therapy Creates Conflict – “…it’s led me astray” 
(Peter, Transcript 1, p. 8, line 158). 
 
All participants were painfully aware that the way they practiced CBT in their clinical 
work bore little resemblance to what they described as ‘mainstream’ CBT. It seemed 
as if participants felt that their clinical practice had been ‘led astray’ by the personal 
therapy they had themselves received, deviating from what many seemed to hold up 
as an idealised image of a standardised and sanitized protocol-led CBT. For example, 
participants similarly valued a process of ‘exploration’ gained from their personal 
therapy, however also seemed to share the concern that this very process they valued 
was undermined by the protocols they felt pushed into following. As a researcher my 
impression was that the aspects of personal therapy participants had found helpful to 
their clinical practice clashed with their identity as CBT therapists. It seemed as if 
being a conventional CBT therapist meant adhering to one standard without the space 
for individuality and flexibility, which further appeared to reduce CBT to a collection 
of techniques rather than a flexible form of therapy.  
 
 Working in the shadow of what CBT should be 
All participants recounted experiences of delivering something more, or different, to 
‘pure CBT’ in their clinical practice. This not only seemed to suggest that participants 
held an idealised view of CBT but also conveyed a shared sense of paradox by which 
personal therapy seemed to equip participants with therapeutic tools that 
paradoxically hindered their capacity to practice what they described as ‘pure’ CBT. 
It was clear that all participants felt they benefited from their personal therapy, both 
personally and professionally, yet also seemed to share the sense of being 
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contaminated by their personal therapy. My impression was that the CBT model had 
been illustrated as ‘pure’ and antiseptic, a model that participants felt they had 
infected with their experiences of personal therapy. Four out of the seven participants 
specifically described their integration of personal therapy and clinical practice as an 
‘act of deviancy’, suggesting a shared belief that CBT is some kind of ‘norm’ from 
which they are continually diverging. This appeared to facilitate participants’ shared 
sense of being ‘led astray’ from their belief of a conventional CBT model in which 
they ought to follow strict protocols.  
 
For example, Dorinda conveys her sense of being ‘led astray’ by her personal therapy 
when describing her clinical practice as, “completely almost pure CBT but…”, which 
suggests her sense of divergence from a ‘pure’ CBT model in which she must follow 
protocols ‘completely’:  
 
“…it’s completely almost pure CBT protocol but really influenced by just a 
little tiny bit of psychodynamic thinking that, sort of, I gained from looking at 
my own processes, looking at, at a, my own therapy, what I re-enact from the 
past” (Dorinda, p. 5, line 101).  
 
Peter similarly discusses how he has gradually come to depend less on CBT as an 
established set of protocols, instead using a CBT framework as a more flexible 
guideline from which to follow the client’s lead. However, Peter’s use of the word 
‘deviating’ is suggestive of a feeling that he is somehow departing from the usual, 
accepted standards of CBT: 
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“For me protocols now—as a result of the, uh, personal therapy, protocols are 
a guide, but they’re not a must…I’m quite capable of deviating slightly” 
(Peter, Transcript 1, p.7, line 146).  
 
Peter then further compares his clinical practice to his belief in an ideal CBT practice, 
which seems to illustrate his sense of conflict between his clinical practice and the 
‘rigid’ CBT model from which he deviates. Peter appears to personify the CBT model 
as an exclusive group governed by one accepted standard, a group from which he 
seems to feel rejected: 
 
“Now some would say, ‘this is a disaster, that doesn’t do the trick’. Um, but I 
tend to feel this helps clinical practice…So you could say, from a rigid CBT 
point of view, it’s led me astray” (Peter, Transcript 1, p. 8, line 151). 
 
Like Peter, Sandra also personifies the CBT model, however as an ‘institutional 
supervisor’, comparing her clinical practice with what her supervisor might say, as if 
having to choose between her own clinical intuition and the CBT model. She seems to 
dismiss the institutional expectations of the CBT model she perceives for the sake of 
her clients. However, she also appears to manage a sense of rejection from her 
internal supervisor, the part of herself that holds her clinical practice at constant 
comparison with a standardised CBT model: 
 
“I practice…therapy in the way that I think would be beneficial to the client 
rather than being too worried about what my…institutional supervisor might 
say” (Sandra, p. 12, line 270).  
 
Raul similarly compares and, even, distinguishes his clinical practice from the 
conventional CBT model he perceives to be based on specific ‘formula’. As with 
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Dorinda, Peter and Sandra, this suggests a possible conflict between Raul’s clinical 
practice and the image of a more ‘mainstream’ CBT. Yet it seems as if his willingness 
to tolerate the conventional CBT approach warrants his own clinical validation of his 
alternative way of practicing CBT: 
 
“But that’s really working to a, to the formula…and if that’s your target and 
that’s your goal, which is absolutely legitimate and nothing, nothing wrong 
with it, um, uh, then that’s what you do but uh, uh, uh, it’s not, it doesn’t have 
the same components that, uh, the work that I would seek to do, which is to 
help people understand who they are” (Raul, p. 12, line 241). 
 
Participants seemed to describe their clinical practice against the backdrop of a CBT 
‘norm’, which appeared to be illustrated as a clean and uncontaminated clinical 
template against which their rather messier personal therapy experiences intrude and 
about which they seemed to feel guilty. It was as if they had held their own way of 
practicing CBT in a constant state of comparison with a CBT model they perceived to 
be governed by one accepted standard, a standard they had failed to uphold. 
Participants demonstrated a shared feeling of having committed wrong, which seemed 
to elicit a need to justify their clinical practice, to prove themselves as CBT therapists.  
 
Protocol versus Exploration 
All participants distinguished between a personal experience of therapy as a journey 
of exploration and discovery and the somewhat different experience of delivering a 
protocol-led CBT to their clients. The long and difficult process of personal change 
and development experienced and valued by participants seemed to conflict with the 
pre-determined code of procedures proposed by the CBT model they practiced. Five 
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out of the seven participants appeared to share the belief that the strict adherence to 
protocols expected of them as CBT therapists served to hinder aspects of therapy 
essential to their clinical practice. 
 
For example, Peter appears to have struggled with the protocol-driven CBT model he 
once felt pushed into following and which he has gradually come to depend less upon 
in favour of a more ‘relational’ model. Below, he describes his early ‘treatment 
failures’ as relying too heavily on CBT protocols, like a machine, which hindered his 
capacity to subjectively engage with clients; a relational aspect of therapy he finds 
essential to his clinical practice:  
 
“Certainly, some of my, inverted commas, treatment failures, I’ve actually 
been too heavy on a, the sort of delivery protocol…I appear at times 
mechanistic, and I’ve sometimes thought, oh god I didn’t really relate to that 
person at all” (Peter, transcript 1, p. 21, line 431).  
 
Dorinda similarly discusses her struggle to balance her sense of pressure to follow the 
CBT protocols with her belief of the benefits of a deeper, less content-driven 
therapeutic exploration of clients’ feelings. She describes her experience with clients 
who appear to prefer to distance themselves from, and hand over, their problems for 
her to manage. She likens her role to that of a ‘medical doctor’, which seems to 
illustrate an objective, content-driven, problem-solving focused treatment and, 
furthermore, appears to illuminate her struggle to offer a subjective, process-driven, 
explorative treatment where feelings of anxiety can be tolerated: 
 
“…they come in, and they go woosh ‘Here’s all my stuff, you deal with it.’ 
And, and then you kind of diagnose and, and you treat. So very medical 
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model. Doctor my foot is hurting. But I’m much more aware that…there is a 
whole host of anxieties before you even enter the therapy room…that CBT 
doesn’t have space for” (Dorinda, p. 14, line 342). 
 
Charlotte, too, describes her own experience of feeling encumbered by the CBT 
model’s protocol-driven expectations. It is almost as if Charlotte finds that the CBT 
model hinders her from making contact with her client’s emotional distress. She 
struggles with what appears to be a choice between sticking to the CBT approach or 
listening more deeply to her client: 
 
“…if I continued with my structured sort of way…I would’ve completely 
overlooked [my client’s] needs and what was so alive in the room, which was 
she wanted me to sit and allow her to be and for me to actually hear what—her 
pain” (Charlotte, p. 15, line 360). 
 
Below, Raul more overtly distinguishes between his views of therapy and 
‘mainstream’ CBT and appears to reduce CBT to a collection of protocols as opposed 
to a form of therapy. His distinction between ‘therapy’ and ‘CBT’ seems to illustrate 
his need to diverge from the strict application of CBT protocols to facilitate ‘an 
exploratory operation’: 
 
“But I don’t really regard CBT as therapy. Um I regard CBT as the application 
of evidence-based protocols to specific problems. That isn’t my definition of 
therapy. I see therapy as a much more of an exploratory operation” (Raul, p. 4, 
line 72). 
 
Participants’ distinct experiences of personal therapy and clinical practice seemed to 
reveal a greater distinction between the personal therapy they received and the 
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therapy they practiced; between the respective functions of therapy as a journey of 
exploration and discovery and of therapy as a delivery of specific problem-solving 
protocols.  
 
Practice versus Preach  
There appeared to be a particular tension for participants between the notion of 
therapy for a particular problem and a therapy that aims to enhance growth and 
development. Three out of the seven participants described their personal therapy as a 
way ‘to better myself’, ‘enhance wellbeing’, and ‘to improve my life’. In contrast, 
participants portrayed CBT as a ‘goal-driven’, ‘crisis intervention’ meant to help 
overcome the sense of self-defeat. This striking difference between the therapy 
participants sought and the therapy they delivered appeared to illustrate a fundamental 
divergence of attitude between undergoing therapy due to an urgent sense of 
desperation and undergoing therapy due to a more casual sense of desire.  
 
For example, Dorinda identifies CBT as “fantastic at a crisis” (p. 11, line 234) and 
further describes it as a professional intervention meant to help people in urgent need. 
In contrast, Dorinda appears to seek personal therapy for her own personal desire to 
enhance ‘myself’: 
 
“Because when I go to therapy, I don’t go to therapy for a point of, ‘My life is 
not working out and I need help’. So I don’t go to therapy from a sort of 
mental health crisis point of view. I go to therapy as a way of self-discovery. 
Making myself, eh, just a better person for myself, not for anyone else” 
(Dorinda, p. 11, line 238). 
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Similarly, Raul differentiates between his personal experience of therapy as a means 
of enrichment and his belief in the more common approach to CBT therapy as a 
means to overcome a specific problem. Furthermore, it is my impression that Raul’s 
portrayal of life as ‘traumatic’ serves to normalise his more casual use of therapy: 
 
“I’m in personal therapy for richness…I’m not working on any particular um, 
um, uh, uh, traumatic issue apart from life” (Raul, p. 20, line 411). 
 
Hank more overtly explains his use of a less goal-driven personal therapy as a means 
to counterbalance the goal-driven nature of his clinical practice. In this way personal 
therapy appears to offer Hank a sense of balance:  
 
“The payoff is I’m goal driven in my sessions but then when I go to my own 
personal therapy it allows me to just, just be… but with my, with the client 
base that I have it’s not about just being, it’s about working towards the goal. 
And that’s why they come to see a cognitive therapist rather than someone 
else” (Hank, p. 21, line 446). 
 
The difference between the therapy participants’ sought and the therapy they 
delivered seemed to elicit a sense of distance between themselves as clients and their 
clients. Participants’ use of their own personal therapy appeared different from their 
clients’ use of CBT. Yet as therapists, participants’ experiences of personal therapy 
modelled the flexibility and openness that seemed to enhance their capacity to 
connect with, and relate to, their clients’ unique qualities; bridging the gap between 




Self and Other 
The more participants learned about themselves the more they seemed to allow 
themselves to relate to their clients. Participants appeared to use their personal therapy 
to become aware of their own feelings and to share themselves as a part of their 
clients’ experiences. Personal therapy seemed to facilitate participants’ capacities to 
assume a clinical responsibility to think about what had gone on between them and 
their clients. Five out of the seven participants conveyed that their own self-awareness 
allowed them to get involved, and connect, with their clients’ experiences in therapy. 
The following extracts appeared to illustrate participants’ capacities for reflexivity, 
which further seemed to illuminate a fundamental relationship between self and other 
in clinical practice.  
 
For example, Charlotte recounts the first time she becomes aware of her potential 
influence on her client. Her experience seems to illustrate a shift from a clinically 
objective process by which she keeps herself out of, or separate from, her client’s 
experience, to a subjective process by which she considers and shares herself as part 
of her client’s experience: 
  
“…I started thinking about, um, the feelings that are being, you know, that are 
experienced in a room, how much of it is the client’s, how much of it is mine” 
(Charlotte, p. 8, line 179). 
 
Hank similarly recounts his own experience of becoming aware of his feelings in 
relation to his client, and describes what appears to be a confusion between his own 
and his client’s ‘anxiety’:  
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“…I took on [my client’s] anxiety, and I brought that to therapy to sort of look 
at that, that, that I had her anxiety…that’s where therapy will help you or help 
me sort of move forward, um, where I can just go, okay let’s just pull the 
bones out of something” (Hank, p. 20, line 424). 
 
Raul also reflects on how his personal therapy directly impacts his clinical practice by 
facilitating his capacity to think about what is going on between him and his client. 
Raul seems to describe a clinical process by which he uses his personal therapy to 
explore the emotional impact of his clinical work:  
 
“…I dealt with it in personal therapy because I was really wiped out by it. Um, 
I just felt completely, uh, um, uh, um, annihilated by the process, um, and that 
was very helpful because I was able to put it into place and to think, well, you 
know, what was actually going on?” (Raul, p. 23, line 472). 
 
Karly takes it a step further by discussing how she uses her self-awareness to inform 
her therapeutic interventions. In the following example, she describes how she is not 
able to select between different clinical interventions on the basis of how she herself 
is feeling with her client.  Karly’s openness to the choices available to her seems 
relevant to the topic of subjective engagement discussed earlier in the subtheme, 
‘Protocol vs Exploration’, with Peter. Like Peter, Karly’s prime concern seems to be 
about how she relates to her clients and appears to demonstrate her clinical capacity to 
take responsibility for her own motivations: 
 
“I’ll think, what’s my motivation? Am I trying to prove that I’m a good 
therapist? In that moment, what’s going on for me? Am I feeling vulnerable? 
If I’m feeling vulnerable, is it my vulnerability? Is it their vulnerability? So all 
of that has to happen really quickly as a therapist in your, in those 
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nanoseconds when it whizzes through your brain. And then it’s within, it 
becomes a choice as to whether I then make an informed intervention” (Karly, 
p. 24, line 597). 
 
Whilst personal therapy appeared to conflict with many aspects of the ‘mainstream’ 
CBT model as perceived by participants, the very aspects that clashed with their 
identity as CBT therapists seemed to inversely tie them closer together with their 
clients. Personal therapy seemed to facilitate a space for individuality and flexibility 
fundamental to participants’ clinical practice. Although perhaps messier, their 
capacities to ‘use the self’ to take responsibility for their own feelings and 
vulnerabilities appeared to strengthen participants’ capacities to tolerate the feelings 
and vulnerabilities of their clients.  
 
Master Theme 2:  Personal Therapy Ties Me to Humanity – “You know, you’ve 
got to be kind of human” (Raul, p. 29, line 591). 
 
All participants spoke about their feelings and vulnerabilities in ways they seemed to 
consider a ‘normal’ part of ‘being human’. Their shared sense of ‘being human’ 
appeared to convey a transparency by which participants seemed open to their own 
emotional complexities and to connecting with their clients’ unique complexities, as 
opposed to, perhaps, considering themselves to be void of emotional conflicts and 
unlike their clients. Nonetheless, some participants described a struggle to ‘be human’ 
as therapists, under pressure to remain emotionally unaffected by their own life 
experiences, which suggested the presence of a divide between therapists (the 
unaffected) and clients (the affected). ‘Being human’ seemed to include 
vulnerabilities and problems that, as therapists, they felt they should not have. 
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However, participants’ experiences as both clients and therapists appeared to bridge 
this gap and seemed for many participants to sponsor an experience in which two 
humans could share a therapeutic space. Many participants reflected on their positions 
as both client and therapist, moving between both positions and drawing from both 
their experience with clients as well as their experience as clients, to better understand 
their clinical experiences. It seemed as if participants were suggesting that drawing 
from their own experience to understand their clients’ experiences enabled them to 
forge fundamental connections based on the shared experience of ‘being human’.  
 
Manifesting empathy 
All participants demonstrated a capacity to understand and share the feelings of their 
clients. Knowledge of their own vulnerabilities and emotional sensitivities seemed to 
facilitate a process of empathy by which participants and their clients could find 
common ground. The underlying commonality of being human, of being in therapy 
and of being familiar with the emotional burdens of life, seemed to enable participants 
to meet their clients where they are, to help tolerate and work through their clients’ 
suffering. Offering themselves to their clients in this way appeared to illustrate a 
strong connection between them, in contrast to, perhaps, the distance created when 
one feels pity for another’s misfortune. Participants seemed to be familiar with their 
own misfortunes and used their familiarity to be more relatable to their clients.  
 
For example, below Hank speaks about how his personal therapy ‘helps me be okay 
with my clients’, and appears to demonstrate a parallel process by which his enhanced 
self-acceptance facilitates his acceptance of his clients. Furthermore, his capacity to 
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draw from both his positions as client and therapist seems to enhance his capacity to 
position himself by his client and participate in his clients’ clinical experiences:  
 
“…my personal therapy would help me to, to be okay with the reality of where 
my clients are at, um, which allows them to live their lives as they need 
to…it’s sort of normalising life and not making it, um, this big scary thing” 
(Hank, p. 17, line 369).  
 
Similarly, Dorinda reflects on how personal therapy enhances her capacity to 
empathise with clients, and demonstrates her capacity to share an emotional space 
with her client; to keep her client in mind while also moving between her positions as 
both therapist and client, to make sense of complex clinical experiences: 
 
“…I just kind of make sense of it in therapy for me and…I will also talk about 
it when the client is in mind. So it’s not just about me…it’s me wanting to 
discuss whatever touched me but at the same time, uh, having the client in 
mind (Dorinda, p. 6, line 120).  
 
Karly more specifically recounts a complex clinical experience when her client’s 
issues touch on her own. Drawing from both her experiences as therapist and client, 
Karly attempts to facilitate an alternative experience to ‘what always happens’.  By 
allowing herself to be affected by the experience, she appears to make greater effort to 
be a part of her client’s experience, and works alongside her client to co-facilitate an 
alternative outcome:  
 
“…the client wanted to just end…and I said, no…you’re going to come back 
and we’re going to look at this, and we’re going to reflect and understand and 
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be together in this ending… we’re not going to do what always happens in 
both their life and my life” (Karly, p. 10, line 235). 
 
Six out of the seven participants spoke about how their experiences as both therapist 
and client facilitated their capacity to be affected by their clients and to use their own 
feelings to be more receptive to their clients’ experiences. Participants’ reflections 
demonstrated a clear distinction between the notions of empathy and sympathy, by 
which participants were open to sharing a parallel experience with their clients rather 
than separating themselves, the unaffected, from their clients, the affected.  
 
Recognising the client within  
All participants spoke about their experiences of recognising the client within 
themselves and appeared to demonstrate a clinical capacity to identify something in 
their clients after having encountered it within themselves. It seemed as if self-
knowledge was used by participants to monitor their own experience; to use 
themselves as tools to respond to clients; and to sense how their responses impacted 
their clients. Participants seemed to share a sense of having ‘been there’ as clients, 
which appeared to facilitate their sensitivity as therapists. In some cases, it seemed 
that participants had modelled in clinical practice that which they had received from 
their own therapist in personal therapy. Allowing themselves to identify with their 
clients in this way appeared to demonstrate a heightened sense of sensitivity, 
receptivity and respect. 
 
For example, Sandra speaks about her own experience of needing to cry in her 
therapy and how this has influenced her capacity to recognise and tolerate crying in 
her client. Identifying with her client in this way appears to influence Sandra’s 
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capacity to be receptive to her client’s needs, rather than block her client’s process to 
ameliorate her own discomfort: 
 
“And I have it out not to engineer and interrupt because I have been through 
that experience and I recognise the importance of their need to cry for, for, for 
fifty minutes and that’s okay and my being silent and that’s okay. So I’m more 
comfortable, I’m comfortable with that” (Sandra, p. 12, line 266). 
 
Dorinda similarly describes a parallel therapeutic process by which her experience of 
being observed and tended to in personal therapy enhances her capacity to be 
observant and attentive towards her clients. Furthermore, Dorinda’s admission to ‘just 
think it to myself’ serves as an acknowledgement of the CBT model she follows, 
which does not involve discussions of ‘unconscious processes’, and appears to 
illustrate the significance of her ‘notice’:  
 
“But I might just think it to myself. You know, which unconscious un-
conscious process did it trigger? What am I noticing that is your blind spot, as 
a therapist? And why I notice that blind spot, mainly because I’ve been there. I 
had, I’ve got my own blind spots” (Dorinda, p. 14, line 316). 
 
Like Sandra and Dorinda, Hank, too, draws on his own experiences of ‘being there’ as 
a client to reflect on his clients’ experiences in therapy, and seems to use himself as a 
tool, to model his own learning, to relate to and connect with his clients:  
 
“…most people don’t like to admit when they’re wrong…and, you know, if I 
get it wrong it’s okay to say it. That’s part of learning. It’s about saying, okay, 
I got that wrong, you know, it’s okay the world is not going to stop” (Hank, p. 
14, line 298). 
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Below, Peter’s capacity to reflect on his early experiences of emotional difficulty 
offers him insight into his clinical practice. Although he had not undergone CBT 
himself, his ability to draw from his own experiences as a client seems to facilitate his 
sensitivity as a therapist to his clients’ emotional difficulties and the great relief 
therapy can offer: 
 
“My early years were very sort of isolated…and full of awkward emotions 
like shame…and, so CBT comes along and provides a very explicit template, 
which enables one to actually say, well this is how emotions happen” (Peter, 
transcript 2, p.1, line 23).  
 
All participants felt that their positions as clients were essential to their clinical 
practice and offered them insight they otherwise could not attain. The ease in which 
they could be like their clients seemed to support a notion of common humanity. Yet, 
this also seemed to reveal a sense of unease as if, as therapists, participants should not 
be like their clients.  
 
Holding both positions as therapist and client  
Participants all conveyed a curious paradox: on the one hand, they described the 
importance of simultaneously occupying the position of both therapist and client; and 
on the other, they appeared anxious about their role as clients, almost as if emotional 
difficulties were deemed to be unacceptable in therapists.  
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For example, Peter appears to accept his emotional difficulties as a ‘normal’ part of 
being human. However, according to Peter, what is accepted as ‘normal’ for clients is 
not necessarily accepted as ‘normal’ for therapists:  
 
“It’s just a bit of my life that hasn’t been quite normal. I mean it’s normal to 
be fucked up but, you know, it’s not the normal thing you’ve, I think you’d 
expect counsellors to have had” (Peter, Transcript 2, p. 6, line 137). 
 
Having the same feelings and psychological issues as a client evokes a feeling of 
panic in Charlotte. Like Peter, Charlotte speaks about her fears of having emotional 
problems as a therapist, and seems to suggest that therapists who suffer emotionally 
are unfit for practice:  
 
“…she was depressed, and she started talking about her struggle….as she was 
talking I, I just had this moment of panic, like, god she’s describing me! You 
know, she’s talking about me. And then I think I really panicked because I 
thought…how can I help her when she’s describing me as her problem” 
(Charlotte, p. 9, line 204).  
 
Karly seems to use her position as a therapist to challenge herself as a client. Her 
capacity to relate to her clients’ issues appears to serve as her motivation to work 
through her own, which she further finds to be crucial to her development as a 
therapist:  
 
“CBT is absolutely pivotal in challenging my own issues, my own relationship 
with anxi—with anything. Anxiety, depression, mood, eating, you know, all 
the different aspects that come in through the door” (Karly, p. 6, line 138). 
 
 89 
Hank similarly considers the transcendent influence of his emotional development. 
His capacity to acknowledge and take responsibility for his own issues facilitates his 
capacity to be ‘open’ with his clients. Furthermore, Hank’s reference to therapists and 
humans as the same translates his process of therapeutic connection to a process of 
human connection by which he works through his own ‘stuff’ to allow access, and 
make room for others, within himself: 
 
“As a therapist or as being a human being, I think if …you understand and 
own your own stuff you can be more open with other people the same way 
you can be with a client (Hank, p. 12, line 247). 
 
Maintaining a space within 
All participants spoke about a shared therapeutic ‘space’ within themselves that they 
reserved for their clients. This notion appeared to illustrate a psychologically 
hospitable area located inside what might be described as participants’ ‘souls’: a 
mental space of emotional holding, capable of offering support and succour to clients. 
My impression was that participants conveyed a shared sense of being at their client’s 
disposal and appeared to provide their clients with an emotional and spiritual safe 
place where their clients could begin to discover themselves. It appeared that the 
fundamental connection participants managed to forge with their clients depended on 
the relationship they established with themselves. On one level, participants spoke of 
offering to their clients that which had been offered to them as clients. On a deeper 
level, participants seemed to call upon their own vulnerabilities to use themselves as 
clinical tools to better understand and tolerate their clients.  
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For example, Dorinda acknowledges her capacity to use and share a space inside 
herself, where she has been made aware of her own suffering, to allow for, and 
embrace, her clients’ suffering. This appears to illustrate a parallel process by which 
Dorinda’s experience of conveying and expressing her suffering to another prepares 
her to be receptive to her client’s suffering:  
 
“‘Cause I’m kind of aware of my own suffering, but I’m also aware of the 
person who’s coming suffering. ‘Cause I spoke about my own suffering in my 
own therapy….so I’ll have a lot of space for that” (Dorinda, p. 17, line 374). 
 
Similarly, Sandra recognises a ‘space’ within herself that she is able to offer clients 
‘in need’. Her capacity to reflect on her own experience as a client ‘in need’ and the 
‘generosity’ she received appears to facilitate her capacity to offer her clients a similar 
hospitality within herself, sourced by benevolence and beneficence:  
 
“…because I had that sort of generosity experience, that generosity at a time 
of need, I also feel it would be nice for me to offer it to someone” (Sandra, p. 
9, line 200).  
 
Hank, too, refers to a hospitable space inside himself that is meant for sharing with his 
clients. His reference to ‘sitting’ with his clients might be seen as a metaphor for the 
internal home in which Hank invites his clients to ‘pour their hearts out’. There is also 
a sense of familiarity that emerges from this extract as if Hank knows what it is like 
for his clients because he has ‘been there’, too. Hank’s hospitality appears to illustrate 




“You are building a relationship with a client because they’re sitting there 
with you and are about to, um, sort of pour their hearts out and tell you their 
life story” (Hank, p. 11, line 227). 
 
Raul describes how his capacity for self-awareness serves to enhance his sense of 
tolerance for his clients’ uniqueness. This reciprocal process appears to illustrate a 
sense of hospitality within Raul where he can move out of the way to allow his clients 
to become more visible. Therefore, by sharing his hospitality, he appears to become 
more aware of his clients’ unique qualities: 
 
“It’s the use of the self. And the more you are aware of how you are as a 
person, I think, the more you are aware of how the other is as a person and the 
more you can see what’s going on for the other” (Raul, p. 28, line 583). 
 
Participants’ experiences of ‘using the self’ seemed to highlight the significance of 
their personal therapy in sharing a common ground with their clients. Their capacity 
to tolerate their clients’ difficult emotions appeared to rely on their capacity to tolerate 
their own. Participants seemed to call upon their own vulnerabilities to forge 
fundamental connections with their clients based on the shared experience of being 
human. It was clear that they all valued ‘being’ with their clients in this way, 
however, found it difficult to determine its worth within the goal-driven, ‘doing’-





Master Theme 3: Personal Therapy: Being and Doing – “…by doing you’re 
also…you’re being as well. It’s, it’s sort of marrying those two together” (Hank, p. 
23, line 505).  
 
The ‘marriage’ of being and doing described by participants illuminated a distinction 
between a therapeutic emphasis on being experienced in their personal therapy and 
the therapeutic emphasis on doing prioritised in the CBT model they followed. 
Participants found that their roles as therapists relied on their capacities to both be and 
do; however they often struggled to find the space ‘to just be’ in the action-focused, 
goal-orientated CBT model they perceived. In light of this difficulty, five out of the 
seven participants spoke about their efforts to keep a balance between ‘being’ and 
‘doing’ in their clinical practice. Participants believed that the spiritual and emotional 
safe place they provided served to facilitate their clients’ capacities to reach their 
therapeutic goals, yet it remained difficult to explicate how. This difficulty further 
appeared to reveal a lack of space within the field for participants to think about and 
discuss experiences of ‘being’ outside of their personal therapy.  
 
 Making room for emotional experiencing 
Four out of the seven participants referred to the value they placed on allowing their 
clients ‘to just be’, a seemingly ‘foreign’ concept to the CBT model, which instead 
they found focused more on achieving ‘goals’. Participants collectively described the 
CBT model as a therapeutic process revolved around ‘expectations’ and ‘procedures’ 
that could ‘distract’ and leave little room for clients’ emotional experiencing. 
Therefore, participants seemed to have to go ‘off-track’ from their CBT practice to 
prioritise their clients’ emotional experiences.  
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For example, Peter talks about being open to his client’s requests to go ‘off track’ 
from his ‘procedure’-led clinical practice. It seems that Peter’s experience of personal 
therapy facilitates his clinical capacity to follow the CBT model with flexibility, to 
feel more comfortable veering off the session goals and in tolerating his clients’ 
emotional experiences: 
 
“If they don’t want to go a particular way, I’m very easy going about that. 
That doesn’t worry me. ‘You don’t have to do this procedure, let’s just talk’, 
you know, I’ve got all that. And I think I gained that from doing these very 
different therapies, which were invitatory in nature” (Peter, transcript 1, p. 7, 
line 134). 
 
Unlike Peter, Sandra struggles with the expectations she encounters in working with a 
tearful client under the CBT model. Her metaphor of a CBT ‘supervisor’, which you 
might remember from the subtheme, ‘Working in the shadow of what CBT should 
be’, appears to illustrate her internalised sense of pressure to achieve goals and to 
stick to an agenda that is not always relevant to her clients’ experiences. Sandra’s 
predicament seems to demonstrate her sense of having to choose between the CBT 
model’s expectations ‘to do more’ and her clinical intuition: 
  
“It’s probably hard to tell your supervisor, ‘I just let the person cry for the 
entire fifty minutes’. It’s almost like a, well you need to do more…to move 
towards the goal of using their scores…there are a certain set of expectations 
associated with what you achieve” (Sandra, p. 12, line 260). 
 
Charlotte similarly speaks about her struggles of working under the CBT model, 
which she seems to see as an obstacle in the way of allowing clients ‘to just be’. Her 
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views of the CBT model’s priorities to take action and challenge thoughts seems to 
work against the self-acceptance she aims to facilitate in her clinical practice. 
Charlotte appears to find it difficult to integrate a space for emotional experiencing 
into the CBT model she perceives and, like Sandra, senses her need to choose 
between the CBT model and her clinical values:  
 
“…the space for a person to just be and, um to just accept, you know, rather 
than trying to distract themselves or run away from it or correct their thoughts 
or their pattern of behaviour.” (Charlotte, p. 12, line 283).  
 
Dorinda believes that her personal therapy has made her more aware of the implicit 
feelings indirectly expressed by her clients. However, she struggles to reveal these 
‘anxieties’ in her clinical practice, which she finds, quite simply, ‘CBT doesn’t have 
space for’:  
 
“But I’m much more aware that the people who come through this door find it 
sometimes very difficult to talk, there is a whole host of anxieties before you 
even enter the therapy room…You know, that kind of thing. That that CBT 
doesn’t have space for” (Dorinda, p. 14, line 344). 
 
 Being present 
Participants spoke about their experiences of working with implicit communication in 
their clinical practice, such as of handling or containing feelings indirectly expressed 
by their clients. However, incorporating an understanding of implicit communication 
into the explicit template of the CBT model appeared to be difficult for some 
participants. Four out of the seven participants considered how their experiences of 
being present with their clients, to ‘attend’ to, and ‘attune’ to, their clients’ implicit 
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communications, served to benefit their clinical practice. Participants’ accounts 
appeared to illustrate an intricate process of ‘tuning in’ to their own experiences while 
simultaneously staying with, and responding to, their clients’ experiences. Existing in 
sessions with their clients in this way seemed to allow participants to be guided by 
their clients and to contribute more extensively to a shared clinical experience. 
 
For example, below Sandra recounts feedback she had received from her client, who 
felt that she had provided him with an ‘individualised’ treatment. Sandra considers 
that her capacity to ‘attend’ to her client facilitates her capacity to provide a 
standardised treatment in a way that feels individualised. Sandra’s experience appears 
to illustrate her participation in her client’s clinical experience in a way that maintains 
a shared sense of connection: 
 
“I wasn’t inventing new interventions that have never been used but I guess 
perhaps there was this attending to, taking hold of all, all the different issues 
and, um, perhaps him having a sense that I am connected to him” (Sandra, p. 
18, line 382). 
 
Charlotte more specifically recounts her experience of putting aside her CBT protocol 
in order to follow her client’s lead. It seems that her awareness of her preoccupation 
with the CBT protocols facilitates her ability to redirect her focus to her client. This 
process appears to demonstrate Charlotte’s clinical capacity to use her self-awareness 
in the session to prioritise and stay connected to her client:  
 
“I sort of put all the paper and everything away and I just sat. And I, um, and 
she cried, very much so, and she talked, um and I felt that that’s exactly what 
she needed there and then” (Charlotte, p. 15, line 354). 
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Karly similarly speaks about her efforts to ‘bracket off’ her own thoughts, opinions 
and judgements from her clients, to be more open to, and explorative of, her clients’ 
experiences. This process appears to demonstrate Karly’s clinical capacity to 
simultaneously engage with both her experience and that of her client, which seems to 
create a shared clinical experience:  
 
“I’m very aware of my own frame of reference sometimes coming into the 
room and how to bracket that off so how to really think about it, this is how I 
think about it, but stay with the client, stay with the client’s material in terms 
of how do they understand it, how they make meaning, what is the 
significance in their life?” (Karly, p. 6, line 134). 
 
Hank more explicitly refers to his use of personal therapy to attend to his client who 
struggles to stay ‘present’. Hank seems to identify with his client’s difficulty and 
draws upon his own therapy to facilitate his own capacity to be ‘present and focused’. 
By tuning in to his own experience Hank manages to stay with and take part in his 
client’s experience:  
 
“…I have one client in particular…he comes in here and…he’s already, he’s 
had his session…So I have to bring him back to right now to where we are 
right now…And so for that to happen I also need to be present and focused. 
So that’s when my personal therapy comes in. It helps me to be there and do 
that” (Hank, p. 43, line 512).  
 
 Participating in the therapeutic process 
Participants’ involvement in their clinical practice implied more than a protocol-
driven notion of therapy, in which they drew from their own experiences to better 
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understand their clients and to forge fundamental connections with them. Participants 
both consciously and unconsciously appeared to draw upon their personal therapy in 
their clinical practice to facilitate their more intimate participation. All participants 
spoke about their clinical practice in a way that seemed to involve them as integral 
parts of the therapeutic process alongside their clients. Their personal sense of 
involvement appeared to illustrate participants’ openness to being affected by their 
clients.  
 
For example, Charlotte speaks about her experience following a session in which she 
suffers from symptoms similar to her client. Charlotte seems to first become aware of 
her own personal experience before connecting it to the symptoms her client had 
presented earlier that day, illustrating her very personal sense of involvement in her 
client’s experience. This appears to demonstrate Charlotte’s capacity to participate in 
her client’s experience by tolerating her client’s occupation of her: 
 
“…I start noticing that my hand starts sweating and…my heartbeat was sort of 
faster and…I was really anxious and…I just really wanted to run out of the 
bus and I didn’t want to be there so um but I couldn’t even get up…and these 
were very much the very symptoms that the client was presenting to me in the 
sessions” (Charlotte, p. 6, line 142).  
 
Karly talks about what it is like when her clients’ issues touch on her own during a 
session. She describes how she has to consciously set her own concerns aside so as to 
make herself more emotionally available for her clients. My impression is that Karly’s 
enhanced self-awareness demonstrates her clinical capacity to be more available to 
her clients and to be involved in her clients’ unique experiences:  
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“…when I work with clients around issues around food there is a lot that 
comes up: issues around weight, constructions around body image, um, I have 
to be yeah I have, I have to be quite mindful that I have thoughts and 
sometimes it’s a really deliberate bracketing off while I’m sitting as a 
therapist. I have to go, ‘that no—that’s for another time’” (Karly, pg. 14, line 
341).  
 
Dorinda also talks about what it is like when her clients’ issues touch on her own. 
However, her reference to the ‘fast-paced’ nature of her CBT service seems to support 
her sense of difficulty in making room for the implicit emotions that arise in relation 
to her client ‘that CBT doesn’t have space for’. Nonetheless, her differentiation 
between ‘a difficult client’ and ‘a client’s difficulties’ that affect her seems to signify 
her openness to being affected by her clients and her capacity to take responsibility 
for her own ‘being’ in her clinical practice: 
 
“If I have a difficult—not a necessarily difficult client but a client that their 
issues, whatever they are, really, really touch me in…an emotional way…I 
would, uh, yeah, would find it really difficult afterwards because, again, this is 
a very fast-paced service” (Dorinda, p. 5, line 112). 
 
 Seeking balance 
Most participants described the difficulty of balancing the experience of just ‘being’ 
they received in their own therapy with the more active, ‘doing’ framework of the 
CBT model they were applying in clinical practice. Six out of the seven participants 
seemed to find a balance by incorporating aspects of self-reflection and emotional 
attunement as a foundation for their clinical practice. This appeared to illustrate their 
use of ‘being’ as a base from which to ‘do’ their clinical work. It was as if this 
implicit ‘use of self’ served as a supplement to the explicit templates of participants’ 
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clinical protocols. Participants’ capacities to relate their clinical work as therapists to 
their personal therapy as clients seemed to translate into their capacities to relate to 
their clients and to work together to provide a congruent therapy.   
 
For example, Hank speaks about the internal balance he achieves from his personal 
therapy, which serves to benefit his clinical practice. It appears that Hank’s 
experience in his own therapy translates into the ‘cognitive’ and ‘goal-driven’ focus 
of his clinical practice by ‘refreshing’ his ability to be self-aware and mindful: 
 
“So maybe the balance of, um, me working cognitively, um having the 
personal therapy that’s not goal-driven, allows it to be balanced…it allows me 
to be very refreshed and very, um, uh, present in, in, in the sessions with my 
clients. So yeah, personal therapy gives me that, the ability to be very 
conscious and real within my sessions” (Hank, p. 20, line 435). 
 
Charlotte recounts the first time she had experienced the healing capacity of empathic, 
‘non-doing’ in personal therapy, an experience that, like Hank, now translates into her 
clinical practice. It seems that, prior to her own experience of therapeutic empathy, 
Charlotte had not realised its absence from her protocol-led clinical practice in which 
she saw therapy as an activity designed to ‘do’ and ‘fix’:  
 
“I really underestimated the power of empathy…I just wanted to do things, fix 
things, you know, working with things and have an issue and solve it…But I 
think it wasn’t until then that I experienced pure empathy in a very, very 
therapeutic, um, way (Charlotte, p. 11, line 253). 
 
Dorinda similarly speaks about her role or, even, ‘rule’ as a therapist to involve both 
her capacities for symptom treatment and emotional containment. In the subtheme, 
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‘Making room for emotional experiencing’, she reflects on her clients’ implicit 
feelings of anxiety that seems to extend beyond the scope of the goal-driven CBT 
model she follows. Whilst there does not appear to be room for these implicit feelings 
within the explicit templates of her clinical practice, Dorinda appears to make room 
for them within herself: 
 
“I would be more containing and more patient ‘cause, ‘cause I see my rule, my 
role is not just treating a disorder but also being a space for the anxiety and to 
be contained” (Dorinda, p.16 line 352).  
 
Karly discusses the significance of using both implicit and explicit communications in 
her clinical practice to provide well-informed interventions. She exercises her 
capacity to balance her implicit reactions with explicit reflections, demonstrating her 
direct acknowledgement of that which is indirectly expressed. This appears to 
illustrate how Karly balances ‘being’ and ‘doing’ within her clinical practice: 
 
“I have a particular client who likes to know that I’ve remembered their 
history…And sometimes I will choose to give them that that 
acknowledgement…And there are other times when I think I’ll, I’ll perhaps 
just reflect on, on what they’re doing…I wonder what’s happening that they’re 
feeling the need to seek reassurance that I’ve remembered something” (Karly, 






This chapter discusses key findings in relation to relevant theoretical literature. 
Consistent with an IPA model, participants’ experiences of internal conflict and of 
‘being human’ are discussed and contextualised through a philosophical framework. 
This follows with clinical implications for training, theory, and practice in CBT. The 
reflective considerations and delimitations of this study are then addressed with 
suggestions for further research. From the analysis presented in the previous chapter 
three master themes have emerged: ‘Personal Therapy Creates Conflict’, ‘Personal 
Therapy Ties Me to Humanity’, and ‘Personal Therapy: Being and Doing’. Potential 
implications of these themes are explored in the sections below.  
 
Personal Therapy Creates Conflict 
All participants referred to their experiences of personal therapy in a way that seemed 
to create conflicts in their clinical work. It seems important to consider that all 
participants had only experienced personal therapy of a different model to CBT, 
except for one, who had undergone CBT briefly but had more experience of personal 
therapy of a different model. An important distinction can be made between ‘personal 
therapy’ per se and the particular model of therapy that was experienced by 
participants. It can be argued that long-term exposure to a model of therapy (from 
personal therapy or otherwise) that is different to the one in which one has been 
trained is likely to potentially interfere in the way one thinks and practices. Yet, it was 
participants’ sense of dubiousness about integrating aspects of their personal therapy 
into their clinical practice that stood out. Recall that Dorinda describes her clinical 
work as: “…completely almost pure CBT protocol but really influenced by just a little 
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tiny bit of psychodynamic thinking that…I gained from looking at my own 
processes…in my own therapy, what I re-enact from the past” (p. 5, line 101).  
In another example, Peter states, “Now some would say, ‘this is a disaster, that 
doesn’t do the trick’. Um but I tend to feel this helps clinical practice…So you could 
say, from a rigid CBT point of view, it’s led me astray” (transcript 1, p. 8, line 151). It 
was the aspects of their own therapy that participants found most helpful that seemed, 
at the same time, to be the very aspects that were most painfully at odds with their 
professional identity as CBT therapists.  
 
In ‘Working in the shadow of what CBT should be’ participants spoke about how 
their personal therapy equipped them with therapeutic tools that paradoxically 
hindered their capacity to practice ‘pure’ CBT: a seemingly clean and uncontaminated 
clinical template against which their rather messier personal therapy experiences 
intruded, and about which they seemed to feel guilty. Most participants shared a sense 
of clinical wrongdoing, as if under pressure to practice CBT ‘purely’, which, 
consequently, appeared to sponsor their experiences of conflict with the CBT model.  
 
Accounts suggested that being a CBT therapist meant adhering to one standard 
without the space for individuality and flexibility. ‘Protocol versus exploration’ and 
‘Practice versus preach’ further drew attention to striking differences between the 
therapy participants sought and the therapy they delivered. For example, Dorinda 
states “I don’t go to therapy from a sort of mental health crisis point of view. I go to 
therapy as a way of self-discovery” (p.11, line 239). Yet, it was their very use of 
personal therapy for self-discovery that seemed to support their sense of connection to 
their clients; enhancing their capacities to relate to others.  
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‘Self and other’ helped illuminate participants’ experiences of being in relation to 
their clients. Participants spoke about how their personal therapy served to enhance 
self-awareness, to familiarise them with their own feelings, and to facilitate their 
capacities to share themselves with their clients in order to be a part of their clients’ 
clinical experiences. Accounts suggested that personal therapy facilitated a space for 
individuality and flexibility fundamental to their clinical practice. Although perhaps 
messier, participants’ capacities to ‘use the self’ to take responsibility for their own 
feelings and vulnerabilities appeared to strengthen their capacities to tolerate the 
feelings and vulnerabilities of their clients. 
 
A dilemma in the field of psychology 
Participants’ experiences of conflict between their personal therapy and clinical 
practice can be broadened to a dilemma in the field of psychology in which the 
prevailing political culture seems to dismiss the therapist’s ‘use of self’ in place of 
‘pure’ and ready-made solutions; prioritising adherence to treatment strategies over 
the relational components of clinical theory and practice. Gabriel Marcel’s existential 
theories (1949, 1951, 1963a, 1964a) offer insight into this rise in technology and 
techniques and its overall dehumanizing effects, within which our inherent need for 
connection becomes a collection of internal conflicts and dilemmas. Gabriel Marcel’s 
philosophical perspective seems to penetrate the essence of participants’ experiences, 




Gabriel Honoré Marcel (1889-1973) was a French existential philosopher who gave 
significant consideration to the factors of constructive and meaningful relationships 
within a technologically dehumanizing society. In his philosophical writings, Marcel 
(1964a, 1965) invites us as humans to be ‘present’ with one another, rather than 
becoming objects for each other. His philosophy has scarcely been incorporated into 
the research literature of the helping professions and, therefore, it seems appropriate 
to briefly introduce Marcel to the reader before drawing on his key ideas to enrich 
participants’ accounts.  
 
Marcel’s preoccupation with human existence emerged alongside his existentialist 
contemporaries, such as Paul Ricœur, Emmanuel Levinas, Simone de Beauvoir and 
Jean-Paul Sartre, amongst others. Yet, he was particularly influenced by the Christian 
philosophy of Sören Kierkegaard (Malagon, 2016). Raised atheist, Marcel’s 
fascination with religious dimensions of life led to his conversion to Christianity at 
the age of 40. Due to spiritual differences, Marcel and Sartre quickly became rivals. 
Sartre’s atheistic views on the reality of God and philosophy of the isolated self as 
detached from the outside world (Sartre, 1943/1992) conflicted with Marcel’s concern 
for experience over abstraction (i.e. he felt God and, therefore, God existed; Marcel, 
1951) and belief in the inherent ‘participation’ between self and other (Marcel, 1949). 
Marcel’s (1949, 1951, 1964a) philosophy, alternatively, shares many parallels with 
Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965; 1923/1970) both of whom found that 
our capacity to understand the essence of another’s experience is embedded in our 
capacity to connect with another and to ‘participate’ in the other’s experience.  
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The term ‘mystery’ was used by Marcel to describe the insights that arise from our 
‘participation’ with others (Marcel, 1965). However, Marcel (1964a) warned that the 
world of science inherently supports an objective perspective of problem-solving 
through which human ‘mystery’ is easily dismissed. The conflict between personal 
therapy and clinical practice experienced by participants resonates with Marcel’s 
(1949, 1963a) theory of how our growing reliance on technology and techniques can 
serve to deny the presence of ‘mystery’ by allowing only that which techniques can 
address: the problematic.  
 
Problem versus mystery 
It appears that the field of psychology has become easily influenced by the rise of 
treatment protocols, and is becoming increasingly dominated by a science of 
quantitative methodologies and objective outcome measures that serve to translate the 
subjective aspect of treatment into formulaic techniques or procedures—if not to deny 
its existence altogether. Recall Raul’s distinction between ‘mainstream’ CBT and his 
clinical practice: “I regard CBT as the application of evidence-based protocols to 
specific problems. That isn’t my definition of therapy. I see therapy as a much more 
of an exploratory operation” (p. 4, line 72). Participants highlight a major thread of 
Marcel’s (1952) philosophy that raises the issue of protecting one's subjectivity from 
annihilation within a technology-driven society. Marcel recognised the benefits of 
technology, however, warned of a ‘technological mindset’ where people are 
considered as something to be manipulated and exploited, rather than being 
considered someone with whom to engage and participate. 
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Participants distanced their CBT practice from the standardised, protocol-led CBT 
ideal they perceived, which seemed to reflect the value they placed on exploring their 
clients’ mysteries, rather than following a more ‘mainstream’ CBT model: where 
human problems become standardised and are meant to be solved similarly from 
person to person with a technique that, arguably, could be employed by anyone 
(Treanor & Sweetman, 2016). For example, Dorinda recounts the dehumanising 
effects the medical model of mental health treatment can have on both client and 
therapist: “…they come in, and they go woosh ‘Here’s all my stuff, you deal with it.’ 
And and then you kind of diagnose and, and you treat…Doctor my foot is hurting” (p. 
14, line 342). In speaking about her clinical practice, Dorinda raises the issue of 
becoming a problem-solver.    
 
Marcel (1952) was critical of science for its dehumanizing effects, as well as, its focus 
on solving problems. A ‘problem’ is a question that is meant to be answered 
objectively and in which, consequently, the identity of the questioner becomes 
irrelevant.  In contrast, a ‘mystery’ represents a process of exploration and meaning-
making, which, consequently, invites the questioner to subjectively participate, 
facilitate, and be touched by ‘the other’ experience (Marcel, 1963a). Once the object 
of a problem is understood or solved, it is considered complete, whereas a mystery 
always remains alive and interesting (Marcel, 1949). More importantly, and 
embedded within this research project, a ‘mystery’ is a question in which I, as the 
researcher, am intimately involved. 
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Science versus philosophy 
My close connection with this research project compares with participants’ accounts 
of their intimate involvement in clinical practice: there were times I felt it was 
necessary to ‘go off track’ from the interview schedule in order to stay with 
participants’ experiences. As Charlotte recounts: “…if I continued with my structured 
sort of way…I would’ve completely overlooked [my client’s] needs and what was so 
alive in the room” (p. 15, line 360). However, at first, this can be challenging. My 
internal sense of pressure to be a ‘scientific-practitioner’ as I conceived it, presented 
an internal dilemma as if I had to choose between adhering to a method and allowing 
myself to be led by, and to relate to, participants. My experience further resonated 
with Peter’s experience of relying too heavily on protocols: “I appear at times 
mechanistic, and I’ve sometimes thought, oh god I didn’t really relate to that person 
at all” (transcript 1, p. 21, line 435). Following my first and second interviews, I 
acknowledge my dilemma in supervision and came to realise that my position as a 
‘relational-practitioner’ was significant to my research and could be drawn upon to 
enrich my role as ‘scientist-practitioner’.  
 
Marcel (1952) reminds us that the application of scientific knowledge requires 
complex negotiations within the uniqueness of encounters. The current state of 
reliance on empirical outcomes conveys a sense of needing to ‘prove’ or ‘cure’ 
something, which undermines the significance of unique experiences and its 
phenomenological insight. In support of Marcel’s (1952) philosophy, Treanor and 




Evidence versus reflection 
Evidence-based practice emerged in psychology as an attempt to improve clinical 
outcomes by getting clinicians to base their choice of interventions on empirical 
evidence rather than clinical impression, intuition, and convention (Sackett & 
Rosenberg, 1995). However, this positivist approach sacrifices our consideration for 
the uniqueness of being. We see here a ‘technological mindset’ (Marcel, 1952) that 
applies to people, where we consider ourselves and others in terms of the various 
functions we perform: in terms of the evidence we produce. What we risk ignoring is 
the fundamental dignity of each individual person, a kind of mysterious worth at the 
centre of each human being which cannot be easily summed up or defined (Marcel, 
1952), and which we can begin to learn about from our own self-reflections. Recall 
Karly’s demonstration of reflections that she uses to guide her interventions: “I’ll 
think, what’s my motivation? Am I trying to prove that I’m a good therapist? In that 
moment, what’s going on for me? Am I feeling vulnerable? If I’m feeling vulnerable, 
is it my vulnerability? Is it their vulnerability?” (p. 24, line 597).  
 
The relevancy of self-reflection in mental health science has been a long-standing 
debate. Eysenck (1949) proposed that self-reflection is not appropriate to science and 
encouraged a more objective, methodologically sound, impartial and scientifically 
acceptable approach. Marcel (1952) argued that this scientific egoism has the capacity 
to replace ‘the mystery of being’ with a false scenario of human life composed of 
technical ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’. For example, Raul stated: “…working to a, to 
the formula…doesn’t have the same components that, uh, the work that I would seek 
to do, which is to help people understand who they are” (Raul, p. 12, line 241). 
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Participants’ accounts seemed to suggest that the CBT ideal undermines the 
complexity of their clients’ realities, which is precisely where their use of self-
reflection is paramount: to acknowledge and tolerate the distress of their clients that 
extend beyond the expected. Raul described the significance of his personal therapy in 
this regard: “…I was really wiped out by it. Um, I just felt completely…annihilated 
by the process, um, and [personal therapy] was very helpful because I was able to put 
it into place and to think, well, you know, what was actually going on?” (Raul, p. 23, 
line 472). Rather than control the direction of the therapy, participants seemed to 
prefer to facilitate the therapeutic process, to embrace the mysteriousness of the 
therapeutic encounter and allow the unexpected to arise. However, at times, these 
aspects of participants’ clinical practice were overshadowed by their sense of 
expectation to stick to the manual with concern for what their ‘institutional 
supervisor’ might say.  
 
As experienced therapists, most of whom practice privately, participants’ expectations 
and concerns appeared to illuminate an internal dilemma between adhering to 
protocols and allowing for more spontaneous emotional responses. Marcel (1963b) 
suggested that techniques help us maintain a sense of control by keeping us within an 
objective position and protect us from the vulnerability and responsibility that arises 
when we subjectively relate to others. The process of problem-solving can be 
objective, detached, in search of immediate clarity, to elicit a rapid resolve (Lantz, 
2004). On the other hand, the process of mystery, of exploration and meaning-
making, invites participation, facilitation, subjectivity and the ability to be touched by 
another’s distress. The dilemma that participants talked about concerning their model 
seemed to nourish the already difficult feat of human connection and of being deeply 
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affected by the client’s process. However, their experiences of personal therapy 
appeared to elucidate this dilemma and to facilitate participants’ capacities to value 
and navigate the difficulty in getting emotionally involved with clients and feeling 
connected.  
 
Personal Therapy Ties Me to Humanity 
All participants spoke about their feelings and vulnerabilities as a ‘normal’ and 
important part of ‘being human’. In ‘Manifesting empathy’ participants’ accounts 
suggested that their familiarity with their own vulnerabilities and emotional 
sensitivities facilitated a process of empathy by which participants and clients could 
share a common ground. Bringing their own ‘mysteries’ to personal therapy seemed 
to serve to strengthen participants’ sense of self and, consequently, to enhance their 
sense of presence in clinical practice. Recall Karly’s example of ‘Manifesting 
empathy’ when a client’s issues touched on her own: 
“…the client wanted to just end…and I said, no…you’re going to 
come back and we’re going to look at this, and we’re going to 
reflect and understand and be together in this ending… we’re not 
going to do what always happens in both their life and my life” (p. 
10, line 235).  
Through personal therapy, participants appeared to develop a sense of familiarity with 
their own emotional distress that conveyed a level of comfort mirrored in their clinical 
practice, with which they seemed able to tolerate the emotional distress of their 
clients. Marcel’s (1964b) notion of ‘presence’ illustrates this level of clinical 
participation as a shift from being external to becoming internally involved with 
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another—an achievement from the more common tendency to remain a stranger to 
oneself and, consequently, to others as well.  
 
Presence 
Accounts suggested that participants’ experiences in personal therapy, of becoming 
deeply involved with and open to themselves as human, facilitated their capacity to be 
present with their clients. For example, Hank stated, “As a therapist or as being a 
human being, I think if …you understand and own your own stuff you can be more 
open with other people the same way you can be with a client (p. 12, line 247). 
Marcel (1964b) linked openness and intersubjectivity with achieving ‘presence’ by 
which one allows oneself to be moved by the other, a mysterious and enlightening 
experience, a vitalising source of cognition, that gives life and strength to our 
encounters (Marcel, 1964b). Participants’ experiences of clinical presence seemed to 
convey deep and meaningful encounters where they could enter into the presence of 
their clients through their own individual presence (Marcel, 1964b). Recall Sandra’s 
experience: “And I have it out not to engineer and interrupt because I have been 
through that experience and I recognise the importance of their need to cry…and 
that’s okay and my being silent and that’s okay” (p. 12, line 266). 
 
My ‘presence’ as a researcher similarly depended on my capacity to connect with 
participants, to meet them where they are, and be open to the mysteries that arose 
from our encounters. I was afraid that by ‘being’ a part of the discussion, I would risk 
‘doing’ the interview incorrectly. It appeared that some participants similarly feared 
that by taking part in therapy they could risk ‘doing’ CBT incorrectly. Recall that 
Sandra said: “It’s probably hard to tell your supervisor, I just let the person cry…It’s 
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almost like a, well you need to do more …there are a certain set of expectations 
associated with what you achieve” (Sandra, p. 12, line 260). However, by being aware 
of and open to her own experiences of needing to cry, Sandra managed to set aside 
her sense of expectations to stay with her client’s experience.  
 
My initial attempt to adhere to the interview schedule was part of my defence against 
the discomfort of allowing the unknown, with all its mystery and vulnerability, to 
arise. Marcel (1965) suggested that mystery precedes all our encounters, however, at 
first only unconsciously, which allows us to engage more impersonally. It then 
becomes our choice as to whether to embrace the unknowns within ourselves and the 
other, to develop a deep personal connection, or not, and maintain a more internally 
withdrawn position. 
 
By drifting from the interview schedule, I acknowledged my fear of uncertainty, of 
not knowing what I am doing, from which emerged a deeper fear that I might be an 
incompetent researcher. I was tempted to avoid my fear and my associated sense of 
responsibility for participants. I was tempted to dismiss my sense of influence on the 
interviews and to ignore how I, too, was affected by each encounter. Instead, 
however, I chose to embrace my fear and sense of responsibility to engage in and 
develop each encounter; to facilitate an enriching and internally expansive process. 
Although at times painful, I worked hard to acknowledge my own sensitivities and 
vulnerabilities, which, in turn, served my capacity to be receptive to participants’ 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities. A reciprocal process emerged by which each 
encounter seemed to illuminate new aspects of ourselves and our experiences.  
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All participants similarly referred to ‘Recognising the client within’ and demonstrated 
a clinical capacity to recognise something in their clients after having encountered it 
within themselves. They felt that their positions as clients were essential to their 
clinical practice and offered them the insight they otherwise could not attain. For 
example, Dorinda stated: “And why I notice that blind spot, mainly because I’ve been 
there. I had, I’ve got my own blind spots” (p. 14, line 318). The ease in which 
participants spoke about being like their clients seemed to support a notion of 
common humanity. However, ‘being human’ also seemed to include vulnerabilities 
and problems that, as therapists, they felt they should not have.  
 
In ‘Holding both positions as therapist and client’ it appeared that the emotional 
distress participants considered ‘normal’ for humans was, as therapists, an Achilles 
heel and engendered feelings of shame. Recall when Peter said, “It’s just a bit of my 
life that hasn’t been quite normal. I mean it’s normal to be fucked up but, you know, 
it’s not the normal thing you’ve, I think you’d expect counsellors to have had” 
(transcript 2, p. 6, line 137). Participants raised the issue of a double standard between 
what was appropriate for them to feel as clients (or humans) and as therapists, 
respectively. However, their experiences as both client and therapist seemed to bridge 
this gap and to sponsor a clinical experience in which two humans could share a 
therapeutic space. 
 
The importance of being human  
All participants spoke about the importance of ‘being human’ and the fundamental 
connection it helped forge between them and their clients. Allowing themselves to be 
similar to their clients seemed to translate into a clinical common ground, where two 
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humans could share a therapeutic space. Yet, in moments of ‘being human’, like their 
clients, participants struggled with the conflict of their positions as therapists, as if 
they could not be both. Recall that Charlotte feared to be similar to her client: “…she 
was depressed, and she started talking about her struggle….as she was talking I, I just 
had this moment of panic, like, god she’s describing me!...And then I think I really 
panicked…how can I help her when she’s describing me as her problem” (p. 9, line 
204). As the researcher of this project, I experienced this double standard through the 
notion of ‘navel-gazing’ that, at times, overshadowed my research. I was introduced 
to this term at the suggestion that, rather than focus on the perspectives of therapists, I 
focus my research on the perspectives of clients. The fact that the participants of this 
research project are clients seemed to be dismissed.  
 
‘Navel-gazing’ seems to represent a movement within the psychotherapy professions 
by which therapists have been accused of participating in excessive introspection at 
the expense of their clients. However, the notion of navel-gazing perhaps also serves 
to undermine the very process through which participants felt they learned to ‘be’ 
therapists and ‘be’ human. Recall when Peter said, “My early years were very sort of 
isolated…and full of awkward emotions like shame…and, so CBT comes along and 
provides a very explicit template, which enables one to actually say, well this is how 
emotions happen” (transcript 2, p.1, line 23). Although Peter had not undergone CBT 
himself, his ability to draw from his own experiences seemed to facilitate his 
sensitivity as a therapist to his clients’ emotional difficulties and the great relief 
therapy can offer. 
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Marcel (1956) suggested that it is only through the discussion, exploration, 
understanding, and reflection of the unknown parts of ourselves that we can begin to 
discover our intentions, adaptability, and freedom to respond to life in a variety of 
ways; and to facilitate a similar process of self-discovery in others (Marcel, 1956). 
This is a spiritual process that observes a quality of concern with the human soul and 
a quest for meaning, purpose, and value within ourselves, and to acquire insight into 
our own character (Swinton, 2001). As it relates to and affects the human spirit, the 
most valuable contribution to achieving such deep human connection is the self. 
 
The use of self 
In ‘Maintaining a space within’ participants spoke about their ‘use of self’ in a way 
that appeared to illustrate this process of self-discovery through which they could 
temporarily offer, or ‘dispose’ of, themselves for the use of their clients (Marcel, 
1964a). As Raul stated, “It’s the use of the self. And the more you are aware of how 
you are as a person, I think, the more you are aware of how the other is as a person 
and the more you can see what’s going on for the other” (p. 28, line 583). This ‘use of 
self’ appeared to convey participants’ shared sense of commitment to go outside of 
themselves to respond sensitively, respectfully and generously to the values and needs 
of their clients and expressions of desire for meaning (Pembroke & Pembroke, 2008). 
Buber (1923/1970) added that this spiritual element also serves to reduce isolation by 
facilitating the experience of being part of a larger whole. Marcel (1963a) further 
identified loneliness as human’s ultimate source of suffering, which we overcome by 
allowing ourselves to connect with others from a place deep within ourselves.   
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All participants spoke about a therapeutic space within themselves that they reserved 
for their clients, which appeared to convey a mental space of psychological hospitality 
and of emotional holding, where participants were capable of offering clients support. 
For example, recall Dorinda’s experience: “‘Cause I’m kind of aware of my own 
suffering, but I’m also aware of the person who’s coming suffering. ‘Cause I spoke 
about my own suffering in my own therapy….so I’ll have a lot of space for that” 
(Dorinda, p. 17, line 374). This appears to illustrate a bidirectional process of 
exploration and discovery in which participants involved themselves, and looked 
within themselves, to develop a fuller understanding of their clients. Marcel further 
developed this process within his notion of ‘secondary’ reflections: deep reflections 
that begin at the edge of our self-awareness (Marcel, 1951). 
 
Primary versus Secondary reflections 
The use of the self is what distinguishes Marcel’s (1951, 1952) ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ reflections. ‘Primary’ reflections serve a specific function, to examine 
objects through an analytical breaking down of ‘it’ to a technical solution. Recall how 
Charlotte had initially viewed her clinical practice: “I wanted to do things, fix things, 
you know, working with things and have an issue and solve it” (p. 11, line 256). In 
contrast, ‘secondary’ reflections involve the use of that which is within ‘me’ and 
serves to develop a fuller understanding of the mysterious by considering how we 
might also influence the situation. For example, Karly describes her own clinical 
practice as: “...absolutely pivotal in challenging my own issues, my own relationship 
with…Anxiety, depression, mood, eating, you know, all the different aspects that 
come in through the door” (p. 6, line 138). Participants similarly reflected on their 
clinical experiences by involving themselves as equal contributors, exploring the 
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simultaneous existence of both their clients’ and their own unique experiences. They 
appeared to acknowledge their unknown selves and, therefore, could seek ways to 
participate more fully in the unknowns that would arise in their clinical practice 
(Marcel, 1963a). 
 
Participants spoke about their use of personal therapy as a way to embrace their life’s 
many mysteries and to open themselves up to establish a deep connection with their 
clients. For example, Dorinda reflects on how personal therapy helps her make sense 
of her clinical experiences and states, “…I just kind of make sense of it in 
therapy…it’s not just about me…it’s me wanting to discuss whatever touched me but 
at the same time, uh, having the client in mind (p. 6, line 120). Hank similarly 
describes his experience of positioning himself by his clients to help him participate 
in his clients’ experiences: “…my personal therapy would help me to, to be okay with 
the reality of where my clients are at…it’s sort of normalising life and not making it, 
um, this big scary thing” (p. 17, line 369). This opening up of the self expands on the 
spiritual quality of relationships discussed earlier, based on a profound level of 
empathic emotional exchange. Although participants did not appear to engage in a 
back-and-forth of emotional sharing with their clients, they seemed to offer their 
clients a space within themselves to help manage the intense feelings too difficult to 
bear on one’s own.  
 
In line with Marcel’s philosophy, Bazanno (2016) emphasises the significance of a 
therapeutic space that goes beyond narrative, where interactions can flow between 
therapist and client—the full meaning of which is often mysterious and beyond 
conscious thought. This focus on the therapeutic process helps highlight participants’ 
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experiences of clinical participation, where they could begin to share and sense their 
clients’ understanding of what it is like to be them (Bazzano, 2016).  
 
Although narrative, or content, is useful and provides therapists with important 
information regarding the functional reference points they need to follow to know 
what the client is experiencing, ‘process’ uncovers how the client is experiencing: 
revealing affect and other aspects of the self that are not readily accessible through 
discourse but, rather, through the exploration of a less conscious awareness (Bazanno, 
2016). Participants referred to moments in their clinical practice when they 
experienced enhanced insight into their clients’ emotional experiences by sharing the 
client’s feelings or taking on the client’s feelings themselves, which served to 
facilitate a deeper understanding of the clinical process beyond a relational 
dimension. Recall when Hank describes his experience of working through his 
client’s anxiety: “…I took on [my client’s] anxiety, and I brought that to therapy to 
sort of look at that…that’s where therapy will help you or help me sort of move 
forward, um, where I can just go, okay let’s just pull the bones out of something” (p. 
20, line 424). Participants’ capacities to offer their clients the most within dimensions 
of themselves appeared to enhance their sense of emotional attunement, as well as 
their capacity not to get entangled in the relational, to maintain a simultaneous 
connection and separation with their clients (Bazzano, 2016). Marcel’s (1951) notion 
of ‘disponibilité’ further elaborates on this ‘use of self’. 
 
Disponibilité versus Indisponibilité 
The notion of ‘disponibilité’ describes someone who is prepared to put themselves at 
the disposal of another; to loan oneself to another based on one’s inner available 
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resources (Marcel, 1951, 1964a). The concept of ‘disposing’ oneself to another 
involves the capacity to temporarily remove one’s thoughts and feelings from an 
encounter to offer the whole of oneself as an empty space for another to temporarily 
inhabit. This appears to inversely resonate with the significance of participants’ 
personal therapy by which the extensive process of self-discovery served to enhance 
their self-awareness in clinical practice and to make use of themselves in ways 
adaptable to the individual needs of their clients. For example, Karly describes 
‘bracketing off’ her own ‘frame of reference’ to “stay with the client…in terms of 
how do they understand it, how they make meaning, what is the significance in their 
life?” (p. 6, line 136). Participants appeared to convey a shared sense of clinical 
generosity by which they tolerated their own availability and disposability; exposing 
themselves to the influences their clients could potentially have on them; and 
remaining permeable to those influences, to provide space for their clients within 
themselves (Marcel, 1963a).  
 
Marcel (1950) used the term ‘chez toi’, directly translated as ‘your house’, to portray 
the human capacity to offer internal hospitality: to be receptive and ready to open 
oneself to another; to make one’s soul available to another; and to provide an empty 
space within oneself to be temporarily filled by another’s uniqueness, needs and 
desires. Participants appeared to illustrate a similar sense of availability within 
themselves to encourage clients to discover themselves freely, facilitating within 
themselves their client’s own self-discovery. In contrast, ‘indisponibilité’ refers to 
someone who relates to others on functional and technical terms, kept at arm’s length 
and reduced to ‘examples’, ‘cases’ or ‘he/she/it’ (Marcel, 1964a). An indisponibilité 
encounter involves the collection of ‘data’, gathering information on the aspects of a 
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person that serves to complete a ‘form’, or formality. Similar to the notion of 
‘problems’ described earlier, the unique identity of the person under question is 
dismissed and, therefore, the identity of the questioner is also dismissed. Its 
impersonal nature makes both parties replaceable (Marcel, 1964a).  
 
Marcel (1964a) utilised the term ‘avec’, of which the literal meaning is ‘with’, to 
emphasise the human necessity of participation within a relationship, to be affected by 
one another, due to our inherent desire to share ourselves with another. Like Hank 
stated, “You are building a relationship with a client because they’re sitting there with 
you and are about to, um, sort of pour their hearts out and tell you their life story” (p. 
11, line 227). The way we affect one another is not always pleasant. Participants’ 
accounts included painful experiences of distress that arose within their clinical 
practice. Recall Raul’s experience of “annihilation”, Charlotte’s experience of 
“panic”, and Hank’s experience of anxiety, following their sessions with clients. Yet 
their openness to bear the difficulties that arose in their therapeutic relationships 
seemed to demonstrate their sense of fidelity towards their clients and the therapeutic 
process.  
 
My disponibilité as a listener to participants’ stories similarly required that I 
acknowledge and set aside my own experience to focus on and explore how 
participants understood their experiences, how they made meaning of them, and what 
significance it had in their lives. Yet it was only through the use of my own 
experience that I could explore and understand their experiences. I had to draw from 
my own similar experiences to differentiate myself from participants. Encountering 
participants in this way meant that I had to tolerate my discomfort with the unknown 
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and fears of ‘doing’ it wrong, and perhaps it was in the safety of my own vulnerability 
that I implicitly gave permission to participants to talk about their discomfort, 
vulnerabilities, and fears. Furthermore, perhaps it was their open expression that has 
given me permission to more fully express myself here. Tolerating our uncertainty 
together meant embracing the uncertainty of where our exploration could go, which 
facilitated our capacity to allow ourselves to go somewhere new.  
 
Marcel (1951, 1956, 1963b) similarly referred to the notion of fidelity to describe 
one’s availability to another that can withstand the difficulty and unpleasant feelings 
that might arise and to illustrate our creative capacities, described earlier. Fidelity 
requires an active willing of ourselves to be open and permeable towards another and 
to the influx of the other’s presence (Treanor & Sweetman, 2016). Participants’ 
accounts of managing the uncertainty and confusion that arose in their clinical 
practice appeared in their perception of clients, not as a set of characteristics or 
symptoms but, rather, as people with whom they identified and participated in the 
therapeutic journey. 
 
Accounts suggested that by drawing on their own vulnerabilities, participants could 
better understand and tolerate those of their clients and, furthermore, could value their 
own problems and vulnerabilities as avenues through which they forged fundamental 
connections with their clients. Yet, when speaking about their experiences of ‘being 
human’ with their clients, issues were raised about how these experiences could be 
integrated with the ‘doing’-focused framework of their CBT clinical practice.  
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Personal Therapy: Being and Doing 
Results suggested that, for most participants, there appeared to be a fundamental 
divergence of attitude between the space for ‘being’ offered in their personal therapy 
and the emphasis on doing in their clinical practice. However, as therapists, 
participants seemed to rely on their capacities to integrate a space for ‘being’ within 
their goal-orientated CBT model to offer their clients a more flexible and 
individualised therapeutic experience.  
 
Participants’ accounts seemed to convey their experiences of CBT as too greatly 
focused on task-centred techniques at the expense of deeper self-exploration (Marcel, 
1948, 1963b, 1964a). Recall that, in contrast, Peter explained: “If they don’t want to 
go a particular way, I’m very easy going about that. That doesn’t worry me. You don’t 
have to do this procedure, let’s just talk” (transcript 1, p. 7, line 134). Giving space 
for exploration and emotional expression is conveyed by Marcel (1951, 1956) as 
giving ‘testimony’, which is believed to facilitate genuine communication and human 
exchange; a clinical process valued by participants. The distinctions between 
‘problem’ and ‘mystery’, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ reflections, ‘disponibilité’ and 
‘indisponibilité’, each of which expand onto the next, further develop into the 
disparity between ‘observation’ and ‘testimony’ (Marcel, 1973).   
 
Observation and Testimony 
To participate in ‘observation’ is to engage in a functional approach to facilitate the 
clarity of knowledge in which one objectively reports on another’s patterns of 
cognitive and behavioural sequences (Marcel, 1964a, 1973). Although it is considered 
important to identify and assess human patterns of behaviour that inhibit growth and 
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development, Marcel (1948, 1963b, 1964a) argued that treatments centred on 
maintaining objectivity run the risk of facilitating an emotional distance through the 
use of techniques meant to instil a task-centred approach to treatment. Similarly, in 
‘Making room for emotional experiencing’ participants spoke about going ‘off track’ 
from their clinical protocol to prioritise their clients’ emotional needs. For many 
participants this appeared to present them with a predicament in which they had to 
choose between following the CBT model or their clinical intuition; between 
‘observation’ and ‘testimony’. Participants spoke about CBT as a model of conscious 
reasoning and explained that, when they allowed themselves to drift away from 
conscious reasoning, their clinical intuition served to facilitate their capacity to be 
more present in their clinical practice. For example, Charlotte found that the CBT 
model’s priorities to take action and challenge thoughts, at times, worked against her 
capacity to provide “…the space for a person to just be and, um, to just accept, you 
know, rather than trying to distract themselves or run away from it or correct their 
thoughts or their pattern of behaviour.” (p. 12, line 283). Accounts further suggested 
that participants shared a sense of willingness to encounter, empathise, and engage in 
order to ameliorate a distance and avoidance of connection (Marcel, 1949, 1950); an 
element of ‘being’ that they seemed to adopt from their personal therapy.  
 
Participants spoke about their experiences of ‘Being present’ as intricate moments of 
deep thoughtfulness, in which they tuned into their own experience while 
simultaneously ‘attending’ and ‘attuning’ to their clients’ experiences. Recall that, 
when speaking about his clinical practice, Hank referred to tuning into his own 
experience as a client to stay with and participate in his client’s experience:  
“…I have one client in particular…he comes in here 
and…he’s already, he’s had his session…So I have to bring 
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him back to right now to where we are right now…And so 
for that to happen I also need to be present and focused. So 
that’s when my personal therapy comes in. It helps me to be 
there and do that” (p. 43, line 512). 
 
Testimony represents a subjective approach to knowledge that utilises internal 
availability and fidelity to observe the impact of the other on the self and the self on 
the other. Charlotte described a moment in her clinical practice when: “I sort of put all 
the paper and everything away and I just sat. And I um, and she cried, very much so, 
and she talked, um, and I felt that that’s exactly what she needed there and then” (p. 
15, line 354). This generous and genuine intersubjective encounter is meant to 
sponsor engagement, based on the process of enrichment rather than clarity, and 
describes a process of knowledge gained over time through reflections within an 
authentic relationship (Marcel, 1948, 1951). 
 
Accounts suggested that participants integrated the notion of ‘testimony’ into their 
‘observation’-based practice by embracing opportunities to be present and available; 
to sponsor a fundamental connection with their clients based on their shared 
experience of being human (Marcel, 1951, 1964a). Giving testimony further appeared 
in participants’ capacities to notice and honour the discovery of the unknown within 
themselves and their clients, facilitating a parallel movement from unconscious to 
conscious levels of awareness. For example, Karly considered the significance of 
“…when I work with clients around issues around food there is a lot that comes 
up…while I’m sitting as a therapist. I have to go, that no—that’s for another time” (p. 
14, line 341). Karly’s enhanced self-awareness, and ability to set her concerns aside, 
appears to demonstrate her clinical capacity to be more available to her clients and to 
be involved in her clients’ unique experiences.   
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Participants’ involvement in their clinical practice implied more than a protocol-
driven notion of therapy; drawing from their own experiences as a means of 
‘Participating in the therapeutic process’. Charlotte recounted a similar experience of 
being receptively present: “…I start noticing that my hand starts sweating and…my 
heartbeat was sort of faster and…I was really anxious… and these were very much 
the very symptoms that the client was presenting to me in the sessions” (p. 6, line 
142). Marcel’s (1963b) notion of ‘presence’ discussed earlier, along with Buber 
(1965), help further illuminate how being open to their own self-discovery served to 
facilitate participants’ capacities to allow themselves to be touched by their clients 
and to explore the ways in which they were affected by them. As Dorinda described 
it, when “a client that their issues, whatever they are, really, really touch me in…an 
emotional way…I would, uh, yeah, would find it really difficult” (p. 5, line 112). 
 
Testimony can only occur through the committed presence of one to another, and 
through maintaining the relationship in spite of the difficulties, suffering and pain that 
can arise from revealing the true nature of oneself through human connection (Marcel, 
1963b, 1964a). All participants spoke about their sense of involvement in their 
clinical practice, conveying their openness and willingness to be affected by their 
clients. It seemed that by drawing from their own problems and vulnerabilities they 
could allow themselves to personally and emotionally connect with, and relate to, 
their clients in order to attain a more profound understanding of their clients’ 
experiences. Their openness and willingness to meet their clients in this way, to ‘be 
human’ with their clients, appeared to serve as the foundation upon which participants 
practiced CBT.   
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Marcel’s philosophical insights all come back to the notion of ‘problem vs mystery’, 
the issue of protecting one's subjectivity from annihilation within a technology-driven 
society (Marcel 1952); and perhaps it is important here to question how alien the 
notion of ‘problem vs mystery’ appears to be within the dominant, rationalist 
framework within which much of psychology resides, and upon which CBT is based. 
Recall how Charlotte described her initial experience of working with the CBT 
model, “I just wanted to do things, fix things, you know, working with things and 
have an issue and solve it” (p. 11, line 253). In speaking about their clinical practice, 
participants raised concerns with their evidence-based framework due to its focus on 
‘problem’-solving and dismissal of their more subjective participation in uncovering 
‘mystery’. It appears that the significance of human connection is being replaced by 
science and its preference for ready-made solutions. This was further articulated by 
Sandra’s struggle to ‘make room for emotional experiencing’ in her clinical practice: 
“It’s probably hard to tell your supervisor, I just let the person cry for the entire fifty 
minutes. It’s almost like a, well you need to do more…to move towards the goal of 
using their scores…there are a certain set of expectations associated with what you 
achieve” (p. 12, line 260). This raises contentious issues concerning CBT theory, 
training and practice. 
 
Implications for CBT Theory, Training and Practice 
Marcel’s philosophy helps illuminate how participants made sense of their 
experiences of using personal therapy in their CBT clinical practice. It emphasises the 
importance of being human, of acknowledging what makes us human and of 
tolerating our humanness. All participants spoke about using their personal therapy as 
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a way to relate to, and connect with, their clients. However, the value of their 
experiences appeared to be overshadowed by the CBT model they followed and its 
promise of a standardised, ready-made solution. Paradoxes emerged: the aspects of 
personal therapy participants found useful in their clinical practice clashed with their 
identity as CBT therapists; and the value of their position as clients revealed 
emotional difficulties that, as therapists, they feared they should not have. These 
contradictions have potential implications for CBT theory, training and practice, 
which are discussed in the sections below. 
 
CBT theory 
There appears to be a split between the human and mechanistic theoretical 
foundations of CBT. Roth and Pilling’s (2008) competence framework for CBT 
acknowledges a comparable gap between CBT as an art and as a science and uses the 
term ‘metacompetences’ to refer to the capacities required to apply the science-based 
therapy artfully: in a flexible and individually tailored way. ‘Metacompetent 
adherence’ is meant to bridge science and artistry together to deliver more effective 
therapy by using evidence-based adaptations of CBT techniques to respond to human 
experience with humility, compassion, and openness to learning whilst delivering the 
best evidence-based intervention that one can (Roth & Pilling, 2008). As I reviewed 
the literature, I could not help but wonder, what is evidence-based humility?  
 
CBT seems to be trying to empirically validate the therapeutic relationship and is 
struggling to do so because it is hard to measure. Its metacompetence consists of 
numerous procedural rules for applying CBT in different specific circumstances 
(Whittington & Grey, 2014). These metacompetences presumably lay the foundation 
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for attending to the therapeutic relationship, “to create the right interpersonal context 
to carry out the tasks of CBT” (Kennerley, 2014, p. 31).  
 
This presents a purist paradigm where the therapeutic relationship is considered a 
competence that is based on what one sees: visible and measurable phenomena. This 
seems to create conflict: a split from the fundamental mystery and unknown of human 
experience. In speaking about their clinical practice, participants raised the issue of 
feeling conflicted between the importance of human connection and the evidence-
based priorities of their clinical practice.   
 
The therapeutic relationship 
Initially grounded within a psychodynamic perspective, Beck promoted the CBT 
model with consideration for the therapeutic relationship (Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979) and employed the term ‘working alliance’ or ‘therapeutic collaboration’ 
to describe “the general characteristics of the therapist that facilitate the application of 
cognitive therapy,” which include “warmth, accurate empathy and genuineness” 
(Beck et al., 1979, p. 45). In comparison to Roger’s (1957) necessary and sufficient 
core conditions of empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard, the 
‘working alliance’ in CBT is considered necessary but insufficient for optimum 
therapeutic effect (Beck et al., 1979). Therefore, relationality seems to be 
conceptualised and understood within the CBT model as a necessary condition in 
which protocols must be followed.   
 
The quality of the therapeutic relationship has become increasingly formalised 
through quantitative evidence that supports its use as an important element of 
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successful treatment, to predict therapeutic compliance and outcome (Martin, Gorske 
and Davis, 2000; Orlinsky, Grawe & Parks, 1994; Orlinsky, Rønnestad and Willutzki, 
2004), even with internet-based treatment (Knaevelsrud & Maercker, 2007). Indeed, 
Knaevelsrud and Maercker (2007) found that high client-ratings of the therapeutic 
alliance and low drop-out rates indicate that a positive and stable therapeutic 
relationship can be established online. In light of the empirical evidence, there has 
been increased interest in the nature of the therapeutic relationship in CBT (Bennett-
Levy and Thwaites, 2007; Gilbert, 1992; Gilbert and Leahy, 2007; Greenberg, 2002; 
Leahy, 2001, 2005; Safran, 1998; Safran & Muran, 2000). Today, the British 
Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies (BABCP) recognises its 
relevance as a criterion of accreditation: requiring practitioners to demonstrate 
knowledge and understanding of the therapeutic relationship, and competence in the 




There have been empirical attempts to identify the ‘micro skills’ underlying better 
therapeutic relationships, such as ‘active listening’, ‘regulating’, and ‘differentiating 
and attending’ (Gillespie, Smith, Meaden, Jones and Wane, 2004; Ivey and Ivey, 
2003; Rollnick, Mason and Butler, 1999; van der Molen, Hommes, Smit and Lang, 
1995). However, these skills may often be overlooked in CBT training due to the 
model’s emphasis on techniques, which are thought to be sufficient for change 
(Leahy, 2008). Prized as an empirically supported treatment, the CBT model risks 




There is a current trend in which technical expertise is prioritised over relationality, 
where ‘doing to’ overrides the relationship in which ‘being with’ a person is 
paramount (Strawbridge, 2003). Marcel (1964a) suggested that deep human 
connection is embedded within our openness to explore that which is mysterious and 
difficult to understand within ourselves. The more we participate in our own self-
discovery, the more we can connect to others, and the more we connect to others the 
more in touch we are with the richness that develops from our participation (Marcel, 
1964a). This cyclical process helps illuminate how participants used personal therapy 
in clinical practice: to maintain a balance between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ in their clinical 
practice. 
 
Bennett-Levy, Thwaites et al. (2009) recommend the use of self-practice and self-
reflection (SP/SR) over personal therapy, as an integrative training strategy to ‘fine-
tune’ the delivery of CBT protocols (Thwaites, Bennett-Levy, Davis & Chaddock, 
2014). SP/SR is aimed at therapists who have achieved competence in CBT and wish 
to move towards developing therapeutic artistry from the ‘inside’ (Bennett-Levy, 
Travers, Pohlman & Hamernik, 2003). SP/SR is meant to enhance therapists’ 
capacities to apply evidence-based protocols with greater sensitivity, flexibility and 
finesse (Thwaites et al., 2014). However, in comparison to participants’ accounts of 
embracing the many mysteries of self and other through the therapeutic relationship, 
SP/SR is promoted as a way to overcome working with “clients that are so depressed 
that we find ourselves getting sucked into their sadness and hopelessness,” because, 
“Unfortunately, being a competent CBT therapist does not automatically lead to the 
instant transfer of evidence-based approaches to ourselves!” (Thwaites et al., 2014, p. 
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241). All participants spoke about investing in their own self-discovery to enhance 
their sense of connection with their clients, open to the unknown ways in which one 
influences the other, to explore the mysterious aspects of the therapeutic relationship. 
In comparison, and in line with the evidence-based priorities of the CBT model, 
SP/SR appears to create an instrumental view of relationality that, ultimately, serves 
to problematize intersubjectivity.  
 
Alternatively, participants appeared to share a sense of intersubjectivity that 
illustrated a spiritual element, beyond the physicality of manuals and protocols, by 
which they could relate to clients on a profoundly emotional level and could tolerate 
their encounters with clients in a way that allowed them to be, in turn, affected. It 
seemed as if participants were following their own code of clinical behaviour, guided 
by the ethical foundations revealed, explored and developed within themselves. This 
internal code of conduct appeared to serve the foundation upon which participants 
practiced CBT. Yet, the aspects of intersubjectivity they found useful to their clinical 
practice were the same aspects that clashed with their identity as CBT therapists.  
 
CBT practice 
The priority of evidence-based CBT practice has been a logical extension of the 
tradition of the clinician-scientist who seeks to ground clinical practice in research 
(Norcross, Beutler & Levant, 2006). However, there has become a growing need to 
balance the longstanding position of scientific practitioners with an understanding and 
use of a more reflective practice (Galloway, Webster, Howey & Robertson, 2003). 
This split is comparable to the dilemma of ‘problem vs mystery’ that emerged from 
participants’ experiences: of having to choose between practicing CBT as scientific 
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‘observers’, objectively reporting patterns and behaviours, or as a reflective 
‘presence’, subjectively seeking mutual humanity (Buber, 1965).  
 
Bennett-Levy and Thwaites (2007) recommend the use of the SP/SR training tool to 
integrate the CBT model’s technical and relational components: to bring the ‘person 
of the therapist’ into the ‘self-as-therapist’. However, this suggests that the starting 
point is mechanisation: a level of competency that then seems to try to integrate the 
human into the mechanical procedure of applying protocols and techniques. It seems 
as if CBT therapists are not meant to start as humans or therapists, but as mechanised 
performers who then have to become more personal. This mechanised version of 
humanity gives credibility to Marcel’s (1949, 1951, 1963a, 1964a) warning of the rise 
in technology and techniques and its overall dehumanizing effects. 
 
It appears that the human subject struggles to exist in this mechanised world and, 
instead, becomes replaced as a human object with particular functions (Marcel, 1949, 
1952, 1963a). There is an element of safety in becoming objects for each other, where 
evidence-based practice can manage and guide an, otherwise, complicated decision-
making process. Rationalising the complexity and uncertainty of each unique 
therapeutic encounter can be appealing (Kirmayer, 2012). Moreover, our reliance on 
techniques can serve to maintain our sense of control and to protect us from the 
vulnerability and responsibility that arises when we subjectively relate to others 
(Marcel, 1963b). Similarly, one might follow idealised forms of therapy to protect 
oneself from one’s own ‘humanness’ (Fotaki, 2006).  
 
 133 
Accounts suggested that participants used personal therapy to expose their 
humanness, no longer making it ‘this big scary thing’, which they could then translate 
into their clinical practice. In this way, personal therapy seemed to help participants 
‘be’ human and ‘be’ therapists and served as a foundation upon which they practiced 
CBT: sponsoring fundamental connections with their clients based on the shared 
experience of being human.  
 
Being human 
A fundamental aspect of participants’ experiences of clinical practice seemed to be 
the nurturance and acceptance of their humanness and, consequently, of their clients’ 
humanness. It appeared that through their own therapy participants discovered less of 
a need to hide. In fact, accounts suggested that participants’ need to hide was due to 
their shared sense that, as therapists, they should not ‘be human’. Wilson, 
Weatherhead and Davies (2015) explored the personal therapy experiences of trainee 
clinical psychologists, who are predominantly trained in CBT, and similarly revealed 
the presence of stigma by which participants sensed shame in their roles as clients; 
and considered their personal therapy to be, in part, a weakness; as if, as therapists, 
they were expected to be ‘more sorted’ (p.11).  
 
In moments of being human participants struggled with their position as therapists, as 
if they could not be both. It seemed that the uncertainty and vulnerability that 
emerged from their accounts of clinical practice were easily dismissed by the 
evidence-based priorities of their CBT practice. Marcel’s philosophical insights urge 
us to embrace the mysteries of human connection: to stop being objects to one another 
and, instead, become subjects with each other (Marcel, 1952). Participants similarly 
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described participating in their clinical practice through their subjective offering of 
the self in order to share the emotional life of their clients. Their clinical participation 
seemed to increase their knowledge and awareness of both their clients and 
themselves, each reflected in the humanness of the other.  
 
Participants described the significance of their personal therapy in their CBT clinical 
practice as an enriching and internally expansive process. Their capacity to be aware 
of their own presence and the presence of their clients, and to engage with both their 
clients’ and their own participation in the therapeutic process, seemed to establish the 
context in which change could emerge. It has been suggested that CBT therapists 
believe that their interpersonal behaviour with clients can have a significant impact on 
the course and outcome of treatment, and have begun to accept personal therapy as a 
helpful way to improve clinical practice (Geller, Norcross & Orlinsky, 2005). 
Bennett-Levy, Thwaites et al. (2009) argue that, in comparison to SP/SR, personal 
therapy is typically a longer and deeper process from which personal tensions can 
emerge without necessarily having clinical implications. Indeed, Marcel’s philosophy 
of human connection is described as a collection of personal tensions. Participants’ 
accounts suggest that, despite and in light of these tensions, personal therapy is a 
worthwhile process.  
 
Implications for Counselling Psychology 
Participants highlight a split in the psychotherapy professions between medical and 
humanistic approaches to therapy; between evidence-based priorities and expectations 
of reflective practice. Accounts suggest that seeking a balance between these 
approaches can lead to tensions and contradictions that seem to make them 
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incompatible. Counselling psychology resonates with this dilemma, which draws 
upon and seeks to develop phenomenological models of practice and enquiry in 
addition to that of traditional scientific psychology (British Psychological Society, 
2015). However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to integrate deep personal 
connection, to allow for our own humanness, within the medicalised and manualised 
priorities of NHS mental health care and its scientific approach to the therapeutic 
relationship.  
 
The value placed on human connection during the therapeutic encounter is one of the 
fundamental tenets of counselling psychology (Woolfe, 1990) and yet there are 
ongoing debates about whether counselling psychologists can maintain their 
philosophical values within the growing medicalised culture (Larsson, Brooks and 
Loewenthal, 2012). There currently remains strong conviction that its humanistic 
underpinnings are what connects counselling psychology to a human science, which 
will continue to serve to challenge the prevailing medical model of mental health, the 
sentiments of reductive models of psychological healthcare, and the research-directed 
manualisation of psychological therapies (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). Participants 
highlight the use of personal therapy to integrate the significance of becoming human 
into the medicalised approach to mental health treatment; to inspire a humanistic 
foundation upon which evidence-based therapy can be practiced.  
 
Counselling psychology supports the use of personal therapy as a fundamental 
element of becoming a therapist, yet the prevailing push for evidence-based practice 
within the NHS seems to make personal therapy less relevant. However, if CBT, the 
‘gold standard’ for the evidence-based movement in psychotherapy, claims to be a 
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relational approach to therapy, then a self-reflective process is important and requires 
the therapist to engage personally in the client’s experience. Participants highlight the 
significance of their personal therapy in becoming human: in exposing their 
‘humanness’ and in sponsoring the human connection upon which their clinical 
practice is based. Their accounts remind us of the importance of self-exploration and 
meaning-making to encourage participation, facilitation, and subjectivity within 
clinical practice and, perhaps more importantly, to allow ourselves to connect with 
and be touched by our clients’ experiences. Gabriel Marcel’s theoretical insights can 
be useful in understanding the significance of being human and of human connection 
in clinical practice, which can further be drawn upon in support of the philosophical 
foundations upon which counselling psychology is based.  
 
Delimitations 
This section discusses the potential delimitations of this research study, mainly 
drawing upon Smith, Flowers and Larkin’s (2009) methodological guidelines. IPA 
was chosen for this research study due to its appropriateness to the research aim. It 
allows for the provision of a rich and complex insight into the subjective experience 
of the significance of personal therapy in CBT clinical practice. This study does not 
aim to determine a definitive or causal relationship between personal therapy and 
clinical practice, nor to provide generalizable results. Instead, this study aims to 
provide a detailed account of the experiences of a specific group of psychotherapists 
who practice CBT and have undergone personal therapy.  
 
It can be argued that a small sample was a limitation. However, such a sample size is 
considered appropriate to the idiographic nature of IPA and the suitability of this 
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method for the investigation of the research question. Participants of this study are 
not, and were not intended to be, a statistically representative sample of CBT 
therapists. However, participants were selected to increase the homogeneity of the 
sample. From participants’ accounts emerged a potential relevancy between personal 
therapy and CBT clinical practice, which contributes to an ongoing discussion 
amongst psychotherapy practitioners of the significance of personal therapy in clinical 
practice. 
 
To increase the homogeneity of the sample I was careful to ensure that all participants 
shared a specific lived experience by including qualified practitioners who had over 
five years of post-qualification clinical experience and voluntary experience of a 
minimum of two years of weekly personal therapy. Despite this, the experiences of 
participants varied. A notable difference amongst participants pertained to the various 
models of their personal therapy.  
 
All participants had undergone personal therapy of a different model to CBT (i.e. 
psychodynamic, Jungian, Humanistic, etc.), except for one participant who 
experienced brief CBT treatment in addition to a long-term therapy of a different 
model. Therefore, it could be argued that 'personal therapy' and 'theoretical 
orientation' have been conflated in this study and that a purer approach to the research 
question would be to carry out a study where there is consistency in the model of 
therapy the practitioner uses; or perhaps a consistency between the model of therapy 
the practitioner uses in their work and the model used in their personal therapy. 
Suggestions for future research can be to explore the perspectives of CBT therapists 
 138 
who have primarily undergone CBT themselves or to explore the potential effects of 
each particular model of personal therapy on CBT clinical practice.  
 
The use of semi-structured interviews represents another potential limitation: the 
researcher becomes the person in power by holding an agenda which might limit the 
interaction and steer it in a direction the participant might not have chosen otherwise 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005). However, as discussed in the Methodology chapter, the 
reflexive element in which I, as the researcher, was tied to the research question was 
employed to minimise (although not eliminate) such impact. For example, I 
acknowledged an under-current in much of the language I used, which reflected my 
pre-existing beliefs and assumptions about the positive benefits and value of personal 
therapy. I had to monitor this closely and adapt my language to make it more neutral 
and open. Furthermore, this might have influenced the fact that all participants 
happened to report positive experiences of personal therapy. It would be interesting 
for future research to explore the experiences of CBT therapists who have not found 
personal therapy to be useful or helpful in clinical practice. 
 
Another potential limitation concerns the subjective nature of the data collected and 
the researcher’s interpretation of it. The data gathered reflects participants’ 
experiences, understandings and beliefs, and are not trying to claim ‘historical truth’ 
or to represent an objective reality shared by all CBT therapists who have undergone 
personal therapy. Instead, the purpose of this research was to immerse the reader in 




The notion of ‘problem vs mystery’ is embedded within this research project and 
supports ‘mystery’ as a question in which I, as the researcher, am intimately involved. 
This research project did not seek to solve a ‘problem’: a question meant to be 
answered objectively and in which, consequently, the identity of the questioner 
becomes irrelevant. On the contrary, the significance of this research project lies in 
the exploration of ‘mystery’ by which the questioner is invited to subjectively 
participate, facilitate, and be touched by ‘the other’ experience. Therefore, it seems 
important to draw upon my reflexive position to further explore my role in this study.   
 
Reflexive Considerations 
My personal motivation in developing this research was in my desire to marry the 
relational and positivistic elements of clinical practice. I have acknowledged my bias 
as a relational practitioner and struggle to integrate a standardised approach to clinical 
practice. I have revealed my perspective of the psychotherapy profession as split 
between the relational-practitioners and scientific-practitioners and sense of its 
growing division. My bias within this divide fuelled my underlying agenda to achieve 
a sense of unity, which undoubtedly served in the development of this study.  
 
The recruitment process resulted in a selection of participants who all shared the 
belief that personal therapy is relevant to CBT clinical practice. In retrospect, my 
personal beliefs in the benefits of personal therapy manifested in my request for 
experience of at least two years of weekly personal therapy and served to attract a 
group of like-minded people. A person who had not found personal therapy to be 
beneficial would likely not have had such extensive experience of personal therapy. 
 140 
Similarly, I developed the interview questions with this inclusion criteria in mind and 
focused on experiences of deep self-reflection. 
 
My capacity to be neutral throughout the interview process was challenged by my 
belief in the significance of the therapists’ use of self and influenced the interview 
process. The interviews were co-constructed based on the interaction between 
participants and me (Finlay, 2009), which was guided by and mirrored in our 
differences and similarities. My role as a trainee wanting to come across as a 
competent researcher appeared in participants wanting to come across as confident 
clinical practitioners and the more I acknowledged my own fears of being an 
incompetent researcher, the more a similar fear amongst participants seemed to 
emerge. Although I refrained from self-disclosure, my own subjectivity and interests 
had an inevitable impact on the interview process. My intersubjective approach to 
collecting data mirrored the intersubjectivity demonstrated by participants. How I 
listened to and interpreted participants’ accounts were inevitably shaped by my own 
interests and subjectivity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Although I tried to acknowledge 
and bracket my assumptions and expectations, the full extent to which I influenced 
participants accounts and my interpretation of their accounts remains unknown.  
 
The influence of my personal motivation, bias, and agenda was made more apparent 
in my analysis presentation of the findings. The conflicts found in the data relate to 
my own experiences of conflict. The significance of ‘being human’ applies to a 
relational approach with which I take side. And the ‘marriage’ of being and doing 
resonates with my agenda to balance the relational and positivistic approaches to 
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clinical practice. However, despite my agenda, by the end of this research project, I 
found myself more biased than I had been at the start.  
 
As demonstrated in my findings, my initial motivation to overcome my bias and 
achieve neutrality as a counselling psychologist has, instead, resulted in a sense of 
urgency to take sides and advocate for the significance of the therapists’ participation 
and humanness in clinical practice. In line with my support for one’s ‘use of self’, I 
find that my participation in this study has offered an invaluable perspective. Despite 
my desire to marry the relational and the positivistic elements of clinical practice, I 
found that it is difficult not to take sides in this deepening division in the profession. 
Indeed, the impossibility of remaining neutral is a significant finding of this research. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has illuminated a split in the psychotherapy profession and the tensions 
that arise from attempting to balance its deepening contradictions. The prevailing 
political culture has become strongly influenced by the seductiveness of ready-made 
solutions, which seem to compromise the significance of being human and of human 
connection in mental health care and treatment. In the current NHS climate, the 
therapists’ use of self is being dismissed in place of manuals, tools and techniques, 
behind which the humanness of the therapist can easily disappear. The evidence-
based priorities of the CBT model seem to mechanise humanity, undermining the 
enriching qualities of relationality and intersubjectivity within mental health research 
and practice. Through a relational and intersubjective approach, this study provides 
empirical evidence that supports the value of personal therapy in becoming human, in 
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APPENDIX I – ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
The research for this project was submitted for ethics consideration under the 
reference PSYC 15/ 161 in the Department of Psychology and was approved under 








Are you a CBT therapist?  
Have you had your own psychotherapy? 
I am looking for accredited psychotherapists who have 
undertaken voluntary personal therapy on a weekly basis  
for a minimum of two years. 
Can you spare an hour to talk about the relevance of your 
personal therapy to your CBT clinical practice? 
Please see attached Participant Information Sheet. If you are 












Working title of Research Project: Is personal therapy relevant to CBT clinical 
practice? An interpretative phenomenological analysis.  
What is the purpose of the study?  
This Counselling Psychology doctoral thesis aims to explore whether, how and to 
what extent personal therapy might or might not be relevant to CBT clinical practice.  
Why have I been invited?  
You are invited to participate in this study because you have had both an accredited 
psychology/psychotherapy training and accredited CBT training, with at least five 
years of post-accreditation clinical experience, and voluntary experience of at least 
weekly personal therapy for a minimum of two years.  
Do I have to take part?  
Participation is completely voluntary with the option to withdraw at any time without 
giving reason.  
What will happen if I take part?  
You will be one of eight participants. Participation involves attending a one-hour 
audio- recorded, semi-structured interview, where you will be asked to discuss your 
experiences of how personal therapy has or has not been relevant to your CBT clinical 
practice. You can choose where you would like the interview to take place (either at 
the University of Roehampton, your private office or your home). You will have the 
option to review your individual transcript for accuracy and anonymity before it is 
written up in collated form. Results will first be written as a thesis for submission for 
a doctoral qualification (PsychD). It is further intended that this research will be 
published as a journal article.  
Will my data be kept confidential?  
Given the personal nature of the interviews, the information that you provide will be 
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anonymised to preserve confidentiality. There will be no identifiable information  
included in transcripts and you will not be identifiable in publication.  
What are the benefits of taking part?  
Participation can be beneficial as an opportunity to explore and reflect upon your own 
clinical practice.  
Are there any potential disadvantages?  
Following the interview you will have an opportunity to discuss anything you found 
difficult and you will also be invited to contact the Researcher for a follow up 
discussion should you wish to discuss things further.  
What will I do if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries 
please raise this with the Researcher or Director of Studies.  
Researcher Contact Details:  
Ariele Noble University of Roehampton Whitelands College Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD NobleA@roehampton.ac.uk 0755 488 2012  
Director of Studies Contact Details:  
Dr Rosemary Rizq University of Roehampton Whitelands College Holybourne 






APPENDIX IV: CONSENT FORM 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
Working title of Research Project: Is personal therapy relevant to CBT clinical 
practice? An interpretative phenomenological analysis.  
 
This research study aims to explore whether and to what extent personal 
therapy is relevant to CBT clinical practice. This study is recruiting a total of eight 
participants who have an accredited psychology/psychotherapy training and 
accredited CBT training, at least five years post-accreditation experience, and 
voluntary experience of at least weekly personal therapy for a minimum of two years. 
Participation is voluntary and involves attending a one-hour audio-recorded, semi-
structured interview where participants’ experiences of how personal therapy has or 
has not been relevant to their CBT clinical practice will be explored. You can choose 
where you would like the interview to take place (either at the University of 
Roehampton, or your office or home). 
Participants can potentially benefit from this study as an opportunity to 
explore and reflect upon their own clinical practice. Results will first be written up in 
a thesis for submission for a doctoral qualification (PsychD). It is further intended that 
this research will be published as a journal article. 
Researcher Contact Details:    Director of Studies Contact Details: 
Ariele Noble      Dr Rosemary Rizq 
University of Roehampton    University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College     Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue     Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD     London, SW15 4JD 
noblea@roehampton.ac.uk     R.Rizq@roehampton.ac.uk  
0755 488 2012       020 8392 3000 ext. 5761 
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Consent Statement: Initial 
I confirm I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
I understand that if I disclose information about potential harm to myself or my clients 




I understand that I am free to decline my participation of the study and I am able to 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason, although if I do so I 
understand that my data might still be used in collated form. 
 
 
I consent to the audio recording of my interview. 
 
 
I understand that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the 
investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication of any findings, 
and that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act 1998 and with the University’s Data Protection Policy. 
 
 
I understand that relevant sections of the data collected by this research will be 
looked at by authorised persons from the University of Roehampton. Anonymised 
sections of the data collected may also be looked at by representatives from 
academic and professional assessment bodies in order to assess the quality of this 








I agree that anonymised quotes from my interview may be used in any publications. 
 
 






Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please 
raise this with the Researcher (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of 
Studies.) However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of 
Department.  
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:  Head of Department Contact Details: 
Dr Rosemary Rizq    Dr Diane Bray 
University of Roehampton   University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College    Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue    Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD    London, SW15 4JD 
R.Rizq@roehampton.ac.uk   d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
020 8392 3000 ext. 5761   020 8392 3627 
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Professional title: _____________________________________________________ 
 




Year of qualifications: _________________________________________________ 
 
Number of years of psychotherapy experience: ____________________________ 
 
Years of voluntary personal therapy: _____________________________________ 
 
  Theoretical orientation: ____________________________________ 
   




APPENDIX VI – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
1. How long have you practiced CBT? Where were you trained? 
2. What lead you to undertake personal therapy? 
3. Do you feel that your personal therapy has influenced your CBT clinical 
practice? How or how not? Can you give examples?  
a. Can you think of a time in clinical practice when you were aware of 
your personal therapy? In what way? Can you give examples? 
4. Do you feel that that your personal therapy has been influential in maintaining 
effective therapeutic relationships? How or how not? Can you give examples? 
a. Can you think of a time when working with client issues that have 
touched on your own? Was personal therapy useful? How or how not? 
Can you give examples? 
5. Is there anything more you would like to talk about? 







APPENDIX VII – DEBRIEF SCHEDULE 
 
 
DEBRIEFING SCHEDULE    Participant ID number: 
 
Title of Research Project: Is personal therapy relevant to CBT clinical practice? An 
interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
 
Debriefing information:  
 
1. Recap on purpose of the study:  
This research study aims to explore whether and to what extent personal therapy is 
relevant to CBT clinical practice. 
 
2. Review of interview: 
Would you have liked anything done differently? 
 
3. Follow up discussion: 
You are invited to contact me for a follow up discussion if you wish to discuss 
things further.  
 
4. Future concerns and contact information: 
If you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries 
please raise this with the Researcher (or if the researcher is a student you can also 
contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like to contact an 
independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
Researcher Contact Details:    Director of Studies Contact Details: 
 
Ariele Noble       Dr Rosemary Rizq 
University of Roehampton    University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College     Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue     Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD     London, SW15 4JD 
noblea@roehampton.ac.uk     R.Rizq@roehampton.ac.uk  
0755 488 2012       020 8392 3000 ext. 5761 
 
 188 
Head of Department Contact Details: 
 
Dr Diane Bray 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD 
d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
020 8392 3627 
 
Contact information for further support: 
British Psychological Society (BPS) - 0116 254 9568, enquiries@bps.org.uk 
British Association for Counselling & Psychotherapy (BACP) - 01455 883300, 
bacp@bacp.co.uk 






































D04 14: Yeah, yeah yeah. It was. I was. And sometimes 
I’m quite attuned to the client’s need for that release. Uh 
and even though I also practice CBT uh here in uh 
private practice rather than in an NHS setting, so I don’t 
have—many of my clients come through the insurance 
route so I do have a limitations in terms of the number of 
sessions but most insurance companies are quite 
generous in that they provide up to 12 sessions uh, which 
is quite a a good number of sessions to achieve uh 
significant uh benefits for the client. Uh whereas now in 
the NHS they work with four or six sessions in the CBT 
model and you know, of course, then if the client is 
distressed and they may want—need the entire session 
just to cry about because they are distressed. You know, 
as a CBT therapist in an NHS setting you would feel 
limited to the extent that you you can’t tell your—it’s 
probably hard to tell your supervisor, I just let the person 
cry for the entire 50 minutes. It’s almost like a, Well you 
need to do more, [laughs] sort of, to move towards the 
goal, of using their scores at the end, and you know 
whatever there are a certain set of expectations 
associated with what you achieve in the first session and 
the second session, etcetera, even if it’s too prescribed. I 
don’t have, of course I have a sort of model of where I 
want to get to with the client but I’m more flexible in 
that I will recognize the need for if the client needs to 
cry fffor 50 minutes. That’s okay. And have it out not to 
engineer and interrupt um because I have been through 
that experience and I recognize the importance of their 
need to cry for for for 50 minutes and that’s okay and 
my being silent and that’s okay. So I’m more 
comfortable, I’ comfortable with that. And I guess I I 
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have more freedom in the private practice since I 
practice here to to engineer therapy in the way that I 
think would be beneficial to the client rather than being 
too worried about what my supervisor um institutional 
supervisor might say to me or tell me I haven’t fulfilled 
certain goals, um for example.   
Interviewer 15: You’ve brought up this very 
individualized processes.  
D04 15: Hm, that’s right. Yes, yes I guess I guess even 
though CBT is a small structured form therapy in 
comparison to person-centred and perhaps 
psychoanalytic um...I think the personal experience that 
personal therapy has—and also the type of therapy of 
CBT that I trained, the particular institution where I 
trained, and the people that trained me um…the 
emphasis was on individualized case formulation 
approach to the work with clients. So—as opposed to the 
manualised, protocol based CBT, so the importance of 
formulating the the cli the eh problems with the clients 
was at the core of understanding how to work with the 
clients. So I feel that um personal therapy um has 
influenced that sort of part especially to do with uh 
building the trust in the relationship with the client so 
that I can understand well their problems and then use 
the psychological theory and mechanisms to then explain 
the maintenance of the problem or um or to propose the 
treatment for their difficulties. So yes I guess um it is a 
quite an individualized way of working with clients. 
[Pause] From a CBT perspective because it is…um 
influenced and I do follow sort of protocols for, I dunno, 
what you do for panic disorder, how you treat someone 
with OCD but um well probably it’s ver always very 
case individualized.   
Disclaimer: I do 




therapy to the 
client, mixed with 




























to build trusting 
relationships; 
influences how 













APPENDIX IX – SAMPLE INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS 
Theme 1: Being human - “You know, you’ve got to be kind of human” (Raul, page 
29, line 591). 
 
In linking personal therapy and clinical practice Raul focuses on the significance of 
being human and his use of personal therapy to enhance his humanity. He states, “I 
don’t quite understand how um why one would deny oneself that important 
contribution to really enhancing your humanity” (Raul, page 28, line 572). Raul’s use 
of the terms human and humanity appear to illustrate a common ground between 
therapist and client, of human nature, in which people make use of others. Raul is 
both client and therapist. His experiences as a client implicitly link to his experiences 
as a therapist and suggest a parallel therapeutic process by which two unlike people 
meet in a similar way. Raul states, “…everyone’s different, everyone’s the same. And 
so there’s the sameness which underpins it” (Raul, page 14, line 293). 
 
Subtheme: Surrendering to difficulty - “…I dealt with it in personal therapy 
because I was really wiped out by it. Um, I just felt completely uh um uh um 
annihilated by the process um and that was very helpful because I was able to put it 
into place and to think, well, you know, what was actually going on? (Raul, page 23, 
line 472). 
 
Subtheme: Learning from misunderstanding - “And I was thinking about it 
afterward and thinking about it with my therapist and I was thinking that the body 
language was total serenity…I couldn’t see that she was uh in huge amounts of stress 
and in working through that um I uh uh have become uh uh very alert to um body 
language and um and I sometimes uh will ask someone who looks serene what they’re 
actually feeling” (Raul, page 23, line 480). 
 
Subtheme: Exposing himself to another - “…people are talking to me all the time. 
And I find it an enormous relief to be able to go somewhere and actually talk about 
myself for an hour. I know that might be my uh um um need for visibility um but it 
doesn’t really matter. Uh um it’s a just strikes me as immensely important uh for a 
well-rounded uh person” (Raul, page 20, line 415). 
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Theme 2: Distinguishing self from other - “…the most important thing is the ability 
to distinguish self from other” (Raul, page 17, line 344). 
 
Raul appears to appreciate the similarity between therapist and client, which further 
serves to highlight his capacity to recognise differences between himself and his 
clients. He commends his personal therapy for enhancing his self-awareness, which, 
in turn, enhances his awareness of others’ differences; to be able to think about and 
experience himself and others as different. This suggests that personal therapy 
facilitates Raul’s capacity to utilise self-awareness and make use of himself to better 
understand his clients’ individualities.  
 
Subtheme: Deliberating between what is going on for him and what is going on 
for his clients - “It is the use of the self. And the more you are aware of how you are 
as a person, I think, the more you are aware of how the other is as a person and the 
more you can see what’s going on for the other” (Raul, page 28, line 583). 
 
Subtheme: Differentiating between his experience as a client and the experience 
of his clients - “I am very validating and I’m aware that my therapist isn’t 
validating…and I’ve been thinking about her absence of explicit validation…and I’ve 
been thinking about what extent my explicit validation um might actually prevent uh 
in my clients uh their self-validation. Or to what extent my specific validation actually 
contributes to their self-validation” (Raul, page 9, line 180). 
 
Subtheme: Making a distinction between his feelings and his clients’ feelings - 
“…I have some clients who are very very silent uh and uh so I will sometimes say to 
them um um uh, This session seems quite silent, what are you feeling? Um because I 




Theme 3: Making a distinction between CBT and his clinical practice - “…I 
suppose it’s the reflective self” (Raul, page 12, line 245). 
 
When describing his therapeutic approach, Raul makes distinctions between 
traditional CBT practice and his more reflective and relational practice. Raul states, 
“…the function of the therapist is…to be able to ask questions and to elucidate 
and…to make statements which increase understanding uh and the relationship itself 
can do that” (Raul, page 13, line 272). When making distinctions between CBT and 
his clinical practice he talks about his “reflective self”, gained from personal therapy, 
which enhances his therapeutic “arsenal”. When discussing his experience as a client 
with different therapists he states, “…they’ve all given me something…by collecting 
insights it gives me uh uh uh wider arsenal uh to be useful to the variety of client that 
one sees. If you only have a hammer everything is a nail” (Raul, page 17, line 337).  
 
Subtheme: Protocols vs. Exploration - “But I don’t really regard CBT as therapy. 
Um I regard CBT as the application of evidence-based protocols to specific problems. 
That isn’t my definition of therapy. I see therapy as a much more of an exploratory 
operation. Much more exploratory on how you work and how you fit together” (Raul, 
page 4, line 72). 
 
Subtheme: Working to a formula vs. Helping people understand who they are - 
“But that’s really working to a to the formula…and if that’s your target and that’s 
your goal, which is absolutely legitimate and nothing nothing wrong with it um uh 
then that’s what you do but uh uh uh it’s not it doesn’t have the same components that 
uh the work that I would seek to do, which is to help people understand who they are” 
(Raul, page 12, line 241). 
 
Subtheme: IAPT vs Psychotherapy - “If you’re an IAPT person…you’re not really 
doing psychotherapy. Uh and so I I’m not sure you would need um um to be in…I’m 
in personal therapy for richness…I’m not working on any particular um um uh uh 
traumatic issue apart from life” (Raul, page 20, line 409). 
 
